Hong Kong is right to curb smoking despite tobacco lobby pushback
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Hong Kong is not resting on its laurels when it comes to what we have achieved in protecting public health from tobacco. The government is supporting an
amendment bill to strengthen tobacco control. It has been incrementally tightening public health laws for decades, with smoke-free areas, package warnings and restrictions on tobacco advertising.
These measures, along with taxation, health promotion and cessation services, have made Hong Kong one among only a handful of jurisdictions in the world to have reduced the percentage of smokers down to single digits. That is the good news. The bad news is that it still leaves 600,000 smokers in Hong Kong, placing an enormous economic strain on our health system. Two-thirds of them could die from tobacco use.
If there was a manufacturing plant in Kwun Tong whose labour practices killed about 400,000 people, most sensible people would think the government has a responsibility – even a duty – to take immediate action.
The tobacco industry and its allies are mobilising against the proposed policies, particularly the ban on flavoured tobacco and possession or use of e-cigarettes in public places. There are a flurry of misleading arguments that such measures will
hurt the economy , particularly tourism.
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Why am I not surprised? I have heard all these arguments many times before.
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