logo
GNU Chaos: Political elites betraying SA

GNU Chaos: Political elites betraying SA

IOL News5 days ago
An AI image depicts President Cyril Ramaphosa and the DA's federal council chairperson Helen Zille, racing towards a sinkhole as the MK and EFF look on curiously.
Image: SoraAI
THE Government of National Unity (GNU) was meant to be South Africa's grand compromise — a reluctant union between the ANC and DA to stabilise a fractured political landscape.
But less than a year in, the DA's horseplay, including its decision to boycott the National Dialogue called by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, has exposed this union as fundamentally unworkable, revealing a stark contrast in governing philosophies.
While the ANC has at least nominally committed to inclusive nation-building processes, even endorsing a civil society-led National Dialogue it doesn't control, the DA has retreated into obstructionist tactics more suited to opposition benches than a party sharing governance.
The ANC's willingness to participate in difficult national conversations, however imperfectly, stands in sharp relief against the DA's petulant withdrawal over what amounts reportedly to a single deputy ministerial post.
As the GNU teeters, one thing becomes clear: the ANC may be struggling to reform, but the DA is proving it never truly wanted to govern in the first place. The DA has once again revealed its true colours, not as a party of principle, but as a faction of petulant obstructionists.
Video Player is loading.
Play Video
Play
Unmute
Current Time
0:00
/
Duration
-:-
Loaded :
0%
Stream Type LIVE
Seek to live, currently behind live
LIVE
Remaining Time
-
0:00
This is a modal window.
Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window.
Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan
Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan
Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan
Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque
Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps
Reset
restore all settings to the default values Done
Close Modal Dialog
End of dialog window.
Advertisement
Next
Stay
Close ✕
Ad loading
Its decision to boycott the National Dialogue is not just misguided; it is an outright betrayal of democratic engagement. And former president Thabo Mbeki, in a blistering open letter, has torn apart the DA's flimsy excuses with surgical precision.
The DA claims it withdrew from the National Dialogue, reportedly, in protest of Deputy Minister Andrew Whitfield's dismissal from the GNU.
DA leader John Steenhuisen issued an ultimatum: 'Fire ANC ministers in 48 hours or else!' When Ramaphosa ignored it, the DA declared the dialogue 'an ANC-run sham'. Helen Zille called it a 'hollow exercise' that would collapse without the DA's presence.
Mbeki responded: 'The National Dialogue will have absolutely nothing to do with Ms Helen Zille's fertile imagination. It is very good that, at last, Ms Helen Zille has openly expressed her eminently arrogant and contemptuous view of the masses.' The DA signed the GNU agreement committing to an 'all-inclusive National Dialogue, Yet Zille now admits she was very opposed to it from the start.'
Mbeki said: 'I would have found it logical if you and the DA had decided to withdraw from the GNU. Instead, you chose to sabotage a national conversation.'
Meanwhile, the Joseph Mathunjwa-led Labour Party launched a legal and political offensive against Ramaphosa's National Dialogue initiative, branding it unconstitutional, fiscally reckless, and an attempt to sideline Parliament and the working class.
The Labour Party, founded in 2024 with a clear worker-focused mandate, filed an urgent High Court application on June 18, seeking to interdict the process. The party argues that the estimated R700 million to R800m cost of the dialogue is 'unjustifiable' amid the country's deepening socio-economic crises.
However, their main interdict application was not heard when the matter came before the court on July 4. Instead, the court entertained interventions from several high-profile civil society foundations — including the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation, the Strategic Dialogue Group, and the Thabo Mbeki, Steve Biko, and Albert Luthuli Foundations.
'South Africa doesn't need another elite summit behind closed doors,' said acting Secretary-General Lindi Mkhumbane. 'We already have Parliament, Nedlac, and civil society platforms. What we don't have is political will from the ruling elite to act on the people's demands.'
The Labour Party's court papers demand: A declaratory order that the National Dialogue is unconstitutional and irrational.
An interdict blocking public funds for the process, including payments to the appointed 'Eminent Persons Group.'
A review of all executive decisions initiating the Dialogue.
The case has become a flashpoint between the Labour Party and a coalition of prominent civil society groups aligned with the state. On June 30, the aforementioned foundations were granted leave to intervene, defending the Dialogue.
Interim Labour Party President Joseph Mathunjwa said: 'These are not bystanders. These are political actors with deep ties to the post-apartheid ruling class. Their role isn't to unite the nation, it's to preserve an elite consensus forged behind closed doors.'
He accused the foundations of betraying the legacies of the leaders they represent: 'The same communities (these leaders) stood for are ravaged by gender-based violence, unemployment, and poverty. Now these elites want a 'dialogue' instead of action.'
Mathunjwa also criticised the procedural manoeuvring surrounding the case, particularly the fact that the foundations submitted answering affidavits before being granted leave to intervene — a step he described as 'arrogance, plain and simple'.
The Labour Party claims the Dialogue is a smokescreen for IMF-driven austerity policies, including Eskom privatisation and neoliberal reforms. 'This is a rubber stamp for IMF instructions, nothing more,' Mathunjwa said. 'If Parliament is functional, why create a new platform? This isn't inclusion, it's circumvention.'
