Metal sheets, ultra-thin feats: are China's 2D metals the future of electronics?
Chinese
scientists have found a way to squeeze metals into ultra-thin sheets – no more than a few atoms thick.
Advertisement
Some experts believe the feat could revolutionise the way electronic devices are made, from low-power transistors to next-generation chips and supersensitive detectors.
Drawing inspiration from ancient copper-forging techniques, a team from the Institute of Physics at the Chinese Academy of Physics in Beijing produced sheets of bismuth, gallium, indium, tin and lead that were in some cases just one atom thick – hundreds of thousands of times thinner than a human hair.
In an article published in the journal Nature on Thursday, the researchers said that compared to their bulkier counterparts, their ultra-thin metal sheets – especially one-atom-thick bismuth – showed exceptionally high electrical conductivity, among other unique properties.
Javier Sanchez-Yamagishi, a specialist in two-dimensional (2D) materials at the University of California, Irvine, said that while the Chinese team was not the first to produce atomically thin metals, their results stood out because the new method produces 'large-scale, truly 2D metals' compared to previous techniques.
Advertisement
'The stability and large sizes of these materials open up many possibilities for integrating them with other materials and for making new electrical or photonic devices,' Sanchez-Yamagishi wrote in a review article in Nature.
Scientists have long known that 2D materials can show vastly different properties from their 3D counterparts, even with the same chemical composition. For instance, a single-atom-thick sheet of carbon, known as graphene, is far stronger and more conductive than the graphite in pencil tips.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
HKFP
a day ago
- HKFP
WHO says all Covid-19 origin theories remain open after inconclusive study
All hypotheses on how the Covid-19 pandemic began remain open, the World Health Organization said Friday, following an inconclusive four-year investigation that was hamstrung by crucial information being withheld. The global catastrophe killed an estimated 20 million people, according to the WHO, while shredding economies, crippling health systems and turning people's lives upside-down. The first cases were detected in Wuhan in China in late 2019, and understanding where the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID came from is key to preventing future pandemics. However, a lengthy investigation launched by the UN's health agency said that pending further data, the origin of Covid and how it first spread remains elusive. 'As things stand, all hypotheses must remain on the table, including zoonotic spillover and lab leak,' WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told a press conference, referring to the two main hypotheses as to how the pandemic began. Expert investigation An initial WHO-Chinese joint report in March 2021 concluded that the virus most likely jumped from bats to humans via an intermediate animal. It deemed a leak from Wuhan's virology laboratories — known for their research on coronaviruses — to be 'extremely unlikely'. However, that investigation faced harsh criticism for lacking transparency and access, and for not seriously evaluating the lab-leak theory. Tedros launched another investigation, setting up the Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens (SAGO), comprising 27 international experts, in July 2021. Their 78-page report was published on Friday. It said the weight of available evidence suggests a spillover from animals — either directly from bats, or through an intermediate host. However, it could not conclude with certainty where and when this happened, nor whether the Wuhan wet market was where the virus first spilled over into humans. That said, the market 'appears to be the location for amplification of infection in humans', leading to widespread transmission. 'Evidence for widespread infections or cases in any other countries prior to December 2019 is lacking,' it added. While spillover was the best supported theory on the evidence currently available, 'until further requests for information are met, or more scientific data becomes available, the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and how it entered the human population will remain inconclusive,' SAGO chair Marietjie Venter said at the press conference. Lab leak theories 'could not be investigated or excluded', she said, because much of the needed information had not been made available. The experts requested unpublished information from other countries, notably Germany and the United States, but without success, she said. Earlier this week, one SAGO member resigned and three others asked for their names to be removed from the report. 'Crucial question' 'Over the past five years, we have learned a lot about Covid-19 but there is one crucial question about the pandemic that we have not yet answered: how it started,' Tedros said. 'Despite our repeated requests, China hasn't provided hundreds of viral sequences from individuals with Covid-19 early in the pandemic, more detailed information on animals sold at markets in Wuhan, and information on work done and biosafety conditions at laboratories in Wuhan,' he said. He said WHO has requested access to intelligence reports by governments around the world on the origins of Covid-19. US President Donald Trump's administration has officially embraced the lab leak theory. Moral imperative Tedros said finding out how Covid-19 started was a moral imperative for those who lost their lives in the pandemic and to prevent further outbreaks. He said the virus was continuing to evolve, take lives and leave people suffering with post-Covid conditions, or so-called long Covid. Tedros said the WHO is appealing to countries with information about the origins of Covid-19 to share information. SAGO said it would continue to evaluate any new, sound scientific evidence and update its findings accordingly.
