Power shifts in Sudan - World - Al-Ahram Weekly

Al-Ahram Weekly

04-02-2025

Sudanese Army Forces are advancing into areas of Sudan previously held by the Rapid Support Forces, but they may face additional challenges in the western state of Darfur
The war in Sudan has been seeing shifts over the past few weeks, with political analysts noting that the changes appear to be altering the balance of power in the country, though they could simply represent a strategic redeployment of forces.
The first signs of the transformation emerged when the military leadership of Sudan announced that it had taken control of the city of Wad Madani in the heart of the country. The city had been under the rule of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have maintained control over Sudan's most important agricultural region for nearly a year.
This coincided with the Sudanese Army's advance into Khartoum, where it is headquartered in the General Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces and have led further confrontations in Omdurman, the twin city of Khartoum.
The Wad Madani and Greater Gezira regions, which encompass the Gezira, White Nile, and Blue Nile states, have long been regarded as Sudan's agricultural heartland, dating back more than a century when the British colonial administration in Sudan initiated the Gezira Irrigation Project prior to World War I using water from the Sennar Dam completed in 1913.
Following Sudan's independence in the mid-1950s, the newly independent government of Sudan expanded such agricultural initiatives, establishing the Managil Project in southern Gezira and fostering the spread of commercial farming in the White Nile region, particularly with the Kenana Sugar Project.
By the time of the rule of former Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, the Gezira, then divided into three states, boasted the country's most developed infrastructure, including agricultural projects, railways, highways, a university, an advanced school network, and healthcare systems that outpaced those in other regions of the country.
Cities and villages previously controlled by the RSF in the three states have rapidly fallen back under government control. In the words of veteran Sudanese journalist and editor-in-chief of Sudan's Al-Tayyar newspaper Osman Mirghani, these areas have now 'returned to the homeland.'
At the same time, the SAF have regained control of the Jelei Refinery north of Khartoum, Sudan's most important oil facility built in the late 1990s during the early stages of oil exploration in Sudan.
Shortly thereafter, the SAF seized control of the town of Umm Rawaba, a vital transportation hub in western Sudan. Positioned as the gateway to the Greater Kordofan region comprising North, South, and West Kordofan, Umm Rawaba serves as a central meeting point for railways and highways connecting Khartoum, the White Nile, and Kordofan's capital.
While the SAF have thus seen important victories, Sudanese analysts are asking whether these are genuine or whether they represent a tactical redeployment of forces on the part of the RSF. The latter could be withdrawing from these areas in order to concentrate on regions where it has more societal influence, allowing it to better defend its positions and prolong the conflict in the hopes of reaching a political settlement, currently rejected by the SAF.
'These victories are clear signs of the collapse of the Janjaweed militia,' Mirghani told Al-Ahram Weekly, referring to the RSF.
The RSF were formed in 2013 during the regime of Al-Bashir as a parallel military force to the army. The majority of its fighters come from the Janjaweed militia, which has been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Darfur conflict from 2003 to 2008.
Many RSF members hail from Arab pastoral tribes in Darfur and parts of Kordofan, groups that were exploited by the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood government of Sudan under Al-Bashir to suppress the non-Arab farming populations in Darfur.
'The areas where the majority of the Janjaweed are based are vast, open deserts that cannot be defended effectively. As a result, a strategy of creating fortified social strongholds to negotiate a political settlement is not feasible,' Mirghani said.
The RSF's control over the capital, the Gezira region, certain towns in the River Nile state to the north, and parts of Kordofan has not been stable. 'These areas, for various political and tribal reasons, reject the RSF presence,' Mirghani said. 'The RSF were never truly comfortable in these regions.'
The war in Sudan, which has engulfed nearly the whole country, began in April 2023 between the army, led by head of state Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, and his former deputy, Hamdan Dagalo, also known as 'Hemedti,' who commands the RSF.
The catalyst for the war was the refusal of the RSF to integrate its fighters into the army, a move that would have resulted in the loss of political influence for its leadership and their allies. The RSF had been directly subordinate to Al-Bashir and were never a part of the Sudanese Army.
Mirghani said the RSF's recent attack on the Sabreen Market in Omdurman was 'evidence of the Janjaweed's loss of control of the capital.' International news agencies reported that more than 60 people were killed in the assault, which eyewitnesses said originated from areas west of Omdurman still under the control of the RSF.
Talha Gibril, a Sudanese academic, said that 'the army's progress to the north of the capital, its control of Khartoum, its southward push into the Gezira region, and its gains in Umm Rawaba are crucial steps in containing the RSF in Darfur. However, the real challenge lies ahead, as the battle in Darfur will likely be more intense than what we have seen so far.'
'The RSF currently controls most of Darfur, after having carried out significant eliminations of key non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit,' Gibril added.
Many former rebel groups in Darfur, including the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and the Darfur Joint Force, are now fighting alongside the army against the RSF.
The RSF maintain control over Nyala and Al-Geneina, the second and third-largest cities in Darfur, while sustaining a months-long siege on Al-Fasher, the region's capital.
'After the army regained its forces, it was able to reclaim central Sudan and Kordofan from the RSF. However, the battle for Darfur has a different set of challenges,' Mirghani said.
'The primary factors here are the positions of the major Arab tribes in Darfur and, equally significantly, the stance of the Chadian government regarding the ongoing hostilities.'
According to Gibril, 'the most critical theatre of operations at this moment is central and western-central Sudan. The army cannot push towards Darfur or break the siege of Al-Fasher without first securing a decisive victory around the Nile.'
Since the eruption of hostilities in Sudan nearly two years ago, Khartoum has been transformed into a city resembling a vast military encampment. Between April 2023 and June 2024, at least 26,000 people were killed in Khartoum, according to a report by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Entire neighbourhoods have been depopulated and repurposed as strongholds for armed factions, while 3.6 million residents have fled the capital, according to UN estimates.
UN agencies report that at least 106,000 people in Khartoum are experiencing famine, with an additional 3.2 million facing acute food insecurity.
Shortly before leaving office in January, former US president Joe Biden imposed sanctions on Al-Burhan, citing military strikes on civilian infrastructure, including schools, markets, and hospitals, as well as the deliberate use of starvation as a weapon of war.
These measures followed sanctions on Dagalo a week earlier. The RSF are accused of genocide and severe human rights violations in Darfur, where its influence remains deeply entrenched.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 February, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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