Twelve Hong Kong activists appeal convictions in landmark ‘47 democrats' case
HONG KONG--Twelve Hong Kong pro-democracy activists appealed their subversion convictions and jail terms on Monday in a national security case that has spotlighted Beijing's ongoing crackdown on dissent and drawn international criticism.
The appeal stems from the '47 democrats' case, named for the number of activists who were arrested and charged with 'conspiracy to commit subversion' in early 2021.
The court eventually found 45 of the defendants guilty of organising and holding an unofficial primary election in July 2020 after massive pro-democracy protests brought the city to a standstill. Prosecutors considered the action to be a 'plot' to undermine the Hong Kong government.
Security was tight around the West Kowloon law courts building as scores of police officers, some with police dogs, patrolled the area and occasionally searched passers-by.
'I want to see all of them,' said an elderly man surnamed Wong who was among around 100 people queuing to get a public ticket for the hearing. 'They're not criminals.'
Foreign diplomats from over half a dozen countries were in attendance for this latest stage of the legal saga that began with dawn police raids on the homes of high-profile democrats in early 2021.
Some countries such as the United States have condemned the case as 'politically motivated' and are calling for the immediate release of the democrats who were sentenced last November to prison terms of up to ten years.
Hong Kong and Chinese authorities, however, have defended the independence of the judiciary and say no one is above the law and the democrats have received a fair trial.
Of the 16 democrats who pleaded not guilty during the trial, 11 have decided to appeal, including Gordon Ng, Gwyneth Ho and Owen Chow, who were all jailed for over seven years. Another democrat, Prince Wong, who pleaded guilty, is appealing her sentence.
One defendant, Michael Pang, decided to withdraw his application on Monday.
The appeals are expected to take around 10 days and will also include a government appeal against the acquittal of one of the democrats, barrister Lawrence Lau.
A years-long crackdown under a China-imposed national security law has resulted in arrests, the closures of liberal media outlets and civil society groups. The last two remaining pro-democracy parties, the Democratic Party and the League of Social Democrats, disbanded this year citing growing pressures.
The case is one of the most prominent so far under a 2020 national security law that was imposed by China in response to mass pro-democracy protests in 2019.
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