The Take: Why is Taiwan training for war with China?
In this episode:
William Yang (@WilliamYang120) – Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group
Episode credits:
This episode was produced by Tamara Khandaker, Noor Wazwaz, and Amy Walters with Phillip Lanos, Spencer Cline, Kisaa Zehra, Marya Khan, and our guest host, Manuel Rapalo. It was edited by Sarí el-Khalili.
Our sound designer is Alex Roldan. Joe Plourde mixed this episode. Our video editors are Hisham Abu Salah and Mohannad al-Melhem. Alexandra Locke is The Take's executive producer. Ney Alvarez is Al Jazeera's head of audio.
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US Tariffs and the Middle East: Calculations and Implications
The Trump Tariff Shock The extensive tariffs announced by US President Donald Trump on 2 April 2025 did not have the Middle East as their main target. Nevertheless, they affect this region in multiple, mostly indirect, ways. The tariffs present Middle Eastern states with some opportunities, but pose major risks, especially to the energy sector. Analysing the tariffs is challenging. First, they follow on earlier measures, dating back to Trump's initial term in office, some retained by President Joe Biden. There are other additional specific tariffs, particularly on China and on cars and some metals, as well as various exemptions. Second, the economic logic of the tariffs – both the overall concept and the specific measures – is shaky, to say the least. Different officials in the US administration have different reasons for supporting the tariffs—some focus on economic goals, others on political goals—and they disagree on whether these tariffs are meant to be a temporary measure or a permanent policy. This makes it hard to study them with traditional cost-benefit analysis. Trump has also proposed 'secondary tariffs' on countries buying Venezuelan, Russian or Iranian oil, which would add further complexity and uncertainty. Third, the initial tariff announcement was partly rolled back following a very negative market reaction. On 9 April, the specific per-country tariffs—except those on China—were paused for 90 days, though the minimum 10 percent rate was retained. Certain items, such as pharmaceuticals and microchips, as well as goods from Canada and Mexico that comply with the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), were exempted. As of 9 July 2025, the Trump administration's baseline 10% reciprocal tariffs remain in effect for most US trading partners, while higher country-specific tariffs (ranging from 11% to 50%) are suspended until 1 August 2025 to allow time for negotiations—except for China, which continues to face a 34% tariff. Exemptions include USMCA-compliant goods, some electronics and books. Meanwhile, tariffs on steel, aluminium and automobiles (25% to 50%) apply globally with certain exceptions. Negotiations are ongoing with countries like the United Kingdom, Vietnam and Japan, with potential special rates or exemptions under discussion. Legal challenges and the risk of retaliation contribute to significant uncertainty, with outcomes dependent on continuing talks and the scheduled 2026 USMCA review. Even when agreements are reached, they remain subject to change. The initial policy would have taken the average tariff rate on US imports to 27%. The 9 April announcement reduces that only slightly, to 24%, because of the product-level tariffs and the increased levies on Chinese goods. (1) Before Trump's first term, the average US tariff rate was 1.69%, increasing to 2.4 percent by 2023. Fourth, the scope of other countries' retaliatory measures remains unclear. As of 9 July 2025, China has imposed reciprocal tariffs, including a 34% rate on US goods and up to 34.9% anti-dumping duties on European brandy, in response to US and EU trade restrictions. Additionally, China has restricted exports of critical materials like rare earths, gallium and germanium, disrupting global supply chains, with a 75% drop in magnet exports reported since April. A 27 June US-China trade framework eased some restrictions, allowing limited rare earth exports, but many companies still face delays. The EU, citing unfair trade practices, imposed tariffs up to 45% on Chinese electric vehicles and restricted Chinese firms from medical device contracts, prompting China's reciprocal ban on EU medical equipment bids. The EU has paused broader retaliatory measures, including a €95 billion package, to align with the US tariff suspension until 1 August 2025, as negotiations continue ahead of a China-EU summit later in July. The impact on non-US global trade relations has yet to be seen. Fifth, the tariffs interact with other policies by the US, such as efforts to expel undocumented immigrants, to discourage travel, to cut most foreign aid, and to drastically cut the size and scope of the federal government. Other nations also have their own entangled policies, for instance OPEC+ (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman) raised its oil production ceiling by 411,000 barrels per day (bpd) in May, June and July 2025, with an increased hike of 548,000 bpd in August, unwinding voluntary cuts of 2.2 million bpd to regain market share despite