On-demand driver service platform DriveU logs 22% rise in FY25 revenue; net profit zooms to Rs 1.7 crore
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Bengaluru-based on-demand driver service platform DriveU reported a 22% increase in revenue to Rs 111.8 crore in the financial year 2025, up 22% from Rs 91.6 crore a year back, led by an increase in bookings of drivers.The company's profit after tax (PAT) rose to Rs 1.73 crore in FY25, compared to Rs 11 lakh in FY24, said the company in a release.'We are coming back quicker after Covid-19, with our team delivering one of the strongest performances. We will be increasing our presence in cities such as Chennai, Hyderabad, and Delhi in the coming years,' said Rahm Shastry, chief executive officer of DriveU.While revenues jumped significantly, the company managed to check its overall expenses to Rs 27.8 crore, up 13.5% from Rs 24.5 crore a year back. Its marketing expenses almost doubled on-year to Rs 4.56 crore in FY25. Employee benefit expenses rose to Rs 12.26 crore in FY25 from Rs 10.63 crore in FY24.'In one of our major markets, Bengaluru, we are able to get only 7% of car owners to use our service. We will largely focus on improving our presence by promoting drivers on demand in the next few years,' said Shastry.The company reported Rs 1.74 crore of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (Ebitda), up from Rs 1.08 crore in the previous year.Founded in 2015, DriveU has raised around $8.8 million in equity money from a bunch of angel investors and Washington-based Capria Ventures.
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When fundamentally different businesses, with contrasting growth paths, margins, and investor expectations, are housed under one roof, the whole often ends up being valued less than the sum of its parts. Stable engineering cash flows get obscured by the cyclicality of sugar, and the precision of one business gets diluted by the volatility of the other. That's the situation Triveni finds itself in today. Its sugar and ethanol businesses dominate revenue but are regulated and cyclical. The engineering segments, ~10% of revenue, contribute over a third of operating profits, with margins of 34% (gearboxes) and 14% (water EPC). Triveni has been through a similar transition before. On one hand, Triveni Engineering runs sugar mills and ethanol distilleries, a business that is seasonal, regulated, and capital-intensive. On the other hand, it runs precision gearbox manufacturing and executes water infrastructure projects. These are B2B (business-to-business), project-driven businesses that reward operational efficiency and engineering depth. Trying to manage both under one roof is like running a tractor and a bullet train on the same track – they move at different speeds, require different controls, and serve completely different destinations. That's exactly what the company acknowledged when it announced the demerger. The move aims to sharpen focus, accelerate growth in engineering, and allow each business to be valued independently. To give each business the space and autonomy it needs to grow, Triveni is splitting into two focused entities: one for its cyclical, agri-linked sugar business, and another for its capital-efficient, engineering verticals. Along with simplifying the business structure, the demerger also ensures that shareholders benefit directly. This isn't the first time Triveni has restructured its business to unlock value. In 2010, it spun off its steam turbine business into a separate listed entity, Triveni Turbine Ltd (TTL). At the time, the move went largely unnoticed. But over the next decade, the results spoke for themselves. TTL, which started life as a division inside a sugar company, is today a Rs 20,000 crore listed giant. In contrast, its former parent, Triveni Engineering, has a market cap of Rs 7,900+ crore. More than just a stock story, TTL's success highlights what focus and independence can do. Freed from the conglomerate structure, it built a strong investor following, attracted analyst coverage, and deployed capital with discipline, all of which contributed to its growth trajectory. Today's planned demerger of Triveni's gearbox and water infrastructure business follows a similar logic. These are niche, high-precision businesses that need their capital allocation logic and execution autonomy, just like TTL once did. And if the past is any indication, this breakup might again lead to a buildup in value. TTL was listed at around Rs 35 in 2011. It has since touched highs of over Rs 800, a 23x move over the decade, creating enormous value for long-term holders. At a market cap of Rs 8,100+ crore, Triveni Engineering trades at a P/E of 34, EV/EBITDA of 19, and MCap/Sales of 1.43x. On the surface, these numbers might seem fair, even rich. But once you unpack what's inside the business, a different story emerges. In FY25, Triveni reported Rs 6,559 crore in revenue from its Sugar and Distillery operations. However, the engineering businesses, namely Power Transmission (Gearboxes) and Water Infra EPC, together generated Rs 604 crore in revenue, just under 10% of the total revenue, but a far more meaningful Rs 160 crore in PBIT, which is over one-third of its total operating profits. Let's break it down: This margin contrast is stark, and that's the story the market is missing. Right now, Triveni is being valued like a blended sugar-ethanol stock. And that's understandable, given how large the sugar business is in absolute terms. But once you apply segment-wise valuation lenses, the mispricing becomes clear: – Elecon Engineering trades at EV/EBITDA of 20x and P/E of 30x – Water infra players like VA Tech Wabag and ION Exchange trade at EV/EBITDA of ~16-20x In contrast, Triveni's engineering segments are buried inside a sugar company, with little independent visibility or coverage. That's where the demerger comes in. Post-listing, the new engineering entity (TPTL) will operate cleanly as a capital-light, high-margin, infra + industrial play, and can be benchmarked against its rightful peers such as Elecon or VA Tech. Meanwhile, the parent company (TEIL) will retain the sugar, ethanol, and cogeneration power operations, which are clearer, simpler, and easier to value. Until the demerger is completed, the full value of the engineering vertical will remain hidden, making this a classic case of a conglomerate discount waiting to be unlocked. Usually, when low-margin, regulated businesses are bundled with high-quality engineering verticals, consolidated valuations often miss the mark, and that's the case with Triveni today. To value it more accurately, we break it down using an SOTP approach, assigning distinct multiples based on each segment's fundamentals and listed peers. Note: This is not indicative of where the stock price/Market cap could head. It's just an if-then calculation for academic purposes. This gives us an implied value of Rs 7,680 crore, not far from Triveni's current market cap of around Rs 8,000 crore. But here's the real takeaway: Today, all segments are valued like a sugar business. Post-demerger, the engineering entity will have independent visibility, peer benchmarking, and potential re-rating, unlocking upside that the consolidated view can't capture. So, while deep undervaluation does not seem to exist right now, this story is more about unlocking value through re-rating for superior engineering and water Infra EPC businesses. Standard risks exist, such as delays in getting approval for the demerger and deterioration in either of the businesses in the meantime. Triveni's demerger marks more than a breakup, it's a shift toward a sharper strategic focus. With the engineering verticals now maturing and the sugar business still bound by regulation, this is about giving high-quality segments their platform to grow and be valued independently. The SOTP math hints at modest value unlocking, though much of it may already be reflected in the price. This is not a textbook deep value play, but a business in transition, offering optionality if execution stays on track. The spin-off may be rational, but is it rewarding? Time and price discovery will tell. Note: We have relied on data from and throughout this article. Only in cases where the data was not available, have we used an alternate, but widely used and accepted source of information. Rahul Rao has helped conduct financial literacy programmes for over 1,50,000 investors. He has also worked at an AIF, focusing on small and mid-cap opportunities. Disclosure: The writer or his dependents do not hold shares in the securities/stocks/bonds discussed in the article. The website managers, its employee(s), and contributors/writers/authors of articles have or may have an outstanding buy or sell position or holding in the securities, options on securities or other related investments of issuers and/or companies discussed therein. The content of the articles and the interpretation of data are solely the personal views of the contributors/ writers/authors. Investors must make their own investment decisions based on their specific objectives, resources and only after consulting such independent advisors as may be necessary.
