Can consensus still save ASEAN?
ASEAN has long been viewed as Southeast Asia's stabilizing factor, promoting harmony in politically diverse and previously tense surroundings. Its "ASEAN Way" of nonconfrontation and consensus is used to hold postcolonial countries together and prevent conflict. But today, this approach has become a barrier to quick and collective action in response to urgent challenges.
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Nikkei Asia
2 days ago
- Nikkei Asia
Letter from Nikkei Asia's editor: Thailand and Cambodia step back from the brink
Hello from Tokyo. A ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia, following an escalation in clashes that began on Thursday last week, took effect at 0:00 a.m. on Tuesday. At Nikkei Asia, we provided continuous coverage throughout the weekend via live blogs and breaking news updates. When reports emerged that Thailand had deployed F-16 fighter jets against Cambodia, our newsroom braced for the worst: the possibility of full-scale war between the two nations. Fortunately, the conflict -- which claimed more than 40 lives and displaced around 300,000 people -- was halted through mediation by Malaysia, the current chair of ASEAN. Although sporadic violence continued in places even after the ceasefire, the truce -- fragile as it may seem -- has taken hold. For a detailed look at the ceasefire and behind-the-scenes analysis of the two militaries, please read our coverage here. This episode has underscored the fragility of ties among some Southeast Asian nations. Had tensions between Thailand and Cambodia escalated further -- especially amid the ongoing civil war in Myanmar -- it would have delivered a serious blow to the region's economy and political stability. That the crisis was contained within the ASEAN framework is significant. Maintaining regional peace is essential for the bloc at a time when it faces challenges such as intensifying U.S.-China tensions and high tariffs from the Trump administration. Nikkei Asia has a major editorial bureau in Bangkok, and contributing writers in Cambodia helped drive our coverage of the recent events. As editor-in-chief, I am deeply concerned about rising tensions in the region. At the same time, I also take great pride in how our journalists continue to deliver timely, responsible and impartial reporting during crises -- one of our greatest strengths. I invite you to log in to Nikkei Asia and explore our reporting on the turbulent period that unfolded. Nikkei Forum in Melbourne Lastly, I have an announcement. On Aug. 18, Nikkei will host the Nikkei Forum in Melbourne, where experts and our Sydney-based reporters will explore the deepening business and economic ties between Japan and Australia. Online viewing is free, so please register to join the discussion! My suggested reads 1. Australia's auto market is one of the most competitive in the world, and Chinese makers want a bigger slice of it. Our reporter in Sydney visited the imposing off-road track known as Beer O'Clock Hill to see how companies like GWM aim to prove they have both the tech and toughness to muscle out rival brands. 2. Tourism-related stocks in Thailand -- from airlines to hotels and retailers -- have slumped amid falling foreign visitor numbers, particularly from China, making the country's equity market one of the region's worst performers. As our reporter in Bangkok notes, ongoing tensions with Cambodia, despite a ceasefire agreement, may further dampen travel demand and pressure the sector. 3. Faith-based businesses in Malaysia are staging events attracting thousands of people from across the region as demand rises for accessible spiritual inspiration. With tickets, sponsors, merch and vendor booths, these gatherings -- held for both Muslims and Christians -- could easily be mistaken for pop concerts or cultural festivals, just with a higher purpose. Wishing you a wonderful weekend! Akito Tanaka Sign up for the weekly Editor-in-chief's picks newsletter here. Follow us on LinkedIn and Instagram
The Diplomat
3 days ago
- The Diplomat
Can the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Bring China and the US Together?
Amid an increasingly tumultuous time of escalating global nuclear tensions, a quiet but potentially significant development emerged in the Southeast Asia region. During the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference with China, Beijing reportedly declared its commitment to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty 'without reservation.' The Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed this, expressing China's willingness 'to be the first' in signing the treaty. Russia is expected to sign as well, according to Malaysia's foreign minister. Beijing's longstanding support for the SEANWFZ has been consistent and welcomed by the region and proponents of disarmament. What is more surprising – and arguably more consequential – is that the United States is reportedly reviewing and considering the treaty. This consideration, after years of giving the SEANWFZ a cold shoulder, reflects an unexpected alignment with China and Russia – a rare potential point of convergence between the three nuclear powers on nuclear restraint in the region. This development marks a major turn for the SEANWFZ. Also known as the Treaty of Bangkok, it aims to prohibit the development, stationing, or testing of nuclear weapons in the territories of ASEAN member states. A related protocol within this treaty calls for the five nuclear-weapon states – France, the U.S., the U.K., Russia, and China – to not use or deploy nuclear weapons in the zone. Yet three decades since the treaty's signing by ASEAN states in 1995, none of the nuclear weapons states has signed the protocol. This persistent impasse doesn't stem from outright rejection of the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone, given that several nuclear weapon states have signed on to similar initiatives in Central Asia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the reluctance to sign on to the protocol is in large part due to the interpretive uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the articles of SEANWFZ. Take the issue of transporting nuclear weapons through the region, for example. While Article 3(1)(b) required signatory states to not 'station, or transport nuclear weapons by any means,' Article 7 indicated that it is the prerogative of each state to allow foreign vessels entry or passage through its territorial waters. In both cases, the treaty lacks explicit clauses involving the transit of nuclear weapons by a third-party nation. The ambiguity in terms of strategic assets transiting through the zone could contradict and undermine longstanding commitments to freedom of navigation. While there have been revised protocols brokered between nuclear weapon states and ASEAN to narrow the divide and outline steps toward eventual agreement, disagreements still persist over the vague geographical extent of the treaty and its related transit provisions. From this view, the current convergence on support for the SEANWFZ, however nascent or fragile, offers a valuable and rare opening to reinvigorate stalled and acrimonious strategic relations between the world's top nuclear powers. This can be done by seizing this opportunity in shifting the focus of the dialogue. Rather than debating the merits of the treaty, China, Russia, the United States, and ASEAN can redirect efforts and engage