New Jersey Catholic bishop says diocese will no longer oppose investigation into abuse allegations
CAMDEN: The Catholic bishop of a New Jersey diocese said he would no longer oppose a state grand jury investigation of clergy sexual abuse that the church has been fighting behind closed doors in court for years.Camden Bishop Joseph Williams , who took over the diocese in March, told the Philadelphia Inquirer on Monday the diocese no longer wants to prevent the attorney general's office from seating a grand jury to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by priests and other religious officials.Williams told the newspaper it was important to help those harmed by the church and that he doesn't want to stop their voices from being heard."Our people need to hear this, the clergy needs to hear this, so that it never happens again, first of all," Williams said.A message seeking comment Tuesday was left with the diocese.The change comes a week after attorneys for the diocese argued before the state Supreme Court that prosecutors did not have the authority under court rules to use a grand jury to investigate private church officials. Instead, the lawyers argued, the rule requires grand jury presentments to tackle public officials and government.The high court has not yet issued an opinion on the arguments.It's not immediately clear how the bishop's new position would affect their ruling.The state attorney general's office said in an emailed statement Tuesday that it welcomes the "introspection that produced this shift in the Diocese of Camden's position."The statement pointed out that prosecutors are still subject to lower court orders that blocked the investigation.Mark Crawford, state director of Survivors Network for those Abused by Priests, said in a text message Tuesday that the change was "long overdue.""We are cautiously optimistic as this is certainly the right thing to do and for the right reasons," he said. "This should have happened long ago and seeing Bishop Williams take a different approach is encouraging."The issue dates to a Pennsylvania grand jury report in 2018 that found more than 1,000 children had been abused in that state since the 1940s, prompting the New Jersey attorney general to announce a similar investigation.But the results of New Jersey's inquiry never became public partly because a legal battle led by the Diocese of Camden was unfolding behind closed doors amid sealed proceedings.Then, this year the Bergen Record obtained records disclosing a trial court's judgment in favor of the diocese and revealing the diocese's objection to the grand jury. And in March, the Supreme Court ordered more documents in the case unsealed.The core disagreement is over whether a court rule permits grand juries in New Jersey to issue findings in cases involving private individuals. Trial and appellate courts found for the diocese.In oral arguments, Supreme Court justices at times sounded skeptical of the diocese's then-position that the grand jury investigation would amount to a condemnation of the church and its officials."We don't know what a grand jury would say, am I right?" Justice Anne Patterson asked at the time.
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News18
32 minutes ago
- News18
'Cryptic Reasoning': SC Sets Aside HC Order On Bail To Murder Accused For Carrying Victim To Hospital
The High Court, however, allowed the said applications by way of the common impugned order of November 14, 2024, thereby enlarging the respondents on bail The Supreme Court has said the Punjab and Haryana High Court's order allowing bail to two persons in a murder case, by a cryptic reasoning and having noted they have carried the victim to the hospital after the incident, holding that the trial court has rightly noted the said aspect and declined to grant relief to them. A bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma said the respondent-accused have been alleged to have committed the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. It may be a fact that they may have carried the injured victim, who later died, to the hospital but he was actually brought dead to the hospital. This fact will have to be considered de hors from the fact as to who actually had committed the offence in the first place in the instant case. 'In the circumstances, we find that the order of the High Court calls for interference and therefore, the same is set aside. Consequently, the order of the Sessions Court is restored," the bench said. By the impugned order, the High Court has set aside the order of the Trial Court declining to grant regular bail to the respondents herein and consequently, has allowed the petitions for bail. An FIR was registered on March 22, 2023 under Sections 302, 323, 148, 149 (Sections 148 and 149 deleted and Sections 34, 427, 120B added later on) of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Nangal, District Rupnagar. The said FIR was registered based on the statement given by the complainant-appellant Baljinder Singh alias Aman against accused No. 1 – Mandeep Singh alias Bhoda and accused No.2- Narinder Kumar alias Nindi. The appellant alleged that he received a telephonic call at about 11.30 p.m. to the effect that the respondents, accompanied by 7-8 other persons, were using filthy language against the appellant and trespassed onto his land by dismantling the barbed wire fencing on his property. He claimed that after receiving the said call, the appellant along with his driver Anil (deceased), Deepak Kumar and Chowkidar Bahadur Singh had gone to the appellant's land at Taraf Majri in his Land Cruiser vehicle when the respondents rammed their Fortuner car into the car of the appellant. When the appellant came out from his car, accused No. 1 hit the deceased with their car and threw him down. It was alleged that all the accused persons were armed with wooden sticks when they stepped out of their car. Accused No.1 gave a wooden stick blow on the head of the deceased whereas accused No.2 inflicted injuries to the deceased and other persons accompanying the appellant. The appellant witnessed the entire occurrence but fearing for his life, fled the scene and later discovered that the respondents took the deceased to the hospital where he was found to be dead. The respondents were arrested in connection with FIR on March 23, 2023 and were sent to judicial custody. The Inspector General (IG) Rupnagar Range, Rupnagar, on receipt of complaint from Dev Raj (father of accused No. 2) transferred the investigation in the present matter to Ms Darpan Ahluwalia, IPS, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Sub Division Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar, Mohali. A charge sheet was submitted by the SHO, Police Station Nangal before the competent court on June 20, 2023. The JMIC, Rupnagar took cognizance and the matter was committed to Additional Sessions Judge, Rupnagar for trial and adjudication. Thereafter, a supplementary charge sheet was filed on October 09, 2023 based on subsequent investigation conducted by Assistant