Anwar's defining week: Broker of peace and economic reprieve
He has certainly been in top form as he brokered a ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia, orchestrating a diplomatic breakthrough, and then went on to make a call to United States President Donald Trump at 6.50 am.
Anwar received plenty of messages from world leaders congratulating him on the handling of the potentially dangerous conflict between two neighbouring countries.
It was a huge test for him as the Chair of Asean, but he pulled off magnificently as he brought the leaders of Thailand and Cambodia to Kuala Lumpur for a dialogue.
He also made sure that officials from the US and China, the two important players in the region, were present to observe the talks.
It is also evident that Malaysia's neutral posture of not taking sides has shown positive results, as that brought the two countries, locked in conflict, to the negotiating table.
Trump himself reportedly intervened in the ceasefire negotiations by threatening both parties with heavy tariffs, but Malaysia's central role in mediating the agreement gave it diplomatic capital.
At the same time, Malaysia scored a much-needed economic reprieve after the US agreed to scale back steep tariffs that had been threatening Malaysia's export-driven economy.
At one point, Washington had threatened Malaysia with reciprocal tariffs of up to 25 per cent in retaliation for what it claimed were unfair trade practices and currency.
This week, the White House agreed to lower the rate to 19 per cent, offering breathing room to Malaysia's key sectors, especially electronics and palm oil. The sound of relief could be heard across the nation.
Without doubt, Anwar was properly prepared by officials for his telephone conversation with Trump.
But as many world leaders would know, an element of uncertainty can also be expected when dealing with Trump, as some US allies have ended up with high tariffs.
Both cases, which Anwar handled well, demonstrated strategic diplomacy which was carried out with precision and the personal charm offensive, which Anwar is good at.
By now, world leaders would have watched how Anwar has the ability to lift up the phone to call his counterparts.
The world will certainly now see that there is value in Malaysia as a stabilising force and an economic partner.
The week has not just been a personal success for Anwar and his government, but as one analyst put it, they are a reminder that middle powers like Malaysia can shape outcomes when they choose engagement over posturing.
Thai veteran journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn wrote that Anwar has now positioned himself as a peacemaker.
'Asean is doing a somersault. It just needs decisive leadership,' he said, pointing out that Anwar got the US and China to be present, which was another coup, as 'both superpowers rarely collaborate on anything these days. Yet both sent envoys to support the Asean Chair's initiative.'
These successes are not just wins for Anwar's government; they are reminders that middle powers like Malaysia can shape outcomes when they choose engagement over posturing.
Writing in the Thai PBS World, he described that on the regional stage, 'PMX just had his finest hours.''
On the economic front, Malaysia has ended up having the same 19 per cent tariff as Indonesia and the Philippines. However, in Jakarta and Manila, there has been reported unhappiness that they have given in too much to Trump.
Malaysia stood its ground that it would not allow the red lines to be crossed, particularly on its Bumiputera policy during negotiations.
To the protestors who turned up by the thousands calling on Anwar to step down, they may not understand headlines like tariffs or ceasefires, but this week's developments demonstrated the importance of leadership. — Bernama
• Datuk Seri Wong Chun Wai is a National Journalism Laureate and chairman of the Malaysian National News Agency (Bernama).
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