Eviction drive Intensifies in Kotkhai: Over 1,220 apple and pear trees felled
The eviction drive was undertaken following the Himachal Pradesh High Court's strict directives to remove illegal apple orchards from encroached forest land.
According to official information, the trees belonged to nine individuals who had allegedly encroached upon government forest land and planted commercial orchards.
In today's operation, the SOP team cut down 418 apple trees, 53 pear tree and one peach tree
Officials from the Revenue Department stated that the trees were between 10 to 35 years old, indicating long-term illegal occupation of forest land.
The operation was halted around 4:10 PM due to rainfall. However, the district administration confirmed that law and order remained peaceful throughout the day, and further updates will be communicated as the situation develops.
This action follows Saturday's drive in the same region where 93 apple trees belonging to Dinesh Tajta were removed. 664 apple and pear trees from the land encroached by Pratap Chauhan were cut
Total trees axed in two days now stands at 1,229, comprising of 973 apple tree, 117 pear trees and one peach tree
These evictions are part of the enforcement of the July 2, 2025, High Court order in CWPIL No. 17 of 2024 and CWPIL No. 9 of 2015. The Court had directed the Forest Department to immediately remove all apple orchards from previously encroached forest land across Himachal Pradesh and recover costs from the encroachers as arrears of land revenue. It had also issued bailable warrants against those obstructing the implementation.
The Forest Department and district administration, working under enhanced police security, are pressing forward with the removal despite adverse weather, ensuring compliance with the High Court's order. UNI ML SSP
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