Party leaders skeptical of three-party ruling coalition after Upper House vote
The Upper House campaign for half of the 248 seat chamber kicks off Thursday, and for the ruling coalition, 50 is the magic number.
If the LDP and Komeito collectively win fewer than 50 seats, they lose their majority. That would force them to either remain a two-party ruling coalition and face the difficult and time-consuming process of gaining agreement from at least one opposition party for every piece of legislation in both chambers, or invite an opposition party into their coalition.
Currently, the LDP and Komeito, which lost their majority in the October Lower House poll and must work with other opposition parties in that chamber to pass legislation, hold a majority in the Upper House.
During a leaders' debate in Tokyo on Sunday over whether the LDP and Komeito would create a larger coalition by bringing in a third party, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said that doing so would be difficult.
'A coalition should be formed based on a certain level of consensus among the parties, not simply to have a coalition,' Ishiba said.
Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito added, 'We are not at the stage where we can think about other partners for the LDP/Komeito coalition.'
The three main opposition leaders from the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of the People, and Nippon Ishin no Kai also indicated at the same debate they had no plans to formally join the LDP and Komeito.
CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda said a coalition was not formed based on just one issue, and that his party aimed to capture a majority in the Upper House. Nippon Ishin head Hirofumi Yoshimura said his party would not enter any ruling coalition, but cooperate on a policy-by-policy basis.
DPP leader Yuichiro Tamaki said that his party's decisions were based on what it could accomplish, not who it could work with.
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan head Yoshihiko Noda speaks to reporters in Tokyo on Friday. |
JIJI
LDP and Komeito leaders are warning their parties that the election will be a difficult one.
On Thursday, LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama seemed open to discussing the possibility of including the CDP in a coalition if the LDP and Komeito end up without a majority in the Upper House. That came after Komeito's Saito indicated Wednesday his party was opposed to the idea.
Political commentator Tetsuo Suzuki said that while Moriyama has suggested the CDP, other LDP executives have said either Nippon Ishin or the DPP should be the third coalition partner.
'But if we have an LDP/Komeito coalition that adds one of these parties, a lot of compromises between the three would be needed. We have to ask if this kind of politics of compromise is really a good thing,' Suzuki said.
If the LDP and Komeito get fewer than 50 Upper House seats, Ishiba — who announced his party's goal was to maintain the ruling coalition majority — will be forced to resign. While the prime minister could also dissolve the Lower House, the LDP would probably try to avoid that because the feeling within the party is that it would lose that election as well, Suzuki added.
On the other hand, should the LDP and Komeito collectively win 50 or more seats, they would keep their majority, and Ishiba would probably retain his job, Suzuki said. The political situation would mean the LDP and Komeito could continue to negotiate with the opposition parties on an individual basis through the autumn session of parliament.
Finally, while 50 is the critical number for the ruling coalition, 63 is the ideal number for the LDP. Winning at least that many Upper House seats would give it a majority on its own.
The LDP could interpret such results as meaning it has a solid base of public support. That might then lead to talk within the party about holding a Lower House election in the hope that the Upper House support results in the LDP — by itself or with Komeito — recapturing that chamber.
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