falling oil prices. Sixth, the tariffs have numerous indirect and second-round effects, such as redirecting trade and investment, increasing US inflation, influencing decisions on interest rates, and raising doubts about the stability and competence of US economic policy. These factors have contributed to a rise in bond yields, a sharp fall in stock market valuations, and a decline in the value of the dollar. Since Gulf currencies are pegged to the dollar, they will experience some imported inflation—especially if the US Federal Reserve lowers interest rates to support the US economy. (2) US Tariffs and the Middle East The Middle East appeared to have got off relatively easily in the first round of tariff announcements. The Gulf states (and Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon) suffered only the standard 10% rate. This outcome reflects the curious methodology used—basing decisions on the bilateral trade deficit in goods, while ignoring services. Since the Gulf states no longer export significant volumes of oil, gas, or petrochemicals—their main exports—to the US, but still import vehicles, machinery, arms, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, and other products from the US, the US now has a trade surplus with them. Other MENA countries face higher tariff levels: Syria 41%, Iraq 39%, Libya 31%, Algeria 30%, Tunisia 28%, Jordan 20%, and Israel 17%. However, since the main exports of most of these countries are hydrocarbons—which are currently exempt—and because North African countries primarily trade with Europe, the direct impact remains relatively limited. The main exceptions are Israel, for which the US accounted for 29% of exports in 2023, and Jordan (21%). (3) In any case, if these elevated tariff levels are reimposed, they would pose an additional obstacle to MENA countries' efforts to diversify their economies. The GCC states are affected by the sectoral tariffs on aluminium and steel, which are currently at 25 percent. These were the leading exports of the UAE and Bahrain to the US. But, as large and low-cost producers, they should be able to find markets elsewhere as required. Energy Market Impacts The energy market changes most directly impact countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, these countries currently export relatively little oil, gas or petrochemicals to the United States. This is not due to tariffs — oil and gas imports into the US are generally exempt from tariffs — but because the US has become largely self-sufficient in energy production thanks to its domestic shale oil and gas boom. As a result, US imports now mainly consist of heavy crude oils, which are blended with lighter domestic crude in refineries. These heavy crudes come primarily from Canada, Mexico and, depending on sanctions, Venezuela. Trade measures against its neighbours, notably the previously proposed 10 percent tariff on Canadian oil, would probably result in some diversion of oil from Canada and the diversion of most Mexican oil. Crude from Brazil and from the Middle East would be possible replacements, although the Middle Eastern countries export little of these very heavy crudes. Saudi Arabian Heavy, Iraq's Basrah Heavy, and perhaps a separate blend of Kuwait's heavy Lower Fars crude, would be the likely alternatives. The Chinese market is now effectively closed to US products due to the very high retaliatory tariffs. This will allow Middle Eastern exporters to gain market share in China for crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). The main problem for China may be in obtaining sufficient supplies of petrochemical feedstocks, notably ethane and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), where the US had become a very important supplier. Economic and policy uncertainty, the loss of the Chinese market, and higher costs because of tariffs on key materials, will make it harder for new US LNG export plants to secure financing. Costs of construction for liquefied natural gas plants have risen, with Woodside's Louisiana LNG project, for example, assessing the tariff impact. (4) This is positive for Middle Eastern LNG and other gas exporters (notably, Qatar, as well as the UAE, Oman and Algeria), although US LNG plants currently under-construction are still likely to lead to a substantial over-supply in the later part of this decade. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) signed three LNG supply deals with Chinese companies–namely, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, ZhenHua Oil and ENN (5) – in April for a total of about 2.3 million tonnes per year and terms ranging from 5 to 15 years. Qatar had already secured several Chinese equity investments and sales contracts for its major in-progress LNG expansion. (6) Still, the tariffs and the resulting economic uncertainty have caused a sharp drop in oil prices. Brent crude, the main international benchmark, fell from $74.95 per barrel on April 2 to $65.58 on April 4, followed by only a modest recovery. Asian LNG prices also declined by about 12%. By July 2025 (up to the 13th), prices showed mixed trends: starting at $67.63 on July 1, rising to $71.95 on July 7 (the latest spot price), then easing to $69.11 