The state's delayed filing of its answering papers — missing key deadlines — has further fuelled suspicions of procedural stalling. 'They missed the deadline, and now they're bringing in reinforcements to stall,' Mathunjwa said.
'The President cannot wake up and decide to allocate R800m without parliamentary scrutiny,' Mkhumbane argued. 'This is executive overreach masquerading as participation.' As the legal showdown looms, the Labour Party has called on ordinary South Africans to reject what it calls a 'PR stunt' designed to distract from worsening conditions across the country.
'Rape, violence, and poverty don't need a dialogue, they need action,' Mathunjwa declared. 'We're ready to meet them in court.'
Political analyst and author Nicholas Woode-Smith delivered a scathing critique of Ramaphosa's National Dialogue, calling it a 'vanity project' designed more to distract South Africans than to solve the country's deepening crises.
Woode-Smith, managing editor of *The Rational Standard* and a senior associate at the Free Market Foundation, argues that the event — budgeted at R700 million — was emblematic of Ramaphosa's leadership style.
'This is not going to be some miraculous meeting of the minds where all of South Africa's many issues are solved,' Woode-Smith said. 'On the contrary, Ramaphosa has set up the entire indaba to distract South Africans from the fact that he is completely underequipped to be our president.'
He added: 'This entire affair could have been an email.'
According to Woode-Smith, the high cost of the summit reflects its true nature — a political exercise in self-aggrandisement rather than a genuine attempt at national healing or problem-solving.
'The initial cost of R700m is just a testament to the fact that this entire event is a vanity project,' he stated. 'Ramaphosa is even taking advantage of condemnations of the quoted bill to try to act like he cares about cost-cutting. If he truly cared about saving money, he'd privatise Transnet and Eskom and stop bailing out the Post Office and SAA.'
He continued: 'The fact that even a cent of taxpayer money is being spent on Ramaphosa's little pow-wow is unacceptable.'
Woode-Smith questioned the very purpose of the National Dialogue, pointing out that there is no clear objective or roadmap for how it will lead to tangible change.
'It is also unclear what this National Dialogue aims to accomplish,' he said. 'Even if Ramaphosa hears contrary views, they will go ignored. The ANC has a history of not working with its partners. Why should we expect Ramaphosa to respect challenges to ANC policy in a National Dialogue when his party runs roughshod over his coalition partners in the Government of National Unity (GNU)?'
He pointed to recent actions by the president as evidence of the ANC's inability to share power responsibly.
'The ANC does not know how to share power,' Woode-Smith asserted. 'At every turn, it has ignored the fact that it is a partner in government, and not a dictator. Ramaphosa firing the Democratic Alliance (DA) Minister Andrew Whitfield is just the most recent example. And no, his excuse is not sufficient. He is not a dictator who can unilaterally kick out ministers.'
He further said: 'He is a partner in a coalition government who should be in constant dialogue with the other parties. He should try that dialogue before making it national.'
The analyst also criticised the ruling party's legislative agenda, particularly the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Bill and expropriation without compensation, which he says were pushed through without meaningful consultation.
'Pushing through BELA and expropriation without compensation, while refusing to countenance any dissent are just the cherries on top of the farce that is pluralism in the GNU,' he said.
Woode-Smith also took aim at the composition of the so-called 'Eminent Persons Group,' tasked with facilitating the dialogue.
'Meant to represent South Africa as leaders that reflect 'the great diversity of our nation,' this group is nowhere close to reflecting the true, political diversity of this country,' he argued.
He noted that the list includes 'a few business leaders, trade unionists, religious leaders, researchers and politicians. But mostly just celebrities. Actors, writers, sportsmen, models.'
He asked: 'Is this supposed to be a serious discussion to establish a way forward for our crumbling society, or a festival of shiny faces and shallow vibes?'
'There are no drastic alternative views to Ramaphosa's dogma present in the list,' Woode-Smith said. 'Only Lindiwe Mazibuko was a member of the opposition, and her departure from the DA was not cordial.'
He concluded: 'Ramaphosa has crafted a list of yes-men, with some token business leaders who are likely to be too afraid to rock the boat to be too outspoken. This is not the guest list of a dialogue. It's that of an echo chamber.'
In Woode-Smith's view, a real national dialogue would involve voices across the ideological spectrum — including those who strongly oppose the ANC's policies.
'A true national dialogue, with the aim of patching South Africa's rifts and working towards solving our problems needs to include parties from all sides of the spectrum,' he said. 'Most importantly, Ramaphosa's enemies; he should have invited Ernst Roets. He should have invited Kallie Kriel.'
He added: 'Helen Zille has been an integral part of South Africa's post-1994 political space. Invite her. Invite at least a single representative from an opposition party. Take advantage of South Africa's host of world-class think tanks: the Institute of Race Relations, the Free Market Foundation, the Brenthurst Foundation, the Institute for Security Studies.'
Woode-Smith accused the ANC of systematically excluding certain communities from governance. 'The fundamental issue of the ANC's governance has been that it doesn't want to include everyone,' he said. 'It wants to push Afrikaners, white people and other minorities further and further into the periphery. And when said minorities still thrive, they grow bitter.' Get the real story on the go: Follow the Sunday Independent on WhatsApp.
Orange background