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- AllAfrica
China steps closer to landing on moon by 2030
China has successfully conducted an escape flight test on its lunar spacecraft Mengzhou, which means 'dream ship' in Mandarin. By 2030, the country plans to send three Chinese astronauts to land on the moon. It was the second zero-altitude escape flight test in 27 years, following the first one conducted by the Shenzhou manned spacecraft in 1998. Zero altitude means the test was performed on the ground instead of high in the air. The launch escape system or tower, powered by solid rocket motors (SRMs), was installed at the tip of the Mengzhou aircraft's return capsule. In an emergency during a launch, the capsule is to be separated from the rocket within two seconds whenever the system detects any abnormal situation. During the test on June 17, the integrated spacecraft and launch escape tower assembly ascended and reached its designated altitude in about 20 seconds. The return capsule separated from the escape tower and landed on the ground with a parachute in two minutes. According to the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), Mengzhou's escape and rescue subsystems are now centralized in the spacecraft. In Shenzhou's case, the rocket handled the escape functions. 'Mengzhou will become the core manned spacecraft sustaining the application and development of China's space station, manned lunar exploration, and other tasks,' said the CMSA. 'The successful test has laid an important technical foundation for the subsequent human-crewed lunar exploration missions.' The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp (CASIC) Fourth Academy, the developer of the launch escape tower, said in a statement on June 24 that its team has achieved many breakthroughs in developing SRMs, which use solid propellants to generate thrust. It said such an achievement significantly improved Mengzhou's escape system compared with Shenzhou's. 'For the first time, we were responsible for developing the escape system's server using self-developed sensors and mechanics,' it said on June 24. 'We also developed the software and algorithms to control the SRMs, and used environmentally friendly rocket fuels.' 'We will continue to take practical actions to realize China's dream of sending people to the moon,' it said. In January 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on the CASIC Fourth Academy and accused it of acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. After testing the escape system, CMSA's next key mission is to launch the Long March 10A rocket in 2026. China launched its uncrewed Chang'e 6 spacecraft to the moon in May last year using the Long March 5 rocket. Long March 5, nicknamed 'Fat Five,' has eight YF-100 rocket engines in four boosters, and two YF-77 engines on its first stage. Total thrust is 10,636 kilonewtons (kN). It can lift 25 tons to low Earth orbit (LEO), 14 tons to the geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) and 8 tons to the Earth-moon-transfer orbit, or trans-lunar injection (TLI) trajectory. Such lifting power is not enough to support China's crewed lunar mission. Long March 10 is an upgraded version of Long March 5. It has 14 YF-100 engines in two boosters and seven more on its first stage. The total thrust is 26,250 kN. It can lift 70 tons to LEO and 27 tons to TLI. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) planned to launch the Long March 10 in 2027. However, it said last November that it would launch the Long March 10A in 2026. The Long March 10A is the Long March 10 without two boosters. It can lift 14 tons, or a spacecraft with up to seven people, to LEO, and can be reused. 'The development of our next-generation crewed Long March 10 rocket is on schedule,' said Wang Yue, a researcher at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. 'We have achieved some breakthroughs in developing reusable rockets, and have already started producing the components. According to CNSA's plan, China will launch the Long March 10 thrice between 2027 and 2030. By 2030, the fourth and fifth launches will be a moon lander (Lanyue) and the Mengzhou spacecraft, respectively. None of these rockets will be reused. During the 2030 mission, the spacecraft carrying three astronauts will dock with the lander before landing on the moon. In 2023, CNSA decided to launch the lander and spacecraft separately, as its more powerful Long March 9 rocket will only be available after 2030. Some Chinese commentators said the lunar exploration mission of the Long March 10 will continue to expand after Chinese astronauts' landing on the moon. 'Landing on the moon is only a small part of our country's lunar exploration plan,' a Sichuan-based columnist writes in an article last month. 'We have a much bigger goal – to transform the moon into China's backyard.' 'After our astronauts reach the moon, our people will move and live there sooner or later,' he says. 'We will chat and have entertainment on the moon, treating the place like our backyard.' He says Chinese astronauts will build houses on the moon and frequently travel between the Earth and the moon. He says China will also use its space technology to boost ties with other countries and help send astronauts from different countries to the moon. Ultimately, China will discover how to extract water and make oxygen using resources on the moon. 'Our lunar plan keeps accelerating, while the United States keeps postponing its plan,' he says. 'It is possible that China will beat the US in sending people to the moon in this round of the space race.' On December 19, 1972, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) landed humans on the moon during the Apollo 17 mission. It plans to revisit the Moon in mid-2027 with the Artemis III mission. Two of four astronauts, including the first woman and first person of color, are to land on the Moon's South Pole for a week of scientific exploration. Read: US, China in hot race to put nuclear reactors on the moon
