Protests and sit-ins erupt across southern Iraq over jobs and services
Several southern Iraqi provinces witnessed protests and sit-ins on Tuesday, as demonstrators called on the federal government to take urgent and concrete steps to address unemployment, deteriorating public services, and local governance failures.
In Basra, Shafaq News correspondent reported that sit-ins continued for the third consecutive day at the main gate of the state-run Basra Oil Company (al-Makina). The protestors — including engineers, geologists, and oil sector specialists — are demanding employment opportunities through daily wage contracts in profit-generating companies affiliated with the Ministry of Oil.
In al-Hartha district, north of Basra, coordination committees extended their sit-in for a second day in front of the local administration office. Protesters reiterated their demands for improved services, job creation, and genuine local development initiatives.
Amid the ongoing unrest, informed sources told Shafaq News that the Basra Provincial Council voted on Tuesday to dismiss two local officials — al-Hartha District Commissioner Nadhir al-Shawi and Qurna District Commissioner Abdul-Majid Jassim.
In al-Diwaniyah, dozens of 2024 graduates from health-related fields demonstrated outside the provincial health directorate, urging authorities to launch the centralized employment application process, as was done with previous graduating classes.
Further south in Muthanna province, young residents of the al-Suwair sub-district pitched protest tents near the local administration building. Organizers stated that their sit-in would remain open-ended until all their demands are addressed.
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