in substantive and productive dialogues to clarify the meaning, scope, and mechanisms underpinning the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Specifically, to capitalize on this alignment and move the SEANWFZ from a mere concept to actuality, ASEAN should take a more proactive role in convening and leading discussions. Whether in initiating dialogues or establishing multilateral working groups involving the nuclear weapons states, ASEAN's role is imperative in this regard for two reasons. First, it would not only assert the bloc's relevance and leadership – a key feature of ASEAN Centrality – but it could also demonstrate ASEAN's maturity and showcase its capacity for leadership in complex strategic affairs. Second, ASEAN's involvement as an honest broker could also steer the conversation away from geopolitical impasse and toward practical and meaningful dialogues among the participants. Importantly, the goal of discussions and dialogue should not be the immediate ratification of the SEANWFZ by the nuclear weapons states. On the contrary, the focus should be centered on the process that will lead to the ratification. The process of establishing a joint understanding and establishing clarity in the Southeast Asian version of a nuclear weapons-free zone would, by extension, include discussions regarding setting the boundaries of the zone, clarifying the permissibility of transit of nuclear weapons – and if so, what type, under what conditions, and how would it be verified – as well as clarifying issues surrounding stationing of strategic assets. Such dialogue could serve as a low-hanging confidence-building measure that could kickstart strategic dialogues. At the same time, it offers a rare on-ramp to China-U.S. or Russia-U.S. strategic engagement, potentially laying the groundwork for future trilateral discussions and cooperation. In an era of great power rivalry, where formal strategic dialogues have become increasingly hard to come by, dialogues surrounding the technical and legal aspects of ASEAN's nuclear-weapon-free zone offer an invaluable opportunity to develop common points and establish shared understandings. Despite being narrow in scope, it is high in potential as joint technical and legal discussions and consultations on the SEANWFZ can lay the foundation for broader strategic dialogues, particularly at a time of frayed relations. Viewed this way, even if clarifying the terms and meanings of the SEANWFZ will not resolve great power tension, it offers a rare, realistic step forward, while affirming ASEAN's central role in Southeast Asian affairs and creating a pathway for renewed great power strategic dialogue.
The Diplomat
3 days ago
- The Diplomat
China's New Regional Policy: A Challenge to the Indo-Pacific?
Typically, whenever it finds itself facing an adverse international environment, China will look to shore up ties with partner countries as well as its neighbors. So it should come as no surprise to see Beijing acting to strengthening its relations with Russia and Iran, while at the same time putting on the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries in April, in a clear statement of just how much importance China attaches to relations with its neighbors. Shortly after the conference, Xi Jinping traveled to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia, accompanied by his daughter, to call for unity within the 'Asian family.' In arranging the trip, Beijing was clearly choosing countries also facing high tariffs from the United States. For now, Xi's visits do not appear to have produced any immediate major results, but the visits may have served as a catalyst for the regional policies that followed. It is also clear that the visit to Malaysia was a steppingstone for another meeting in May 2025. Premier Li Qiang visited in May 2025, meeting with the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and other groupings meanwhile continue to expand. In this respect, China seems to be getting the help of Malaysia, which emphasizes cooperation with Islamic countries in the Gulf, in creating 'minilateral institutions' within broader cooperative associations such as the SCO and BRICS, creating a multi-layered organization. Moreover, as is clear from the ASEAN and Gulf countries, this framework is mindful of the Indo-Pacific concept touted by the United States, Japan, and Australia. Of course, China is not urging these countries to distance themselves from the United States, and as Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has stated, ASEAN countries are not expected to choose between the United States and China. Nonetheless, it is clear that Beijing is keen to strengthen its ties with developing countries and others at a time when the United States is suspending a majority of USAID projects. In June, President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and led a summit meeting with the leaders of five Central Asian countries. Central Asia does not have a robust framework for convening meetings of its leaders, and this was just the second time that China had organized a summit. The expectation is that this framework will be used on a regular basis going forward. From the perspective of the Central Asian countries, China's presence is also important in balancing the threat from Russia. Indeed, Beijing is bolstering its economic and social relations with Central Asian countries; the region is already a key transportation conduit from China through Eurasia. In addition to natural gas and crude oil pipelines, a freight railway between China and Iran opened in June 2025, just before the Israeli and U.S. strikes. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, and the opening of the freight railway between China and Iran should put the significance of economic blockades and other sanctions on Iran to the test. As noted, China's regional strategy is likely designed to counter the Indo-Pacific initiative, while at the same time serving as a means of bolstering relations with neighboring countries in response to the Trump administration. However, Beijing's actions cannot be considered solely in the context of the United States. For one thing, while China is developing relations with the ASEAN, the Gulf states, Central Asia, and other regions, South Asia is notably missing from the equation. Right now, China is unable to hold a summit with South Asian countries because of the tensions between India and Pakistan and China's own close relationship with Pakistan. Yet this is not the only issue. From Beijing's standpoint, there is also India's failure to invite China to the Global South Summit as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision to announce the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) with U.S. President Joe Biden on the occasion of the G20 summit in 2023. There is also the fact that India and the EU have been working toward a free trade agreement, not to mention Prime Minister Narendra Modi's own active diplomacy, including visits to Cyprus and the Balkans, in recent months. All this means that while Beijing is under pressure to keep the West in check in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, it is at the same time competing with India. To better stand up to the West, China is seeking to position itself as the leader of the Global South. Unfortunately for China, however, it is not the only Asian giant with that goal. KAWASHIMA Shin is a professor at the University of Tokyo.
