Mystery Of The Grounded Fleet: Is Indias Vital ALH Dhruv Fleet Safe To Fly After Porbandar Tragedy?
The ALH Dhruv fleet has been grounded for most of the last three months after an Indian Coast Guard ALH Dhruv helicopter crashed off Porbandar on January 5, 2025. According to a source, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the maker of the aircraft, is clearing the fleet in phases, while the review of the entire fleet is ongoing.
Understanding The ALH Dhruv And Its Importance
ALH Dhruv is a twin-engine, multi-role, 5.5-tonne helicopter that has been developed and designed by HAL. Ever since it was inducted in 2002, the helicopter has been a workhorse of the Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. It carries out multiple missions, such as troop transport, reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, and combat in difficult terrain like the Siachen Glacier.
Of the 330 total Dhruv helicopters, the Army has more than 180 (including 60 gun-bearing 'Rudra' variants), the Air Force 75, the Navy 24, and the Coast Guard 19. Army helicopters alone had around 40,000 flight hours last year, highlighting the fleet's crucial contribution to India's military arsenal, particularly along the borders and in relief missions during disasters. A worrying trend of crashes over the past few years has, however, cast doubts about safety.
The Porbandar Crash And Subsequent Grounding
The January 5, 2025, Coast Guard ALH Dhruv crash off the coast of Porbandar fatally killed all three crew members on board—two pilots and a diver. The incident led to an immediate grounding of the entire Dhruv fleet for an overall safety audit. Although the Army recently resumed flying its checked and cleared helicopters due to heightened security requirements following the Pahalgam attack, most of the fleet is still under scrutiny.
Crash Investigation Findings
During February 2025's Aero India, HAL Chairman Dr. D.K. Sunil gave a preliminary preview of the Porbandar crash probe. He indicated that a crack in the swash plate of the helicopter was found, an essential part governing the rotor blades, and could have caused the crash. The investigation team is currently attempting to find the causative root of the crack. The final report will determine if there needs to be more fleet-wide inspections or alterations.
Dr. Sunil stressed that the Dhruv is not inherently a flawed design. In the last 25 years, 28 Dhruvs have crashed, of which 13 have been caused by technical malfunction, 13 by human error, and 2 by unknown reasons. Notwithstanding that, Dr. Sunil pointed out that the fleet as a whole has collectively logged millions of flight hours, testifying to overall strength. But he also admitted to shortfalls in training and maintenance procedures.
Past Mishaps Inspiring Worries
The ALH Dhruv fleet of helicopters has witnessed a number of mishaps in recent years, inspiring suspicions about the safety record of the aircraft:
October 2024: An Air Force helicopter lost power and ditched while flying on flood relief missions in Bihar.
September 2, 2024: A Coast Guard helicopter crashed in the Arabian Sea, killing two personnel.
May 2023: An Army helicopter crashed in Jammu, injuring two pilots and a technician.
March 2023: A Navy chopper emergency-landed off Mumbai.
October 21, 2022: A 'Rudra' variant crashed in Arunachal Pradesh, killing two officers and three soldiers.
August 2021: A mishap took place near Pathankot, resulting in fatalities.
2019: The helicopter of the Northern Army Commander crashed, although without any casualties.
These accidents resulted in a prior grounding of the fleet in 2023, and its present re-induction is also being handled in phases.
Current Status And Future Outlook
Presently, although the Army has returned to operation with its cleared helicopters following operational requirements, the Navy and Coast Guard Dhruv fleets are mostly on the ground. HAL's gradual clearance procedure indicates that it may be a while before the complete fleet is operational again. The report of the ongoing investigation will also be significant in determining required adjustments to maintenance schedules or pilot training.
Positives: The operational clearance of certain helicopters guarantees the Army's heightened readiness at all times.
Concerns: If the swash plate problem found in the Porbandar crash is systemic, it raises a high risk to the entire fleet.
Future: HAL has the mandate of making strong enhancements in training, maintenance, and possibly small design adjustments to ensure that future mishaps do not take place and that complete confidence in India's indigenously manufactured helicopter fleet is restored.
Implications For India
The grounding of the ALH Dhruv fleet has far-reaching implications for India:
Security: The ALH is critically needed for border security and disaster relief. A fleet that is partially grounded impacts directly the operational readiness and capability of the military.
Indigenous Pride: The Dhruv represents India's defense production self-reliance. Ongoing crashes threaten to undermine public and military confidence in its dependability and overall credibility.
Economic Impact: An extended grounding of the fleet would cost HAL and the defence forces heavy financial losses in terms of maintenance budgets, operational expenses, and future procurement strategies.
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When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. FAA and Army defend actions, shift blame Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. The NTSB's final report will be done next year, but there likely will not be one single cause identified for the crash. "I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident," aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti said. Army officials said the greater concern is that the FAA approved routes around Ronald Reagan International Airport with separation distances as small as 75 feet (23 meters) between helicopters and planes when planes are landing on a certain runway at Reagan. 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The controller acknowledged in an interview that the plane's pilots were never warned when the helicopter was on a collision path, but controllers did not think telling the plane would have made a difference at that point. The plane was descending to land and tried to pull up at the last second after getting a warning in the cockpit, but it was too late. FAA was warned about the dangers of helicopter traffic in D.C. An FAA working group tried to get a warning added to helicopter charts back in 2022 urging pilots to use caution whenever the secondary runway was in use, but the agency refused. The working group said "helicopter operations are occurring in a proximity that has triggered safety events. These events have been trending in the wrong direction and increasing year over year." Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said "every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that." But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. "What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem," Homendy said. "But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'"
