First volume of international military law journal released by Panjab University V-C
The first volume of the Forces Law Review (FLR), billed as the first international military law journal, was released Friday by Panjab University Vice-Chancellor (V-C) Renu Vig. At the event, certificates were also distributed to the Indian student editors who contributed to the publication.
The FLR is a collaborative effort between the National Institute of Military Justice (NIMJ), Washington DC, and the Centre for Constitution & Public Policy (CCPP), University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh. It focuses on issues related to the defence services and other uniformed forces including the police, paramilitary, and armed police forces.
The journal's editorial oversight is led by three honorary chief editors — professor Franklin Rosenblatt, president of NIMJ; professor Shruti Bedi, Director of UILS; and Major Navdeep Singh, advocate at the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Editorial Advisory Board comprises legal and academic experts from across the world. Six student editors were selected globally to assist with the project.
Indian members of the advisory board include Justice Rajiv Narain Raina, senior advocate Sanjeev Sharma, and Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati.
The journal features case briefs, summaries of landmark judgments from constitutional and appellate courts worldwide, and includes sections on recent legal developments and contributed opinion pieces.
The inaugural volume includes messages from Supreme Court's Justice Augustine George Masih, Chairperson of the Armed Forces Tribunal Justice Rajendra Menon, PU V-CRenu Vig, and head of the military judiciary in the United Kingdom Justice Alan Large.
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