Reduce Remote Workers' Pay
Like Jamie Dimon, employers across the country are eliminating the option to work from home ('Remote Work and JPMorgan's Mole,' by Matthew Hennessey, op-ed, Feb. 20).
Managers contend that working in the office will improve productivity, foster camaraderie and save money. Employees see it differently. There might be a win-win solution: Reduce pay for employees who choose to work from home. This would cut employers' costs by increasing productivity and accommodate employees' needs, helping to reduce the cost of child care and transportation, among other expenses. According to one recent study, 40% of workers say they'd accept a pay cut of at least 5% to keep their remote job. Everyone can be happy.
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Forbes
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Will The ‘Beautiful' Bill Increase The Deficit?
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Exploding U.S. indebtedness makes a fiscal crisis almost inevitable
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