Superintendent of Police, Dera Bassi, District SAS Nagar. On a petition filed by the respondents under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court dismissed it on July 16, 2024. However, an order was passed in interim restraining the trial court from proceeding further. This order remained in operation. The respondents filed separate bail applications before the trial court which came to be dismissed by orders on May 21, 2024 and May 24, 2024 respectively, finding that accused No. 1 is a habitual offender as eight other criminal cases have also been registered against him and keeping in view the gravity of the offences in this case and the heinous crime alleged to have been committed by them. The High Court, however, allowed the said applications by way of the common impugned order of November 14, 2024, thereby enlarging the respondents on bail. Being aggrieved, the appellant-complainant has preferred the instant appeal before this court. Challenging the order, the appellant contended that the impugned order is lacking in reasons for granting relief of bail to the respondents herein inasmuch as paragraph 12 of the impugned order only records the submissions in a cryptic manner, the reasoning given in paragraphs 13 and 14 and consequently, the relief of bail was granted to the respondents herein. He submitted that the reasons are erroneous in as they do not make merit a case for grant of bail. The counsel said the respondents have been, inter alia, alleged to have committed the offence under Section 302 IPC, the manner in which the offence was committed itself is gruesome and was planned and executed in a manner which reflects that there was a criminal conspiracy amongst the accused. The appellant said the respondents were in jail for a period of one year and eight months; the chargesheet had been filed and the supplementary chargesheet had also been filed. His counsel said the respondents-accused have been granted the relief of bail and on the other hand, there is a stay of trial. The said orders would require interference at the hands of this court inasmuch as the respondents herein have criminal antecedents and they are not entitled to the relief of bail having regard to the manner in which the deceased was put to death. The State counsel supported the case of the appellant-complainant herein and therefore, having regard to the merits of the case, appropriate orders may be made in these appeals. Defending the High Court's order, the respondents counsel said the fact the accused themselves carried the deceased to the hospital and saw to it that he was given treatment immediately showed that there was no criminal intent in their mind; they further submitted that the High Court has recorded in detail the submissions of the counsel for the respective parties and has come to a right conclusion and hence there is no merit in these appeals and the same may be dismissed. Allowing the appeal, the bench directed the respondent-accused to surrender before the Court of the Jurisdictional Magistrate or the concerned Police Station since they have been on bail pursuant to the impugned order. About the Author Sanya Talwar Sanya Talwar, Editor at Lawbeat, has been heading the organisation since its inception. After practising in courts for over four years, she discovered her affinity for legal journalism. She has worked More Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 02, 2025, 21:12 IST News india 'Cryptic Reasoning': SC Sets Aside HC Order On Bail To Murder Accused For Carrying Victim To Hospital
News18
an hour ago
- News18
Undressing Girl Despite Protest 'Attempt to Rape', Rules Allahabad High Court
Last Updated: The court found that it had been proved by the prosecution that the victim was forcibly kidnapped by the appellant with intention of marrying and having intercourse with her The Allahabad High Court on July 1, 2025, upheld the conviction of a man for attempting to rape a girl after forcibly abducting and detaining her for nearly 20 days, holding that the offence of attempt to rape is made out even if attempt to penetration does not occur clearly, as long as intent and overt acts are established. The Court distinguished the case from the Supreme Court's findings in Tarkeshwar Sahu vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) (2006), where the top court had set aside the conviction under Section 376/511 of the IPC (attempt to rape) recording a finding that the accused had neither undressed himself nor even asked the prosecutrix to undress so there was no question of penetration. The top court had said that 'in the absence of any attempt to penetrate, the conviction under Section 376/511 IPC is wholly illegal and unsustainable". The bench of Justice Rajnish Kumar emphasised that the ruling in the said case was not applicable to the case at hand as here the victim had stated not only in her statement under Section 164 CrPC before the magistrate but in evidence before the trial court also that the appellant had undressed her, however on her protest, he could not do intercourse. The single judge bench referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Pandharinath vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) where it was held that if the accused-appellant had removed the victim's clothes and he had not rebutted this statement of the prosecutrix in his examination-in-chief, it was definitely a case of attempt to rape. In every crime, there is first, the intention to commit, secondly, preparation to commit it, and thirdly, the attempt to commit it. If the third stage, that is 'the attempt' is successful, then the crime is complete. If the attempt fails, the crime is not complete, but the law punishes the person attempting the Act under Section 511 IPC, the high court said, referring to the Supreme Court's ruling in Koppula Venkat Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004). The court found that in the present case, it had been proved by the prosecution that the victim was forcibly kidnapped by the appellant with intention of marrying and having intercourse with her. The appellant with the said motive kept her at the residence of his relative for about 20 days, where he not only outraged her modesty but also attempted rape by undressing her, however, he could not do so due to victim's protest. 'Nothing could be extracted from her (the victim) in cross-examination, which may create any doubt on her version or about the veracity of her evidence," the single judge bench noted. Further, since the FIR was lodged by the girl's mother on August 31, 2004, 21 days after the girl went missing, the appellant argued that the delay pointed to fabrication and that the incident was consensual. However, the court rejected both claims, stating that the delay had been explained and that such delays are not unusual in cases involving sexual assault due to societal stigma. Therefore, finding no illegality or infirmity in the trial court's order, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction under Sections 363, 366, 376/511 and 354 of the IPC.
