What will it take to end Iran's nuke program? An army.

Japan Times

12 hours ago

In the weeks since the U.S. attacked the Iranian nuclear program with 30,000-pound "bunker busting' bombs and submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles, we've heard wide variation in how much damage has been done overall.
American President Donald Trump's claim that the U.S. had "obliterated' the Iranian nuclear program was widely challenged and current assessments have broadly settled on "severe damage' that has set back the program 12 to 24 months.
What is largely not disputed is that 800-plus pounds of enriched uranium remains somewhere in Iran; that some number of the critical enrichment machines (gas centrifuges, cascade structures, precision bearings) are likely still in Iranian hands; and, indisputably, that the scientific knowhow to produce an atomic bomb still exists in the minds of Iranian scientists, engineers and technologists who survived the strikes.
When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Trump met last week, they were in agreement: Iran can never be permitted to have a nuclear weapon. But from there, the beliefs diverge. Israel probably wants more strikes to find and destroy the uranium stockpile and machinery, and to assassinate leading scientists. Trump likely wants to avoid more strikes, seeking to find a diplomatic and economic solution that doesn't drag the U.S. further into another Middle East war.
But the fact is, neither of these approaches would achieve that ultimate goal of ensuring the Tehran regime never produces a viable nuclear arsenal. So, what would it actually require? Certainly, more than the American people, their elected officials and the military would be eager to undertake any time soon.
One way to think about this is to look at the 2003 invasion of in Iraq. Yes, we all know it turned out that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein didn't have a nuclear weapons program. But, paradoxically, the mission intended to find it must be considered a military success in terms of achieving its objective. That effort provides a blueprint for what it would take to truly obliterate a nation's weapons research programs.
I remember the invasion of Iraq clearly. Immediately after 9/11, I was promoted to a one-star rear admiral's rank and head of the Navy's new tactical antiterrorist think tank, called "Deep Blue.' My mission was to come up with ways to defeat al-Qaida forces who had perpetrated the attack on the U.S.
Given our focus on finding and eliminating terrorist groups in Afghanistan, I was surprised to hear more and more discussion in the Pentagon about invading Iraq. Operational plans were underway to remove Saddam's regime, on the presumption that he had a capable program for weapons of mass destruction. That intelligence turned out to be wrong. But at the time, the objective for the military was to destroy what we believed was an extensive Iraqi nuclear program.
I remember reviewing those plans and they were far, far from a series of precision strikes. They included an initial force of more than 150,000 ground troops (U.S. and British); another 200,000 supporting troops; almost 2,000 combat aircraft for 24,000 sorties in the first six weeks, with 65,000 airmen supporting; and more than 100 naval warships 60,000 sailors. Several thousand highly trained special forces members were also to be engaged. Ultimately, nearly 40 nations participated in the operation that began in 2003, including a major NATO training mission which I would eventually command.
The plan also envisioned that Shiite Muslim militias — opposed to Saddam's Sunni-led regime — would rise up and fight alongside our forces. I recall another rear admiral speaking in football parlance that "Shias go long,' like NFL wide receivers.
Wishful thinking aside, here's the point: This was a massive undertaking that ultimately cost the U.S. trillions of dollars, thousands of combat deaths and tens of thousands of life-changing wounds and countless Iraqi civilian lives. It was costly, bloody and painful.
Nonetheless, every government lab was inspected and neutralized; key scientific personnel were identified, interrogated and placed under surveillance. Machinery was destroyed and factories converted to other uses. But this required, above all, boots on the ground. It simply could not have been done in Iraq with a handful of airstrikes and clusters of Tomahawk missiles.
Now let's look at Iran. It is nearly four times the size of Iraq, with a population roughly twice as large. Unlike the case in Baghdad, we know with absolute certainly — because of international inspectors — that Iran has an active and impressive program to build not only nuclear weapons but also ballistic missiles to deliver them. Thus, the challenge to obliterate that capability is immense, far greater than in Iraq. It would require invading Iran with hundreds of thousands of ground troops, occupying the country and systematically dismantling the state.
Could we do that? Yes, but the costs would be enormous. Would the Iranian people greet us as liberators and turn their nation into a democratic beacon in a turbulent region? Uh, we heard exactly that about Iraq. Didn't work out well.
If our leaders are going to call for obliterating the Iranian nuclear program, they need to be clear-eyed. Perhaps someday an overwhelming military option may be needed, but for now let's see what we can accomplish at the bargaining table. And tell the Israelis to cool their jets, literally.
Any potential deal needs to include a guarantee of open inspections by international bodies anywhere, anytime; no uranium enrichment within Iran (if the regime truly wants low-enriched material for an energy program, it can come from a neutral third site); termination of long-range ballistic missile research and testing; and no further support to terrorist or proxy groups threatening the U.S., Arab states or Israel.
In return, we can offer a graduated series of steps to relieve sanctions; cooperation on peaceful nuclear power; and economic incentives — for the Europeans, a peaceful Iran could be a very attractive investment opportunity.
Over the long haul, we can always go back to the Pentagon and pull out the war plans to invade Iran — and the Tehran leadership knows it. But we shouldn't kid ourselves about what can be accomplished strictly with low-cost and low-risk airstrikes. To truly obliterate the Iranian nuclear plan would be shockingly costly and painful. Far better to try again diplomatically. The ghosts of Iraq demand no less.
[Bio]James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.[/bio]