From ‘ironclad' to uncertain: Trump's aid freeze shakes US-Philippines ties
Department of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Eduardo de Vega attempted to downplay the damage during a palace press briefing on Saturday, insisting there was still room to negotiate.
'We're still talking to the Americans about that,' he said, adding that the freeze was still temporary.
He also argued a stoppage in help from Washington would not 'severely affect us' because the Philippines still has the financial support of other allies.
De Vega also stressed that, despite the suspension, operations at the nine existing EDCA sites – military facilities jointly used by US forces in the country authorised by the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) – will in 'no way' be affected.
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AllAfrica
3 hours ago
- AllAfrica
The inevitable and fraught militarization of space
US President Donald Trump's plans to build a space-based Golden Dome missile defense shield have drawn immediate criticism from China, which has framed it as a renewed American push to 'weaponize space.' This program, announced in an executive order signed in January 2025, echoes former President Ronald Reagan's 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative, or 'Star Wars,' which was never completed but is believed to have pressured the Soviet Union into a costly arms race. Whether the Golden Dome will meet the same fate or move beyond rhetoric remains to be seen. Regardless of its future feasibility, the president's announcement marks another departure from the vision of space as a peaceful domain. Aside from the US Air Force's anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in 1985 and the abandoned Star Wars program, treaties like the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Moon Agreement (1979) helped restrain space militarization during the Cold War. In the 1990s, multinational projects like the International Space Station further reinforced a vision of international cooperation under US leadership. As a result, public discussion of space weapons remained largely restricted, even as governments quietly advanced their capabilities. That began to change in 2007, when China shocked observers by using a missile to destroy its own satellites, followed by a similar US Navy test a year later. These events signaled a clear break from past restraint and kick-started a new space race. In place of the Cold War's bipolar competition, the 2020s have seen a more multipolar and militarized space race taking shape. The 2019 reorganization of US space branches marked a turning point in Washington's military approach to space. It created the US Space Force for training and equipping personnel, and reestablished the US Space Command, responsible for operational missions. NASA, though a civilian agency, continues to support military objectives through dual-use technologies and interagency coordination, while the White House's National Space Council also helps shape policy. Trump's second term has seen the Space Force intensify its rhetoric on space conflict, casting doubt on the Artemis Accords' stated peaceful intentions declared in 2020. In April 2025, General Stephen Newman Whiting, head of Space Command, publicly called for deploying weapons in space, according to Defense One. Meanwhile, General B Chance Saltzman, the Space Force's chief of space operations, outlined six types of counterspace capabilities during the Air & Space Forces Association Warfare Symposium in March 2025; three ground-based (kinetic missiles, directed energy, and jamming), and the same three methods adapted for use from satellites in orbit. In April, the Space Force released a new document titled Space Warfighting, which provides a framework to guide military planning in the largely untested environment. The focus remains on Earth's orbit, broken down into low, medium, and geostationary orbit, where most satellites operate. The unmanned Boeing X-37B spacecraft, launched in 2010 by the Pentagon, is just one secretive military project in space. It stayed in orbit for more than 900 days from 2020 to 2022, raising concerns over U.S. ambitions in co-orbital warfare and its ability to tamper physically with other satellites. Private industry has long been integral to American space capabilities, and a new wave of companies is expanding that role. Elon Musk's Starlink, designed as a civilian internet service, has become a critical asset for Ukraine's military during its war with Russia. Meanwhile, firms like L3Harris have repurposed commercial satellite sensors for military surveillance and tracking. The Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR), initiated by the Department of Defense in 2024, aims to integrate with the private sector for space-based operations. Beyond Earth's orbit, the cislunar space between the Earth and the moon is emerging as a major zone of competition. The Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) 'Primer on Cislunar Space' in 2021 identified the region as a growing military priority, and the Pentagon established the 19th Space Defense Squadron to monitor activity in cislunar space and regions beyond traditional satellite orbits. AFRL is also developing the Oracle-M spacecraft to track objects in cislunar orbit, and completed thruster and ground systems tests in March and April 2025, respectively, and is now moving toward launch readiness reviews. While some experts argue that the strategic value of cislunar space is overblown, the moon itself is increasingly seen through a militaristic lens. 