Hindustan Times
an hour ago
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The Constitution of India enshrines a vision of justice — social, economic, and political — and a commitment to equality in status and opportunity. But history has shown us that these ideals are often contested terrain. In the early decades after independence, as India grappled with urgent demands for land reform, social equity, and economic stability, the pillars of democracy — the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary — often stood at odds. From the 1950s until the 1970s, India was crying out for reforms — agrarian and economic. Land redistribution was key, but it clashed directly with the constitutional right to property — then a Fundamental Right under Articles 19 and 31. After years of wars, economic disparities, and political turmoil, public pressure on the government was mounting, and so the government moved to abolish the zamindari system by acquiring private property. But this clashed with the Fundamental Right to Property under Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. These reforms were challenged in courts; some were struck down. In response, Parliament passed the First Amendment in 1951, introducing Article 31A, Article 31B, and the Ninth Schedule to shield such laws from judicial review. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) was the first case to test this. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo, a zamindar, challenged the First Amendment Act, arguing that the State cannot make any law which takes away fundamental rights. But the Supreme Court disagreed. The court ruled that Parliament could indeed amend the Constitution — including the part on Fundamental Rights. Soon after Shankari Prasad, a Jalandhar-based family, the Golaknaths, which owned vast farmlands, reopened the same questions, challenging the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act, 1953. Once again, the spotlight was on a single, seismic question: Could Parliament rewrite the Fundamental Rights? In Golaknath, the Supreme Court — by the slimmest of margins, 6:5 — drew the line. Fundamental Rights are 'transcendental' and 'immutable' — and therefore are beyond the reach of Parliament. This sent shockwaves through political corridors. Riding on a landslide victory in the fifth Lok Sabha elections, the government wasted no time in flexing its muscle. Within five months Parliament bulldozed through the 24th Amendment, expressly granting Parliament the power to amend any provision of the Constitution and tied the President's hands by mandating assent to any constitutional amendment bill. The battle wasn't over. The clash between Parliament's desire for reform and the judiciary's role as guardian of the Constitution was about to reach its biggest showdown in the history of India — Kesavananda Bharti v State of Kerala (1973). Kesavananda Bharti challenged the limit of property one can hold under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The question — can Parliament amend Fundamental Rights — rose again. The courtroom witnessed the finest from the Bombay Bar — Nani Palkhivala, Fali Nariman and Soli Sorabjee — defending the petitioner and a determined HM Seervai represented the government in what would become India's longest argued case with the largest constitutional bench ever assembled. The Supreme Court overturned the Golaknath verdict, ruling that while Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution, it cannot alter its 'basic structure'. That structure — a democratic, secular, federal republic which preserves separation of powers — is the very DNA of India. It gave birth to the basic structure doctrine, a safeguard against unchecked parliamentary power. But, this legal victory was only the beginning. Two years later, the judiciary faced the same questions at a time when India's political waters churned with unrest. Severe fiscal and oil crises resulted in bold economic reforms. An electoral triumph in light of powerful social movements led a presumptuous government to take drastic steps to cling to power. On June 25, 1975, a national Emergency was declared. Civil liberties were suspended, dissent was crushed, and the very essence of democracy was threatened. The Emergency was more than a political crisis — as the government suspended fundamental rights, the Constitution's basic structure was once again under siege. As we mark 50 years since that day, the lessons remain urgent. The 'basic structure' isn't just a legal doctrine — it's the first and last line of defence. The memory of this dark day urges us to protect judicial independence, civil liberties, and tolerate dissent — because without checks, freedoms, and the liberty to speak out, democracy is just a word. Insiyah Vahanvaty is an author and journalist and Ashish Bharadwaj is professor and dean of BITS Law School. The views expressed are personal.