by July 13 based on futures settlements. This pattern suggests a slight recovery since April's lows, tempered by some downward pressure in recent days. Energy-importing MENA states, notably Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, will benefit from lower oil and gas prices. But they will suffer from a generalised economic slowdown, from the cut-off of US aid in some cases (particularly Jordan's), and from any reduction in remittances, tourism and investment inflows from their oil-exporting neighbours. OPEC+ Strategy The fall in oil prices was further intensified by OPEC+'s decision to raise output ceilings more than expected starting in May. On 3 April, just hours after the tariff announcement, the alliance increased its production ceiling by 411,000 bpd—three times its usual monthly increments. Since then, OPEC+ has steadily rolled back production cuts with additional increases: output remained flat in April despite the quota hike, further adjustments were confirmed for June (including Kazakhstan), and on 5 July, the group announced a larger-than-anticipated boost of 548,000 bpd for August 2025 to speed up supply restoration. OPEC+ is on track to fully reverse voluntary cuts by September 2025, with further phased increases planned amid ongoing debates about market demand and price effects. This stems from a complex combination of various motives: the group took advantage of exhortations from the White House to raise production, but only as long as doing so aligned with its own assessments of its interests. The increase signals to Iraq and Kazakhstan, two members who have been producing well above their assigned ceilings, that they need to improve compliance and, ideally, make 'compensation cuts' to offset past over-production. As fields in Canada and Norway come into maintenance season, there may be room in the market for some additional oil, and after that, the Northern Hemisphere summer period usually brings greater oil consumption for travel, as well as increased air-conditioning in countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. OPEC+ has also seized an opportune moment to target U.S. shale. Tariffs—especially those on steel, which is essential for drill pipe, well casings, tubulars, and pipelines—will increase costs for shale development. Alongside lower oil prices, greater economic uncertainty, the increasing maturity of shale resources, and industry consolidation, this will significantly slow growth in U.S. shale output. The U. Energy Information Administration projects that US oil production will peak at 14 million bpd in 2027, up from 13.7 million bpd in 2025, before flattening out. Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency's April report lowered its estimate for US oil production growth this year from 640,000 bpd to 490,000 bpd, and expects growth to slow further to 280,000 bpd next year. Slower US production expansion should partially cushion the impact of lower global demand, and help OPEC+ to start regaining market share. Higher output will ease the hit to revenues experienced by OPEC+ members, especially those with additional voluntary cuts (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria). MENA countries not in OPEC+ or not bound by quotas, including Qatar, Libya and Iran, will simply experience lower oil prices, and lower prices for oil-linked LNG or pipeline gas contracts. Renewable and nuclear energy The very high tariffs on Chinese imports have made it virtually unviable to sell Chinese solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric cars in the US. To prevent tariff circumvention, the US imposed similarly high tariffs on alternative Asian manufacturers—including Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—starting in June 2025. These rates reach up to 3,521% on solar cells and modules, targeting unfair subsidies and efforts to bypass duties on Chinese goods. As a result, the cost of renewable energy installations in the U.S. has increased substantially. Since these countries supply over 75% of U.S. solar imports, disrupted supply chains are pushing solar module prices up by an estimated 20–30%. This price surge risks slowing the deployment of clean energy projects critical to meeting climate goals, such as achieving 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035, and may lead to greater short-term reliance on fossil fuels. Recent analyses from June 2025 estimate that solar panel costs have risen by 3–4 cents per watt, along with increases in balance-of-system expenses. These added costs are placing significant pressure on utility-scale renewable projects just as demand for clean energy is surging. This cost pressure is compounded by other administration actions seen as anti-renewables, such as Interior Secretary Doug Burgum's order for Norwegian company Equinor to halt construction of the fully permitted Empire Wind I offshore project in New York. Equinor had already invested $2 billion in the project before the abrupt halt. Trump, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, Vice President JD Vance and presidential ally Elon Musk have all spoken in favour of nuclear power. However, Musk's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is