A look at the diplomatic dance over Taiwan, as US presses allies for clarity amid China flex

The Print

9 hours ago

Following recent developments, Colby said on X that the Pentagon is committed to following President Donald Trump's strategy of 'restoring deterrence and achieving peace through strength.' Part of this vision involves encouraging allies to increase their defence budgets and enhance collective security measures.
The report quotes sources as saying that Elbridge Colby, the US under-secretary of defence for policy, has been actively addressing the topic in discussions with defence officials from Japan and Australia in recent months.
New Delhi: The Pentagon is urging Japan and Australia to clarify their position in case there is a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan. According to a report in the Financial Times on 12 July, the move has led to frustration among key American allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
Efforts are also being made to persuade allies to increase their defence spending in light of growing concerns regarding China's ambitions toward Taiwan. However, the request for commitments related to a potential conflict over the island has taken Tokyo and Canberra by surprise, considering that the US itself has historically been ambiguous about its support for Taiwan.
The US has long had a policy of 'strategic ambiguity' under which it does not say if it would defend the island. Former president Joe Biden on four occasions deviated from that, saying the US would intervene. And Donald Trump has echoed other presidents in refusing to say what he would do.
President Donald Trump had just been elected when NBC asked him if the United States was committed to defending Taiwan if it was invaded by China on his watch. 'I never say.' he answered. 'I never say, because I have to negotiate things, right?'
Since then, Trump's position on Taiwan has been fairly consistent: He hasn't decided yet. This isn't unusual by any means. It's mostly an extension of the United States' policy that has existed since 1979 under the Taiwan Relations Act. Under this Act, the US rejects any use of force to settle the dispute, maintains cultural and commercial ties with Taiwan and commits to selling arms to Taiwan for self-defence. It also maintains the ability to come to Taiwan's defence while not actually committing to doing so.
Simply speaking, the US response to Taiwan's invasion will depend on the occupant of the Oval Office. With growing concerns over China's military activities on the Strait, Trump's Taiwan policy will be critical in determining the island country's future.
China's 'threats', growing concerns
On 11 June, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence stated in a post on X, '43 sorties of PLA
aircraft and 6 PLAN vessels operating around Taiwan were detected up until 6 a.m. (local time) today. 25 out of the 43 sorties entered Taiwan's northern, central and southwestern ADIZ. We have monitored the situation and responded accordingly.'
17 PLA aircraft, 8 PLAN vessels and 1 official ship operating around Taiwan were detected up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8) today. 7 out of 17 sorties crossed the median line and entered Taiwan's northern, southwestern and eastern ADIZ. We have monitored the situation and responded. pic.twitter.com/Bqj1NJ4jL1
— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) 🇹🇼 (@MoNDefense) July 14, 2025
This hadn't gone unnoticed. The last few months signal the United States' growing
concern. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's recent statement at the Shangri La Dialogues referenced China posing an 'imminent' threat to Taiwan.
'Earlier US assessments were that an invasion was neither imminent nor inevitable. This
suggests that there is concern among certain US officials about China's military posture,'
Sriparna Pathak, Professor of China Studies and Senior Fellow at Jindal India Institute, told
ThePrint.
But clearly in this case, concern doesn't quite equal commitment. It's difficult to say exactly how cooperative the United States will be. All we really know is that Trump has adopted an 'America First' approach and is increasingly less keen on spending money to defend foreign countries.
'There is a certain impulse of prioritisation that the US is leaning towards which is trying to
find a balance between engaging deeply with the world, but not doing everything.' Manoj
Kewalramani, a senior fellow at the Takshashila Institution, told ThePrint.
US Vice President J.D. Vance recently declared in a commencement address at the US
Naval Academy that US under President Donald Trump will 'choose carefully when to
use military force' and 'will avoid involvement in open-ended conflicts' in what he called a
break from recent US policies. Not exactly encouraging for Taiwan if they are depending
on the US joining a potential fray.
'There's certainly a weariness of getting involved in direct conflict because the US has been engaged in direct conflict for more than 25 years now,' Kewalramani acknowledges, but
cautions that Vance is probably referring to conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan carried out
with certain nation-building agendas, not necessarily to Taiwan, where US strategic interests lie.
Moreover, there are definite signs that the Pentagon has been working on strategies to
make it as difficult as possible for China to invade Taiwan. Though, this doesn't necessarily
mean military involvement.
'Donald Trump's second term is characterised by heightened transactionalism from the US,'
says Pathak, arguing that the focal point of the US' current Taiwan policy is its economic
interests.
Taiwan's balancing act
Taiwan is well aware that its own precarious position is highly dependent on an
unpredictable US policy. Indeed, a 2023 RAND report found that without US support,
Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat by China within 90 days. For the past couple of years, they
have raced to overhaul their defence equipment, intensified military exercises and reinstated a one-year compulsory army conscription. In March, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) published its 2025 Quadrennial Defence Review, which has a section dedicated to 'deepening military exchanges between Taiwan and the US'. The report described the United States as Taiwan's 'most important international
backer' and outlined Taiwan's intent to boost military exchanges, intelligence sharing, high-
level strategic dialogues, among other types of cooperation with the United States.
'Taiwan is quite smart,' Kewalramani noted. 'The moment Trump was elected, they were
talking about a massive arms package that they wanted to buy. They've also been talking
about further expanding their defence spending.'
Pathak notes that officials from the US have indicated that arms sales to Taiwan could
exceed the USD 18.3 billion approved under Trump 1.0, double Biden's USD 8.4 billion, to