AllAfrica
3 days ago
- AllAfrica
US missing the point on China's industrial cyberespionage
The United States is attempting to decouple its economy from rivals such as China. Efforts toward this include policymakers raising tariffs on Chinese goods, blocking exports of advanced technology and offering subsidies to boost American manufacturing. The goal is to reduce reliance on China for critical products, in the hope that this will also protect US intellectual property from theft. The idea that decoupling will help stem state-sponsored cyber-economic espionage has become a key justification for these measures. For instance, then-US Trade Representative Katherine Tai framed the continuation of China-specific tariffs as serving the 'statutory goal to stop [China's] harmful … cyber intrusions and cyber theft.' Early tariff rounds during the first Trump administration were likewise framed as forcing Beijing to confront 'deeply entrenched' theft of US intellectual property. This push to 'onshore' key industries is driven by very real concerns. By some estimates, theft of US trade secrets, often through hacking – costs the American economy hundreds of billions of dollars per year. In that light, decoupling is a defensive economic shield – a way to keep vital technology out of an adversary's reach. But will decoupling and cutting trade ties truly make America's innovations safer from prying eyes? I'm a political scientist who studies state-sponsored cyberespionage, and my research suggests that the answer is a definitive no. Indeed, it might actually have the opposite effect. To understand why, it helps to look at what really drives state-sponsored hacking. Intuitively, you might think a country is most tempted to steal secrets from a nation it depends on. For example, if Country A must import jet engines or microchips from Country B, Country A might try to hack Country B's companies to copy that technology and become self-sufficient. This is the industrial dependence theory of cyber theft. There is some truth to this motive. If your economy needs what another country produces, stealing that know-how can boost your own industries and reduce reliance. However, in a recent study, I show that a more powerful predictor of cyberespionage is industrial similarity. Countries with overlapping advanced industries, such as aerospace, electronics, or pharmaceuticals, are the ones most likely to target each other with cyberattacks. Why would having similar industries spur more spying? The reason is competition. If two nations both specialize in cutting-edge sectors, each has a lot to gain by stealing the other's innovations. If you're a tech powerhouse, you have valuable secrets worth stealing, and you have the capability and motivation to steal others' secrets. In essence, simply trading with a rival isn't the core issue. Rather, it's the underlying technological rivalry that fuels espionage. For example, a cyberattack in 2012 targeted SolarWorld, a US solar panel manufacturer, and the perpetrators stole the company's trade secrets. Chinese solar companies then developed competing products based on the stolen designs, costing SolarWorld millions in lost revenue. This is a classic example of industrial similarity at work. China was building its own solar industry, so it hacked a US rival to leapfrog in technology. China has made major investments in its cyberespionage capabilities. Crucially, cutting trade ties doesn't remove this rivalry. If anything, decoupling might intensify it. When the US and China exchange tariff blows or cut off tech transfers, it doesn't make China give up – it likely pushes Chinese intelligence agencies to work even harder to steal what they can't buy. This dynamic isn't unique to China. Any country that suddenly loses access to an important technology may turn to espionage as Plan B. History provides examples. When South Africa was isolated by sanctions in the 1980s, it covertly obtained nuclear weapons technology. Similarly, when Israel faced arms embargoes in the 1960s, it engaged in clandestine efforts to get military technology. Isolation can breed desperation, and hacking is a low-cost, high-reward tool for the desperate. There's no easy fix for state-sponsored hacking as long as countries remain locked in high-tech competition. However, there are steps that can mitigate the damage and perhaps dial down the frequency of these attacks. One is investing in cyber defense. Just as a homeowner adds locks and alarms after a burglary, companies and governments should continually strengthen their cyber defenses. Assuming that espionage attempts are likely to happen is key. Advanced network monitoring, employee training against phishing, and robust encryption can make it much harder for hackers to succeed, even if they keep trying. Another is building resilience and redundancy. If you know that some secrets might get stolen, plan for it. Businesses can shorten product development cycles and innovate faster so that even if a rival copies today's tech, you're already moving on to the next generation. Staying ahead of thieves is a form of defense, too. Ultimately, rather than viewing tariffs and export bans as silver bullets against espionage, US leaders and industry might be safer focusing on resilience and stress-testing cybersecurity firms. Make it harder for adversaries to steal secrets, and less rewarding even if they do. William Akoto is assistant professor of global security, American University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