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Comments

No comments yet...

Related Articles

Regional trade could focus South Africa's muddled foreign policy
Regional trade could focus South Africa's muddled foreign policy

Daily Maverick

timean hour ago

  • Daily Maverick

Regional trade could focus South Africa's muddled foreign policy

Coalition governance is messy, but parties should be able to agree on prioritising economic growth and trade into Africa. South Africa's government of national unity (GNU) has just staggered past the one-year mark. Its foreign policy reflects continuity, some change, a steady mismatch between ambition and resources and little focus on national growth priorities. Disagreements on foreign policy and strained relations, particularly regarding Western partners, highlight the challenges when the two largest GNU parties – the ANC and the DA – come from such different backgrounds. The 2024 GNU statement of intent includes only one catch-all sentence on foreign policy among its basic minimum priorities: the country will pursue 'human rights, constitutionalism, the national interest, solidarity, peaceful resolution of conflicts, to achieve the African Agenda 2063, South-South, North-South and African cooperation, multilateralism and a just, peaceful and equitable world'. Everything and therefore nothing. The sum effect is a foreign policy adrift. The International Relations and Cooperation Department rarely pursues the country's developmental priorities (growth, poverty reduction and equity). It also has a selective approach to democracy and human rights issues in the region. The defence force's humiliation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo also shows that South Africa does not have the military means to support its peacemaking ambitions in Africa. Foreign policy largely takes the form of a commitment by the ANC to its traditional partners and issues such as Palestine, Cuba, Western Sahara, China and Russia. Regarding Russia, it's ironic that US President Donald Trump's tilt towards that country has reduced European (and US) criticisms of the ANC's tacit support of Russia. Some fresh air came into a stale debate when the uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party stood back from the ANC's commitment to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic's independence from Morocco. The DA hasn't taken a formal position, but is less passionate about Western Sahara than the ANC, and would probably agree with MK. South Africa's active role in international forums and advocacy for human rights on Israel's genocide in Gaza has been commendable. However, Pretoria seems to take a principled stance only when it has no real influence on an issue that is suitably far away (such as Western Sahara) – shrinking back on matters in its own neighbourhood. The ANC's hostility towards Western partners is readily evident to anyone on the diplomatic circuit in Pretoria and Cape Town. BRICS partner events attract many government officials, whereas high-level events such as the European Union's (EU) Europe Day struggle to attract even one, despite EU trade being more important. The future of South Africa's trade and manufacturing growth doesn't lie in Europe, China or the US, it lies in Africa. South Africa is particularly enthusiastic about BRICS' expansion, emerging as a leader of the Global South – although without any substantially associated trade benefits. Unlike trade with China, where South Africa exports commodities and imports manufactured goods, EU-South Africa export values roughly match imports, and have higher-value content. EU countries also have much larger investments in South Africa, and many European companies have long-standing domestic operations. Between 1,000 and 2,000 EU companies are active in South Africa, collectively holding almost half of the total foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country and supporting more than 500,000 jobs. South Africa has a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China (as do many other African countries), and the number of Chinese-invested companies in South Africa has increased. And while the stock of Chinese FDI has grown, it is still below 4% of China's total stock, compared with 48% in the EU 's case. China presents South Africa with two existential challenges. The first is the imbalance created by South Africa largely exporting commodities and importing manufactured and other higher-value items from China. Second, China is South Africa's largest regional competitor, and the flood of Chinese goods has been key to South African and regional deindustrialisation. The Institute for Security Studies' African Futures and Innovation has modelled the comparative contribution that growth in different sectors could make to increasing incomes and reducing poverty in South Africa. The forecasts find that manufacturing has the largest potential impact on these two crucial indicators of progress. Yet, after peaking at 25%, manufacturers' contribution to gross domestic product has declined to below 13%. South Africa is deindustrialising. Reversing that trend requires a hard-nosed assessment of partners and future markets. However, the future of South Africa's trade and manufacturing growth doesn't lie in Europe, China or the US – which the American Chamber of Commerce says accounts for about 5.3% of South Africa's FDI stock. Rather, it lies in Africa. Intra-African trade strategically aligns with South Africa's industrial and geopolitical goals. Already, trade with African nations accounts for much of South Africa's exports, emphasising the country's role in regional commerce. With the African Continental Free Trade Area, there's potential for growth. During the most recent budget vote, Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau made the appropriate noises, but still referred to the tired butterfly strategy of the 1990s – with a wing each in Asia and the Americas. Instead, the vision should be of South Africa's own Belt and Road Initiative into Africa. The country should build the infrastructure to benefit from the regional market. Regional trade must be the pillar of South Africa's trade strategy, especially in promoting value-added exports and expanding its influence across Africa. While not as large in absolute terms as trade with Asia or Europe, intra-African trade strategically aligns with South Africa's industrial and geopolitical goals. The Southern African Development Community region accounts for about 20% to 25% of South Africa's total exports, and South Africa enjoys a significant trade surplus with most African countries. Regional trade is also heavily weighted towards value-added exports, such that vehicles, machinery, processed foods, construction materials and petrochemicals dominate exports to African countries. Trade into Africa helps support local South African manufacturing and industrial employment. Meanwhile, the end of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Trump's punitive approach to trade with South Africa (and other countries), will inevitably galvanise the search for alternative markets, particularly in Africa. That is good news. Under the GNU, South Africa's foreign policy operates within a more complex domestic political landscape. But the one thing parties should agree on is to prioritise South Africa's economic growth and trade into Africa. DM