counter China. According to Kewalramani, this move appears to be a double pronged strategy, partly satisfying whatever trade hunger Trump might have as well as helping Taiwan acquire the defence capabilities it needs.
Trump has repeatedly called for Taiwan to raise its defence budget to 10 percent, a near
impossible ask. Nevertheless, Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te announced that he would seek legislative approval to increase defence spending to over 3 percent of GDP in 2025 and continue to increase it in subsequent years.
'Elbridge Colby has been quite complimentary of this increase in defence spending.'
Kewalramani pointed out.
Pathak raises a valid concern: Taiwan being used as a bargaining chip by the US in its
negotiations with China. 'What is starkly irresponsible of the US are Trump's comments
on how defence support for Taiwan could be contingent on economic concessions or
increased burden-sharing,' Pathak points out.
However, it is important to note that reluctance to defend Taiwan militarily has not been
uniform even in the Trump cabinet. Some have advocated for a robust US support system in the past. 'If you look at people like Elbridge Colby and Dan Blumenthal, there is a sense that the US will be militarily supportive of Taiwan. If you look at the US administration today, different individuals have different impulses.' Kewalramani says. Pathak agrees that this aligns with a hawkish stance from Rubio and Waltz, both of whom have advocated for rapidly arming Taiwan.
A top military commander in the Indo-Pacific warned in 2021 that 'Taiwan may represent the most dangerous flashpoint for war' and that a threat to it will manifest in the 'next six years'. The recently released 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment by the United States Defence Intelligence Agency confirmed that China is likely to continue to advance its long-term objective of unification with Taiwan, deter any move by Taiwan towards independence, and test the United States' commitment to Taiwan's defence.
A clear shift from the normal
All recent moves by China have pointed towards a shift from the normal. Almost every day in the month of May, a tweet by the Ministry of National Defence of Taiwan documented the
PLA military crossing the median line of Taiwan, in total crossing it more than 400 times
last month alone and obliterating the once unofficial boundary. A certain level of preparation seems to have begun on both sides across the strait. An invasion might seem imminent, but in reality, things are more complicated. These intimidation tactics just short of armed conflict are commonly known as 'grey zone' coercion.
'The PLA's exercises around Taiwan continue becoming increasingly routine, rather than in
response to specific provocations. The routineness from China is to ensure sustained pressure, rather than immediate escalation to invasion.' says Pathak. She also notes Chinese actions like cutting undersea cables, increasing coastguard patrols, etc., align with 'grey zone' warfare, aiming to exhaust Taiwan psychologically and economically while avoiding full-scale war.
Kewalramani agrees and acknowledges that there has been a shift, from regular testing of deployments to air sorties. Significantly, one of the objectives of this is not just operational exercises, but to also test Taiwan's reaction. 'These exercises do tell you that preparatory work is being done for an invasion,' Kewalramani suggests.
An imminent invasion, however, would require large-scale troop and equipment movement,
none of which have yet been reported.
The US has not remained idle as China openly tests Taiwan's redlines. In February, the US
State department removed a statement on its website that it does not support Taiwan
independence instead emphasising that differences must be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. The page also added that the US will support Taiwan's membership in international organisations 'where applicable'. This did not go down well with the PRC, which released a statement arguing that this change sent the wrong signal to Taiwan's independence movement. It also urged the US to 'stop helping Taiwan expand its international space' as well as to 'stop escalating the substantive relationship between the US and Taiwan'.
The United States clearly did not take note of Beijing's urgings. Instead, developments in the past few months point only to intensification of US relations with Taiwan. In May, a new bill was introduced in Congress that seeks to designate Taiwan as a 'NATO Plus' partner of the United States to facilitate faster and easier arms sales.
Even the recent public disclosure of retired US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery that around 500 US military personnel are stationed in Taiwan signals a more open and substantial military support for the island.
'The fact that this is being published is public signaling that the US is supportive and
engaged in the region,' Kewalramani acknowledges, pointing out that 500 soldiers on US soil would not exactly be substantive as deterrents.
Indeed, behind all recent US developments lies a game of signalling. As tensions rise
between countries, all parties maintain their strategic non-alignment while exchanging ominous signals.
'It is a negotiating tactic aimed at China. The ambiguity is being kept precisely so it can be
used for persuading China, while extracting economic concessions from Taiwan; as well as
keep the hope alive that the US will act decisively if there is a full scale conflict,' says
Pathak.
US policy may not have fundamentally shifted, but Beijing is fuming over recent
developments, bargaining chips or not. The United States' active efforts to arm Taiwan may
constitute all the support the latter needs in Beijing's eyes. Reunification remains Beijing's
goal, but invading Taiwan in the near future remains tricky.
Is China ready for war?
'China is facing its own economic challenges today,' Kewalramani points out. 'I doubt it is confident enough to carry out an invasion successfully and achieve the objectives with minimum damage.'
At present, all sides are mostly engaged in testing boundaries. 'The Chinese would prefer
peaceful reunification but they are realising that the window is shrinking,' Kewalramani
observes, pointing towards changing Taiwanese domestic politics spurred by growing
nationalism. The Taiwanese in turn understand that US policy is unpredictable, but are
currently seeking military equipment and trade agreements to hedge their bets. The
Americans, meanwhile, know that they must remain engaged without stumbling into conflict.
The world order is shifting, and the situation is complicated. As the Indo-Pacific enters a
period of increased friction, Taiwan remains at the center of a complex diplomatic triangle.
Strategic ambiguity may have worked for decades, but now its limits are being tested. And for now, Taiwan's fate remains uncertain.
(Pragya Sharma is an intern with ThePrint)
(Edited by Viny Mishra)
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