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Paul Szymanski of the Space Strategies Center stated in a 2023 article in that companies are planning to provide 'cell phone service on the moon and the Air Force Research Lab is developing several programs, such as space surveillance for the far side of the moon. None of this makes sense unless there is some other not publicly known factor that has changed everyone's attitudes.' With help from private companies, the US is at the forefront of space militarization, though it faces growing competition from other countries. Its former Cold War competitor, Russia, brought its 'air force and the… Aerospace Defense Forces under one unified command,' of Aerospace Forces (VKS) in 2015, according to the Moscow Times. Russia displayed its ASAT capabilities in November 2021, when it destroyed one of its defunct satellites. Just before it invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russia launched the Cosmos 2553 satellite into a high, radiation-heavy orbit around 2,000 kilometers above Earth, a zone rarely used by communications or observation satellites. US officials believe it may be connected to a Russian project for a space-based nuclear weapon. In 2024, reports emerged that Russia was developing a weapon that could disable hundreds of satellites using 'radiation effects or the resulting electromagnetic pulse.' Also in 2024, the US accused Russia at the UN Security Council of launching a satellite capable of attacking other satellites. Experts suggested this satellite was part of a series of similar Russian satellites launched over several years that may carry kinetic projectile weapons. Then, in March 2025, US officials observed multiple Russian satellites 'work together to surround and isolate another satellite that was positioned in low earth orbit, demonstrating how they could potentially target enemy spacecraft in a future conflict,' stated an official in a CNN article. China, however, has overtaken Russia since the end of the Cold War to become the US' primary competitor in space. In December 2024, several Chinese satellites conducted what US officials described as 'advanced patrols and advanced attack' approaches, showing their ability to physically disable nearby satellites. A senior US general later confirmed that China is testing satellites capable of 'dogfighting maneuvers,' also using multiple spacecraft. China's missile capabilities have also advanced rapidly. In 2021, the country tested several hypersonic weapons faster than Mach 5—or five times the speed of sound—using a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), in trials that surpassed anything the US has publicly demonstrated. In each case, China launched a payload into low Earth orbit that circled part of the globe before releasing a hypersonic glider, which struck a target in China. In one test, the glider released a second missile during its descent. These tests laid the groundwork for later claims of more sophisticated, space-based strike systems. In April 2025, Chinese military officials claimed they can launch missiles from space using various platforms, including reentry glide vehicles capable of reaching up to 13,000 miles per hour. This all comes as China plans to land its own astronauts on the moon by 2030. China, Russia, and the US have all developed Earth-based lasers capable of blinding satellites. As these powers advance their arsenals, other nations are building up their own. Among the newcomers, India has demonstrated its own ASAT capabilities in 2019 when it shot down one of its satellites. New power blocs are also taking shape. Traditional coordination between the US and allies in Europe and Japan now faces growing competition from China and its partners. The China and Russia-led International Lunar Research Station project aims to build a lunar base by 2035. Nearly a dozen other countries have already pledged support. While Washington seeks to preserve its lead in space, that very dominance can make it vulnerable. Russia, less dependent on space infrastructure, is investing in systems designed to trigger cascading effects. Chinese strategists, meanwhile, believe the US would win a prolonged war in space but may be vulnerable to a sudden first strike, influencing their planning. Debris from previous ASAT tests by the US, China, and Russia already threatens spacecraft and satellites. As more countries acquire offensive space capabilities, the vision of a peaceful and cooperative exploration of space becomes harder to realize. A more realistic approach may be to acknowledge space militarization and focus on managing risks. In preparing for conflict, humanity may still develop technologies and infrastructure that ultimately serve the public good. John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, 'Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas', was published in December 2022. This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute, and is republished with kind permission .
South China Morning Post
4 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Trump administration calling back 2,000 National Guard troops in Los Angeles
The Trump administration said on Tuesday it is ending the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops in Los Angeles. Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell announced the decision in a statement. Roughly 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines had been deployed. It was not immediately clear how long the rest would stay in the region. The troops were tasked with protecting federal buildings and guarding immigration agents as they carry out arrests. The deployment began in early June and was slated to last 60 days. US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of about 4,000 California National Guard troops and 700 active duty Marines in early June to respond to a series of protests against immigration raids in and around Los Angeles.
