‘America's attitude to Britain was ruthless as it became global hegemon — China's ‘military-civil fusion' mirrors the US now'

Economic Times

04-07-2025

What is the core of your research?
When exactly did the 'military-industrial complex' emerge — and is this a purely American entity or a multinational force?
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Katherine C. Epstein is Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University-Camden. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das , she outlines, on America's Independence Day, the rise of the US ' military-industrial complex ' — and its implications:I focus on two main issues. The first is how the two most powerful, liberal societies of the modern era — Great Britain and the United States — sought to acquire the most cutting-edge secret naval technology. Upto World War I, naval technology was the most advanced on Earth — air power was in its infancy and nuclear weapons hadn't been invented. Naval procurement presented difficult challenges though — one was the tension between the government and private sector over the control of intellectual property rights (IPRs), patents and advanced new weapons which, owing to their growing sophistication, couldn't be procured by traditional methods like in-house building in public factories. As such technology grew more complex, governments began investing in private sector research and development. This raised questions about who owned the IPRs — the contractor doing the work or the government giving subsidies? Also, these weapons were so secret, governments could assume national powers over them, forbidding exports, etc. I look at the tension here between classical liberal norms of property rights and national security interests.I also study the hegemonic transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana — this change, where the US became global hegemon over Britain, was much more contested and rivalrous than often thought. Considerable evidence shows Britain was quite unhappy — and the US, quite ruthless — about the American pursuit of power at Britain's expense. I argue the US behaviour towards Britain then anticipated Chinese behaviour towards the United States today. This is reflected in US tech imports, through pursuit and theft, which China has apparently done, and in terms of US efforts to build a navy, financial infrastructure, global telecom, etc., that rivalled Britain in much the same way China has been doing now.For the US, the canonical description of the 'military-industrial complex' comes from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 address — Eisenhower warned this system threatened many American liberties. He defined it as the conjunction of a large military establishment with a permanent arms industry. There were huge changes in military production with World War II and the early Cold War. However, drawing from Benjamin Cooling's work, my research finds the first 'military-industrial complex' in America was naval and emerged in the late 19th century, not as a response to any one war but driven by a set of forces — these included the industrialisation of warfare and technology, geopolitical rivalries between the great powers like the scramble for Africa, the starting of globalisation and so on.William H. McNeill's book 'The Pursuit of Power' further traces the first military-industrial complex to 1880s Britain, emerging in response to a set of global forces that caused a naval buildup in peacetime. This isn't a uniquely American phenomenon — it exists worldwide, from South America to Japan, Russia, France, Germany, etc. China's 'military-civil fusion' has several parallels with the US military-industrial complex and vice-versa. Also, although the military-industrial complex looks like a well-oiled machine from outside — a hugely profitable global ring of arms manufacturers, etc. — inside, there are large tensions between militaries and contractors, the first, often a terrible customer who sees the second as profiteers.My sense is that war will always remain a human phenomenon and we can be sceptical of the ability of any technology to transform warfare. Of course, torpedoes, airplanes and nuclear weapons did change warfare — today, semiconductors and artificial intelligence could do this. However, I retain some reservations about moves like restricting the export of semiconductors to China — we need to ask if this could have been relevant in a lack of smart weapons and the proliferation of dumb weapons which cause huge civilian casualties.With AI , from a national security view of threats posed, this technology makes populations stupider by undermining critical thinking. The American education system is in a dreadful state and AI's role in stunting intellectual development is a huge threat for a nation that needs educated and aware citizens.Further, AI will only deepen the trend of the growing insulation of the American people from the violence done in their names — this has increased over the 20th century, reflected in fiscal terms and how the US has resorted to borrowing to pay for its wars rather than taxation, hiding conflict's true financial costs from Americans.There's also been an increasing move towards 'standoff weapons', like drones, where American bodies are not at risk and the US can effectively do violence to others without risking it for themselves. In that sense, AI and semiconductors — which are about improving the ability of weapons to do what muscle power once did — are more a continuation of a trend than something fundamentally new.Views expressed are personal