Nervousness as markets watch Iran conflict unfold
Markets are closely monitoring whether an oil price shock will eventuate if the Middle East conflict ratchets up further.
The conflict ramped up on Sunday after the US launched unprecedented surprise strikes on three neclear sites in Iran using B-2 stealth bombers. This further escalated tensions
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- AllAfrica
US builds next-generation bunker buster with China in mind
After blasting Iran's nuke bunkers with 13-ton bombs, the US is racing to build a smarter, sleeker penetrator for the next war, possibly with China. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that in the wake of the US Air Force's first combat use of the 13,000-kilogram GBU-57/B massive ordnance penetrator during the June strikes on Iran's Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer, the US Department of Defense has accelerated efforts to develop a successor: the next generation penetrator (NGP). The strikes, which involved 14 MOPs delivered exclusively by B-2 bombers, underscored both the weapon's precision and its operational limitations, particularly in light of the B-21 Raider's reduced payload capacity. A February 2024 US Air Force contracting notice outlines NGP requirements, including sub-9,900-kilogram warheads capable of precision strikes with a circular error probable of within 2.2 meters. Notably, the NGP may feature standoff capability via propulsion systems, improved void-sensing or embedded fuzing technologies, and enhanced or scalable terminal effects. The push for a successor, spurred by lessons from past MOP development and growing global interest in deeply buried facilities, targets adversaries beyond Iran, including North Korea, China, and Russia. The US Air Force aims to receive initial prototypes within two years of contract award, though a complete operational deployment timeline remains unspecified, according to the same February 2024 USAF notice. The future NGP is likely to form part of the Long Range Strike system, alongside platforms like the B-21 and the AGM-181A Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, making it a critical asset for penetrating hardened targets. This need to address hardened targets more effectively, highlighted by possible limitations in the Iran strikes, may have prompted the US to fast-track NGP development, especially with peer adversaries like China in mind. Multiple media outlets cited a leaked US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stating that US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities failed to destroy the core of the program and merely set it back by months. Du Wenlong noted in the South China Morning Post that Iran's Fordow site lies 80 meters underground, 30 meters deeper than the GBU-57's stated penetration capability, raising doubts as to whether the strike hit critical infrastructure. Song Zhongping said in the same article that although the US dropped 14 bombs, satellite imagery showed six craters, suggesting two bombs may have been aimed at each target, possibly to reinforce penetration. He added that while some infrastructure may have been damaged, complete elimination is implausible. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth downplayed the DIA report's findings, calling them 'preliminary,' and noting that the report itself states battle damage assessment takes weeks to complete. Hegseth said the report was not coordinated with the intelligence community and suffers from low confidence due to information gaps. These Iranian lessons could foreshadow far more complex strike dilemmas in a potential conflict with China. In a November 2024 RAND report, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others at RAND noted that if initial US strikes on China's maritime and surface assets fail, the US may need to launch long-range conventional attacks against China's buried inland facilities. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others wrote that command-and-control nodes and missile storage sites are essential to sustaining People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations. Satellite imagery cited by Newsweek in May 2025 shows a 1,500-acre site dubbed 'Beijing Military City' near Qinglonghu, southwest of the capital, with deep pits believed to house hardened bunkers capable of sheltering China's leadership in a nuclear war. Hans Kristensen and others wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in March 2025 that China built over 320 underground missile silos between 2021 and 2025 at Yumen in Gansu, Hami in Xinjiang, and Ordos in Inner Mongolia, significantly expanding its nuclear deterrent capabilities. They stated these silos, with standardized layouts, are designed for solid-fuel DF-41 ICBMs with potential launch-on-warning capability, supported by hardened command infrastructure and possibly nearby underground storage. They also noted continued DF-5B silo construction, reinforcing survivability through dual platforms. Furthermore, Greg Weaver argued in an April 2025 Atlantic Council report that standoff capability is essential for enhancing US aircraft survivability when striking mainland China. He noted that China's advanced air defenses and long-range missiles pose serious threats to forward-deployed US aircraft, making it vital to use standoff delivery systems that launch from outside the range of Chinese defenses. Yet even with advanced penetrators and standoff options, strikes on the Chinese mainland carry severe risks. In a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article, Brian McLean argued that while some strategists believe China can differentiate between conventional and nuclear attacks, hitting leadership bunkers or missile forces might be mistaken for a decapitation or disarmament attempt. He warned that even conventional strikes affecting China's nuclear posture or regime stability could provoke a nuclear response, especially if China perceives its second-strike capability as compromised. As the US weighs options beyond tactical reach, the broader question of deterrence comes into play. McLean said the best way to avoid escalation may be a strategy of deterrence by denial, convincing China not to attack Taiwan in the first place. However, Chen Xi wrote in a September 2022 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that deterrence by denial hinges on forward-deployed forces and regional basing, both of which are increasingly vulnerable to China's growing missile capabilities and anti-access/area denial systems. Chen cautioned that this posture could fuel perceptions of encirclement or US intent to strike first, raising escalation risks. He also pointed to practical limitations, including the difficulty of dispersing assets across allied territories, uncertain host-nation support, and ambiguous defense commitments that may weaken US credibility.
