Pakistan's UNSC posts present diplomatic challenge for India's fight against terror
On June 5, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced Pakistan's appointment as chair and vice chair of two important United Nations Security Council (UNSC) committees: The Taliban Sanctions Committee formed through Resolution 1988 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373, formed after 9/11. Islamabad is now also a co-chair of two working groups: One on documentation and procedural issues with Denmark and another, newly formed one with Greece tasked with analysing the effectiveness of UN sanctions. Pakistan is also set to preside over the council next month. In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and India's efforts to engage with the international community to highlight Pakistan's nefarious role in fomenting terrorism, the appointments have raised concerns about their possible implications for New Delhi.
After being elected to the UNSC in June last year, Pakistan started its tenure as a non-permanent member on January 1. Its term will end on December 31, 2026. Marking its eighth stint at the UNSC, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN, Asim Iftikar Ahmad, restated the country's commitment to utilise the platform to highlight the Kashmir issue and work towards preventing the adverse impacts of terrorism. There can be no doubt that Islamabad will leverage its membership to further its anti-India agenda. The statement released by the Security Council condemning the Pahalgam terror attack was relatively watered down from previous iterations of support to India. Then, on May 5, the UNSC held a closed-door consultation on the 'India-Pakistan Question', the first time after 2019.
Thus, cognisant of the possible role Pakistan can play in the UNSC, India's post-conflict outreach to the world focused on reaching out to permanent and non-permanent members except Pakistan, China and Somalia. Similar to India's outreach, Pakistan also sent its delegation to the UN headquarters in New York, as well as to Washington DC, Moscow, Brussels and London. These delegations, led by senior current and former ministers, are urging for the immediate resumption of the Indus Waters Treaty.
While the all-party delegations sent by New Delhi have made a clear case for India's imperative to target terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and the threat it faces from its western neighbor, the road ahead, to win the narrative war, will not be easy. India has been urging a rethink of the financial support offered to Pakistan by the IMF and the World Bank, and its possible utilisation by Rawalpindi to fund activities against India. India has also decided to revamp its push for Pakistan's re-inclusion in the FATF's grey list after it was removed in 2022. For India, this is important to prevent Pakistan from strengthening its terror-military scaffolding further.
While ties between Kabul and Islamabad plummeted in the last few months, they have now decided to elevate their relationship to the ambassadorial level, the agreement for which was reached during the informal meeting between the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, further changing the dynamics in the region. Both sides have had continued communications, even when the conflict between India and Pakistan broke out. While the Taliban is trying to play both sides, China's close strategic partnership with Pakistan and its openness to engaging with Kabul makes the situation difficult for India.
There has been a close synchronisation between Islamabad and Beijing against India at the UNSC and other international platforms. Pakistan will leverage the platform to propagate false claims of India's support for terrorist attacks in the country, particularly the attacks by Baloch outfits. Islamabad has also tried to pin the blame for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's actions on both Afghanistan and India. While the UNSC posts will not offer Pakistan a lot of leeway directly, it will give it more space to bring up issues that align with its own interests and deflect attention from India's concerns. Pakistan will also vehemently oppose India's permanent membership bid at the UNSC.
The writer is a junior fellow with ORF's Strategic Studies Programme
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