It is China that has won the ‘Cold War' in the Middle East

Mail & Guardian

2 days ago

China plans to lead the world through building state, economic and diplomatic capabilities and not through war. (Yuan Hongyan / ImagineChina / Imaginechina via AFP)
The latest illegal bombing of Iran by the United States could mean many things for the world if seen through the lens of the ongoing struggle to rebalance global power relations. Obviously in the bigger scheme of things, the US cares as little about Iran than it does about China, which has, in many ways, surpassed America in terms of global power and influence.
If the US thought it could lure China, or even Russia into a regional or global war, then it has failed to do so, and will continue to fail. China has no interest in waging a war; it is busy building state, economic and diplomatic capabilities to lead the world. In this sense, China has won the 'Cold War' in Iran/Middle East.
The Osiraq option
In an analysis paper titled Which Path to Persia? — incidentally, it's dated June 2009 — the Saban Centre of the Brookings Institute lays down the foreign policy options for the Obama administration on how to address the Iran 'problem' which is considered a 'national security' priority.
The paper advises the US administration to settle for the Osiraq option, which refers to the surprise airstrike by the
It proposes that the Osiraq option is the best option because the US 'might be able to provide a reasonable justification for such a campaign by building on the fact that the UN Security Council has repeatedly proscribed Iran's nuclear enrichment activities in resolutions enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which are binding on all member states'.
The Osiraq option was chosen because it was less risky in terms of the strategic interest calculus of the US in that region. It also knew that boots on the ground would mean Iraq and Afghanistan 0.2, and the appetite for another prolonged war is very low on the US domestic front. Even Israel could not go the conventional warfare route with boots on the ground; because a full-on invasion by Israel would inevitably force the US to join the war and the situation would be untenable; Iran has capabilities far greater than Iraq.
The paper suggests, quite strangely, that unlike a ground invasion, the Osiraq style is not a 'regime change' kind of strategy. A rhetorically erratic Donald Trump had a different idea though. Days after he violated Iran's sovereignty, he posted on his site Truth Social: 'It is not politically correct to use the term, 'Regime Change' but if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!'
War is the pursuit of politics by other means, namely, violence. Often, 'winning' a war is as pyrrhic for the victor as it is for the conquered. Anyway, the very idea of winning a war is debatable. Others suggest, quite correctly I would say, that there is no winner in war.
The strategic intent of countries like the US is not to win the war. It is to weaken the so-called enemies, divide a people and plunder their resources — often through regime change disguised as the protection of''national interests'. The idea is that if you cannot secure your interests through normal means, you must either buy or bomb your way in. Whatever it is, there is always an organising set of interests that inform the pursuit of war. The recent so-called peace treaty between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed in the Oval Office — not on African soil — is a perfect example of the US's global imperialist agenda. By the way, Trump has never set foot in Africa.
We also know that the bombing of Iran has obliterated any little respect that was left in the United Nations as a multilateral system aimed at preserving peace and preventing future wars. The bombing was carried out without a UN resolution or US congress authorisation, thus making it a unilateral rogue decision by the US government. It violated Iran's sovereignty and international law in a context where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed, repeatedly, that Iran is not building nuclear warheads, in the same way that it found no evidence of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' in Iraq at the turn of the century.
Geopolitical 'game of thrones'?
The single most important headache for the US today is the re-emergence of China as a strategic power pole in a multipolar world. In both his campaigns for the presidency, Trump made it clear that China is the US's 'main competitor', and one of his former national security advisers, Robert O'Brien, put it better when he said, 'China is the threat of the century.' Trump believes this hook, line and sinker.
As I suggested in a recent article, The US, the 'Great Transformation' and the New World Order,
the changing balance of global power is characterised by the decline of the US as a superpower, and the rise of China as a significant hegemon while a multipolar world order is in the offing. Much of the disastrous domestic and foreign policy coming out of the White House today is an attempt at dealing with this unstoppable great transformation. The US elite does not have a coherent strategic response yet.
The elites in both countries are aware that the decline-rise situation between the two countries gives rise to the Thucydides Trap moment. China knows that it is ahead, while the US knows that it has fallen behind on so many indicators of power. But the US is hellbent on kneeling before the shrine of neocon conceptions of power, so much that it is inflicting a lot of self-harm against the 'national interest'.
For its own sake, the US will do well to heed the advice of one of the most hardened conservative Republicans, the late Henry Kissinger, who wrote in his book
On China
that if not handled properly, US-China relations could mirror the Britain-Germany relations pre-World War II with disastrous consequences for both countries — and obviously, the world as a whole. Kissinger counsels that both countries should seek mutually beneficial relations. It is now evident to everyone that the US has already lost the war on global hegemony and consequently, ceased to be a global hegemon or, at worst, a hyperpower that bullies and dictates to everyone in the world. The latest attempt at stirring a trade war, essentially against China, is a case in point. China remains unshaken.
China is playing the long 'game of thrones'. Whether it is the Southeast China seas, Taiwan or Iran tensions, it simply refuses to transform the ongoing tensions into war. It has understood the injunction of Sun Tzu that it is better to win the war without fighting it. The US believes it, too, is playing a long game — the political rhetoric of Trump notwithstanding. In fact, it is Trump and his advisers that defines China as a strategic threat or competitor.
Which way for Africa and the Global South?
Africa and the Global South must respond strategically in the interests of the vast majority of the people of the world who stand to lose if a major war were to break out. The foreign policy of the US is largely the same in the Middle East and Africa. Without a clear strategic orientation, smaller countries will find it difficult to navigate the current tides caused by the rebalancing of power in the global arena.
Some analysis suggests that small countries have no agency, power or even a cost-benefit analysis to make in these high stakes struggles for the rebalancing of global power relations. I think such analysis is grossly mistaken if one considers the role of small countries in World War II or the choice of non-alignment during the Cold War years.
There is a lot to lose and gain in a multipolar world for countries in the Global South. The requirement is that they must be strategic, intentional and consolidate on national and regional unity and integration. There are more opportunities in a multipolar setting than a unipolar or bipolar one. The Global South must position itself well to benefit from this world which is struggling to be born.
David Maimela is a researcher and writer in public policy with a specialisation on foreign policy and international relations based at Unisa. He writes in his personal capacity.