Express Tribune
6 hours ago
- Express Tribune
The dangerous new normal in Middle East
Listen to article Who won the 12-day war between Iran and Israel? To answer that, one must first examine the objectives of all parties involved in the conflict. Israel publicly stated that its main goal was to degrade or eradicate Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb. Before launching direct attacks, the hardline Israeli government claimed that Tehran was only weeks away from achieving nuclear capability. This, it insisted, justified its preemptive strikes. The US initially maintained distance. When Israel, on June 13, launched a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and assassinated senior military leaders and top nuclear scientists of Iran, the Trump administration said it was a unilateral Israeli action. Interestingly, just three months earlier, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard had assessed there was no indication Iran was close to making a nuclear bomb. Trump, however, publicly dismissed the assessment. Despite Israel's claims of initial success, it continued to press for the US involvement. It wanted the US to deploy B-2 bombers capable of dropping bunker-busting bombs needed to destroy deeply buried facilities like Fordow, located hundreds of metres beneath the mountains near the historic city of Qom. For over 45 years, no American president took the bait, even while maintaining close ties with Israel. The reason was simple: any direct attack on Iran's nuclear facilities risked triggering a full-scale regional war. But Trump, who often brands himself a man of peace, broke with the precedent. He ordered direct strikes on three major Iranian nuclear sites including Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz. The US B-2 bombers dropped over a dozen 30,000-pound bombs in an attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Trump swiftly claimed victory, announcing that Iran's nuclear capability had been "totally obliterated". However, a leaked report by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) contradicted this, revealing that the strikes caused only limited damage and had set back Iran's programme by just a few months. Trump dismissed the report as a deliberate attempt to undermine his administration's success. Reports later confirmed that there was no radiation leak from any of the bombed sites, indicating that Iran might have moved its enriched uranium and sensitive materials to safe locations before the attacks. While Iran continued to retaliate against Israel with its limited resources, the direct US involvement escalated the stakes. Until then, Iran had avoided targeting American military bases in the Gulf. But after the strikes, Tehran altered its approach. It had promised retaliation and the obvious targets were the US bases in the neighborhood. When Iran launched missiles at a major US base in Qatar, fears surged that the world was entering uncharted territory. However, it soon became clear that the strike was a choreographed move and coordinated in advance with both Qatar and the US. It was intended to pave the way for a ceasefire. Tehran needed a symbolic response to show its people it had avenged the strikes. Trump even thanked Iran for the advance notice. All the missiles were intercepted over Doha, resulting in no casualties or damage. Hours later, Trump announced a ceasefire deal. Although there were initial violations from both sides, the US president publicly rebuked Tel Aviv, ensuring the truce was held. In Trump's own words, Iran had fought "bravely" and Israel was hit "very very hard". This meant Israel needed a breather. Iran too, under immense pressure, could not afford to prolong the conflict. Israel's ultimate goal of regime change in Tehran did not materialise. Iran, despite heavy losses, survived to fight another day. For decades, Israel and Iran had avoided direct confrontation. That precedent is now broken. The real danger going forward is that such exchanges may become the new normal.
UPI
7 hours ago
- UPI
U.N. watchdog: Iran could resume enriching uranium for bomb in months
1 of 2 | A satellite image shows a view of craters and ash on a ridge at Iran's Fordo underground uranium enrichment facility after U.S. airstrikes June 21. Satellite Image 2025 Maxar Technologies/EPA-EFE June 29 (UPI) -- Iran likely can resume uranium enrichment to make a nuclear bomb in a few months, despite damage to nuclear facilities by United States and Israel airstrikes, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog chief said. Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said there was a "very serious level of damage" to the nuclear facilities during an interview with CBS News on Saturday. U.S. President Donald Trump said U.S. airstrikes on June 21 "obliterated" the facilities, including Fordo, which is underground in a mountain. Initial intelligence assessments suggested that the strikes were successful but set back Iran's program by months -- not years. "It can be, you know, described in different ways, but it's clear that what happened in particular in Fordo, Natanz, Isfahan, where Iran used to have and still has, to some degree, capabilities in terms of treatment, conversion and enrichment of uranium have been destroyed to an important degree," Grossi said. "Some is still standing. So there is, of course, an important setback in terms of those of those capabilities." He explained what remains. "The capacities they have are there," Grossi said. "They can have, you know, in a matter of months, I would say, a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium, or less than that. But as I said, frankly speaking, one cannot claim that everything has disappeared and there is nothing there." He wants International Atomic Energy officials to be able to return sites for an assessment. "Although our job is not to assess damage, but to re-establish the knowledge of the activities that take place there, and the access to the material, which is very, very important, the material that they will be producing if they continue with this activity," Grissi said. "This is contingent on negotiations, which may or may not restart." Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who said the facilities were "seriously damaged," posted on X on Friday that "Grossi's insistence on visiting the bombed sites under the pretext of safeguards is meaningless and possibly even malign in intent." Israel was fearful that Iran was nearly ready to have a nuclear bomb within months, and began airstrikes on June 13. Israel relied on American B-2 fighter jets that can send bombs deep into the ground. Earlier this month, the IAEA said Iran amassed enough 60% enriched uranium to potentially make nine nuclear bombs. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, nuclear deal, which was negotiated by Iran, the United States and the EU, Iran wasn't permitted to enrich uranium above 3.67% purity, which is the level need to fuel commercial nuclear power plants. Iran also was not allowed to carry out any enrichment at the Fordo plant for 15 years. In 2018, President Donald Trump abandoned the agreement among world powers, and instead reinstated U.S. sanctions in an attempt to stop Iran from moving toward making a bomb. Iran resumed enrichment at Fordo in 2021. On Friday, the IAEA said radiation levels in the Gulf region remain after the bombings. Grossi, citing regional data through the 48-nation International Radiation Monitoring System, said the "the worst nuclear safety scenario was thereby avoided." The main concern IAEA had was for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant and the Tehran Research Reactor because strikes to either facility, including off-site power lines, would have cause some type of radiological accident felt in both Iran and neighboring nations, but "it did not happen," he said. Grossi noted that the airstrikes would have caused localized radioactive releases inside the impacted facilities and localized toxic effects, based on the roughly 900 pounds of enriched uranium Iran is thought to have had before the attacks. Trump has said he would "absolutely" consider bombing Iran again if intelligence found that it could enrich uranium to concerning levels.