IEC blocks 'Sharia law' party's registration
IEC blocks 'Sharia law' party's registration

The South African

time3 hours ago

  • The South African

IEC blocks 'Sharia law' party's registration

The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has confirmed that the application for registration of the Islamic State of Africa (ISA) as a political party has been rejected. IEC spokesperson Kate Bapela said the chief electoral officer (CEO), Sy Mamabolo, rejected the application by ISA on three grounds: The first is that the party failed to meet the threshold of prescribed details of registered voters who support the formation of the party. The prescribed details are the signatures of 300 registered voters, together with their full names and signatures. Secondly, the party published the notice of its application in a newspaper which enjoys circulation only in parts of the municipal area. The publication in only some parts of the municipal area is not sufficient to create awareness of the application. 'The purpose of publishing the application is to alert persons in the geographic area linked to the sphere of registration the party is applying for. In the present case, the area of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality,' Bapela explained. The third reason is that the IEC CEO received over 200 objections from individuals and organisations who argued that the constitution of ISA espouses 'the intention to develop policies based on Sharia law'. 'It is the submission of the objectors that part of ISA's constitution is 'antithetical to the secular and inclusive nature of the principles underpinning the South African constitutional order and registering ISA would cause serious offence to a section of the population,' she added. Furthermore, Bapela said the Islamic State of Africa may, within 30 days, appeal the decision of the CEO not to register it as a party to the IEC. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1. Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X, and Bluesky for the latest news.