AllAfrica
4 hours ago
- AllAfrica
10 billion euros nowhere near enough to rebuild Ukraine
Clearly angered by the intensification of Russia's air campaign against Ukraine, Donald Trump has pivoted from the suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine to promising its resumption. Russia's strikes on major cities killed more civilians in June than have died in any single previous month, according to UN figures. Over the past two weeks, the US president has made several disparaging comments about his relationship with Vladimir Putin, including on July 13 that the Russian president 'talks nice and then he bombs everybody in the evening.' Not only will the US resume delivery of long-promised Patriot air defense missiles, Trump is now also reported to be considering a whole new plan to arm Ukraine, including with offensive capabilities. And he has talked about imposing new sanctions on Putin's regime. This is the background against which the eighth Ukraine Recovery Conference took place in Rome on July 10 and 11. The event, attended by many Western leaders and senior business executives, was an important reminder that while the war against Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield, peace will only be won as the result of rebuilding Ukraine's economy and society. Ending the war anytime soon and on terms favourable to Kyiv will require an enormous effort by Ukrainians and their European allies. But the country's recovery afterwards will be no less challenging. According to the World Bank's latest assessment, at the end of 2024 Ukraine's recovery needs over the next decade stood at US$524 billion. And with every month the war continues, these needs are increasing. Ukraine's three hardest-hit sectors are housing, transport and energy infrastructure, which between them account for around 60% of all damage. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a relatively positive assessment of Ukraine's overall economic situation at the end of June, forecasting growth of between 2% and 3% for 2025 – likely to grow to over 4% in 2026 and 2027. But the IMF also cautioned that this trajectory – and the country's macroeconomic stability more generally – will remain heavily dependent on external support. Taking into account a new €2.3 billion package from the EU, consisting of €1.8 billion of loan guarantees and €580 million of grants, the cumulative pledge of over €10 billion (£8.7 billion) made by countries attending the Ukraine recovery conference is both encouraging and sobering. It is encouraging in the sense that Ukraine's international partners remain committed to the country's social and economic needs, not merely its ability to resist Russia on the battlefield. But it is also sobering that even these eye-watering sums of public money are still only a fraction of Ukraine's needs. Even if the EU manages to mobilise its overall target of €40 billion for Ukraine's recovery, by attracting additional contributions from other donors and the private sector, this would be less than 8% of Ukraine's projected recovery needs as of the end of 2024. As the war continues and more of the (diminishing) public funding is directed towards defence expenditure by Kyiv's western partners, this gap is likely to grow. Money is not the only challenge for Ukraine recovery efforts. Rebuilding the country is not simply about undoing the physical damage. The social impact of Russia's aggression is hard to overstate. Ukraine has been deeply traumatised as a society since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Generally reliable Ukrainian casualty counts – some 12,000 civilians and 43,000 troops killed since February 2022 – are still likely to underestimate the true number of people who have died as a direct consequence of the Russian aggression. And each of these will have left behind family members struggling to cope with their loss. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of war veterans. Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there were nearly half a million veterans from the 'frozen' conflict that followed Russia's annexation of Crimea and incursion into eastern Ukraine. By the end of 2024, this number had more than doubled to around 1 million. Most of them have complex social, economic, medical and psychological needs that will have to be considered as part of a society-wide recovery effort. According to data from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), there are also some 7 million refugees from Ukraine and 3.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs). This is equivalent to one quarter of the country's population. The financial needs of UNHCR's operations in Ukraine are estimated at $800 million in 2025, of which only 27% was funded as of the end of April. Once the fighting in Ukraine ends, refugees are likely to return in greater numbers. Their return will provide a boost to the country's economic growth by strengthening its labour force and bringing with them skills and, potentially, investment. But like many IDPs and veterans, they may not be able to return to their places of origin, either because these are not inhabitable or remain under Russian occupation. Some returnees are likely to be viewed with suspicion or resentment by those Ukrainians who stayed behind and fought. Tensions with Ukrainians who survived the Russian occupation in areas that Kyiv may recover in a peace deal are also likely, given Ukraine's harsh anti-collaboration laws. As a consequence, reintegration – in the sense of rebuilding and sustaining the country's social cohesion – will be a massive challenge, requiring as much, if not more, of Ukraine's partners' attention and financial support as physical reconstruction and the transition from a war to a peace-time economy. Given the mismatch between what is needed and what has been provided for Ukraine's recovery, one may well be skeptical about the value of the annual Ukraine recovery conferences. But, to the credit of their organizers and attendees, they recognize that the foundations for post-war recovery need to be built before the war ends. The non-military challenges of war and peace must not fall by the wayside amid an exclusive focus on battlefield dynamics. Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
