CDC re-brands its ‘CGP' as ‘Asaan Connect'
Pakistan's investor base remains under-penetrated with less than 1 percent of the population actively investing in capital markets. Platforms like Asaan Connect lower the barrier to entry, especially for young, digital-first investors seeking ease, speed, and credibility.
Asaan Connect offers investors a single, unified platform to its customers for completing their on-boarding journey and accessing a wide range of licensed institutions, all without redundant KYC or switching platforms. Investors can select from over 150 brokerage houses (TREC Holders) for seamless digital on-boarding; they can access over 200 mutual funds offered by 18 leading Asset Management Companies.
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Customers can also initiate on-boarding with 19 insurance companies through a single window and experience a streamlined process with standardised documentation, faster turnaround, and the ability to give electronic consent directly via the portal.
Asaan Connect enables secure, end-to-end digital on-boarding within minutes eliminating delays and lowering entry barriers. CDC applies the same level of protection to customer information and documents submitted through Asaan Connect as it does to the assets it safeguards as a custodian.
At the core of this digitisation is the KYC on-boarding process. 'Know Your Customer' (KYC) is a regulatory requirement that involves verifying an individual's identity before they can access financial services. Through Asaan Connect, investors can complete their KYC digitally — by submitting their CNIC and supporting documents — enabling swift and secure account opening without the need for in-person interactions or manual form submissions.
All data is collected digitally, with documents submitted in soft form to digitise the experience. The platform is integrated with key verification utilities such as NADRA, the Pakistan Mobile Database, and SBP's RAAST system to enable real-time identity verification and KYC. Information flows electronically between CDC and intermediaries via secure linkages, with no manual intervention involved.
Asaan Connect stems from months of market research, stakeholder engagement, and user feedback. It reflects a broader vision rooted in customer centricity, accessibility, and digital ease, aiming to empower investors with one unified on-boarding experience across diverse capital market sectors. It also marks a strategic shift toward a more intuitive, relatable identity that resonates with today's digitally savvy investors.
Asaan Connect signals CDC's commitment to modernisation and its role in making capital market access simpler and more inclusive. The core idea behind this platform is to provide investors with a simplified, consistent way to complete the on-boarding process — a crucial first step before they can begin investing.
To make the on-boarding process faster, Asaan Connect has introduced a feature through which connected intermediaries can upload standard documents required for on-boarding on the portal such as Commission Structure, Risk Disclosure, Standardized Terms & Conditions, etc. These documents will be available for view and acceptance by the customer on the portal, hence ensuring that Asaan Connect is a one stop platform to meet all on-boarding requirements.
Moreover, if the customers update their profile, all the selected intermediaries are updated automatically, adding to the customer centricity of Asaan Connect. Tutorial videos have also been developed and the portal encompasses helpful guides and tool tips for customers' ease.
With the stock market reaching new highs, mutual fund AUMs growing steadily and InsurTech gaining traction, now is the time to equip the market with infrastructure that delivers on access, scale, and trust.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
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