Turning declarations into deliverables: South Africa's BRICS 2025 Challenge
Turning declarations into deliverables: South Africa's BRICS 2025 Challenge

IOL News

time3 hours ago

  • IOL News

Turning declarations into deliverables: South Africa's BRICS 2025 Challenge

For South Africa, the BRICS 2030 horizon offers not just hope, but a promising future, writes Ayanda Holo. Image: IOL / AI By Ayanda Holo Beneath the glittering chandeliers of the Bank of China building in Johannesburg, Chinese Ambassador Wu Peng addressed a gathering of investors, policymakers, and technocrats. At his side sat South Africa's Deputy Finance Minister Dr David Masondo, a key architect of the government's economic recovery and structural reform agenda. The occasion marked the release of the Chinese Investor Survey, a moment that revealed not only the depth of Sino-South African relations but also the lingering bottlenecks that continue to hinder what could be a transformative partnership. Ambassador Wu's tone was both celebratory and cautionary. Over 200 Chinese enterprises have injected more than $11 billion into South Africa, creating jobs, taxes, and valuable industrialisation footprints. Yet, despite this progress, the Ambassador pointedly highlighted recurring frustrations: the slow and sometimes opaque processing of work visas for essential engineers and managers and the heightened security threats to Chinese nationals. These issues, he suggested, could jeopardise investor confidence unless addressed with urgency and sincerity. At the heart of his speech was a subtle but potent reference to Declaration 42 of the BRICS 2025 Strategy, which states: "We welcome the results of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025… and look forward to the conclusion and implementation of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030, which will… guide cooperation on issues relating to the Multilateral Trading System, Digital Economy, International Trade, Financial Cooperation and Sustainable Development." This strategy is not just a document, but a roadmap to our future. This forward-looking blueprint aims to deepen the ties that bind BRICS nations, with South Africa poised to benefit as a regional gateway for Asia–Africa trade. But such ambitions rest precariously on domestic execution. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading The Visa Conundrum: When Policy Fails Practice A compelling case in point emerged from a significant $200 million investment project in the Eastern Cape, a region with great potential for economic growth. The project procured high-grade industrial equipment from Yangzhou Metal Forming Machine Tool Co. The firm dispatched three highly skilled engineers to oversee installation and training. Despite submitting complete documentation to VFS Global, including verified invitation letters from their South African host, the engineers were denied work visas for several months. This delay was not only an administrative embarrassment but also a tangible blow to investor confidence. The engineers were essential to commissioning a production line that was central to the project's ROI timeline. The months-long delay undermined the "open the way" vision of Operation Vulindlela, a flagship reform programme by the South African Presidency and Treasury designed to reduce red tape for investors. Is Operation Vulindlela truly living up to its name? According to a recent SA Government News release dated March 2025, the Department of Home Affairs has introduced improvements to fast-track visa applications for investors and critical skills workers. A new "Trusted Employer Scheme" was also piloted with large multinationals and BRICS-partner firms in mind. Yet the Eastern Cape incident underscores a gap between policy and implementation, a chasm where projects stall, costs rise, and goodwill wanes. From Zero-Tariffs to Zero-Tolerance on Inefficiency China's recent announcement to provide zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries via the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Development is a tectonic shift in global trade patterns. It gives African manufacturers and agricultural producers unprecedented access to the world's second-largest economy. And South Africa, with its mature logistics, industrial base, and financial institutions, is uniquely positioned to lead this integration. But it must not allow procedural inertia to squander strategic advantages. This is particularly critical in sectors like automotive components, green energy infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing, where Chinese investment has surged. Each of these sectors requires the temporary importation of technical personnel, often on tight deadlines to transfer knowledge and integrate systems. Ambassador Wu's call for smoother visa processes is therefore not a favour to China, but a necessary step if South Africa is serious about its BRICS role. It's not just about accommodating Chinese investors, but about creating an environment where all BRICS nations can thrive, boosting South Africa's economy and global influence. A Catalogue of Cooperation It is worth reminding readers of the many bilateral and multilateral agreements that underpin this evolving relationship. These include: The China-South Africa Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement (2010).The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019–2025 The Belt and Road MOU, signed in 2015, focuses on infrastructure Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Agreements, protecting investor rights The Annual SA-China High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism, encouraging cultural, academic, and tech innovation links. Each of these frameworks, including the 2025 BRICS Economic Strategy, calls for the removal of administrative and logistical barriers that impede the flow of capital, of people, of ideas. What Must Change? If Pretoria is to maintain credibility within BRICS and its reform agenda, several actions are urgent: Mandate real-time escalation channels for work visa cases tied to investment projects over R50 and enforce the Trusted Employer Scheme beyond pilot status. Include a BRICS Investor Fast Lane under the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC).Publish quarterly Operation Vulindlela scorecards, with measurable impact on investor facilitation. As Ambassador Wu concluded, "Challenges are part of development." But challenges left unaddressed become liabilities. For South Africa, the BRICS 2030 horizon offers not just hope, but a promising future. Whether that promise becomes reality depends not on declarations from abroad, but on decisions made at home. * Ayanda Holo is the President of TV BRICS AFRICA ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store