proposing to cut more than half the staff of the Loan Programs Office (LPO), a relatively low-profile but critical unit within the Department of Energy. The LPO provides essential financing support that is crucial for building new nuclear plants in the U.S. Reduced output of renewables and nuclear power will support US gas consumption in both the short and long term, reducing gas availability for LNG exports, a further problem for the industry along with those mentioned above. The restrictions on Chinese imports mean Chinese renewable manufacturers will have to find other markets. Europe will be wary of 'dumping' and may negotiate or impose restrictions of its own. That will, in turn, mean a strong supply of very low-cost renewable systems for other markets. That is favourable for MENA countries who are developing large solar, wind, battery and hydrogen projects, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Egypt and Morocco, as well as emerging renewable users such as Iraq, Tunisia and Algeria. These developments will help limit greenhouse gas emissions, meet rapidly growing electricity needs, save oil consumption and lower overall system costs. However, MENA countries trying to develop their own renewable manufacturing sectors will face a double challenge: US tariffs, which make it difficult to export to the American market successfully, and the increased flow of low-priced Chinese imports. Jordan has already launched an anti-dumping investigation into photovoltaic cells from China, following a complaint by local manufacturer Philadelphia Solar. (7) Macroeconomic Impacts The most serious effects of the tariffs, however, are macroeconomic. They are almost certain to raise US inflation substantially, which will require the US Federal Reserve to decide between cutting interest rates to support the economy or keeping them elevated to contain inflation. Trump is likely to exert political pressure for lower rates. Nevertheless, the US economy will slow, and that will reduce oil demand. The GDP impact will be most pronounced in the US, with an estimated reduction in growth of 0.56%. Close trade partner Canada faces a potential fall of 2.07%. China's loss is relatively muted at 0.22%, while the UK and EU will actually gain to a small extent. Overall, the global economy excluding the US will lose only marginally. (8) The International Monetary Fund has downgraded its overall economic forecasts due to tariffs and the broader negative impact of increased uncertainty. It now projects global growth of 2.8% this year, down from 3.3%, with a rebound to 3% next year—still below the long-run average of 3.7%. The IMF's forecast for the Middle East-Central Asia region has been cut by slightly more than the global and emerging markets averages, dropping from 3.6% to 3% this year, and from 3.9% to 3.4% next year. For Saudi Arabia, which the Fund reports on specifically, growth estimates have declined from 3.3% this year and 4.1% in 2026 to 3% and 3.7%, respectively—suggesting the Kingdom may fare somewhat better than the regional average. The International Energy Agency predicts these negative impacts, and the general effects of higher uncertainty, will reduce global oil demand growth from its previous estimate of 1.03 million bpd to 730,000 bpd. (9) However, a wider breakdown of trade relations, if other countries impose protective tariffs, could mean substantially lower growth. Aside from China, several large and fast-growing Asian countries with export-dependent economies, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines, were targeted with the highest tariff rates. Their economies are often closely coupled with China's, and would therefore be doubly affected by a slowdown there. A tariff-induced debt or currency crisis in a major emerging economy could have ripple effects elsewhere, particularly as the current leaderless global financial architecture may find it hard to organise a rescue. This could repeat in some form the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, accompanied by OPEC quota increases, which saw Brent crude prices fall to $10 per barrel. An even more complicated and speculative area is the position of the US dollar and its financial sector and debt market. Unusually, in the latest shock, US Treasury bond yields rose while stock prices fell, in inversion of the usual flight to perceived low-risk assets. Trump himself, and various figures in his administration, have given mixed messages on whether they want the dollar to be strong or weak, and on maintaining the dollar as the world's reserve currency and main currency for payments. The Trump administration has nonetheless strongly encouraged Gulf investment into the US, with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE making some significant commitments in LNG projects. These, along with promised large arms purchases, may be key negotiating points in any discussions over exempting GCC countries from future tariffs. The dollar peg has generally provided Gulf countries with macroeconomic stability. Since most of their exports, debt, and a large portion of sovereign wealth holdings are denominated in dollars, the peg has historically offered predictability. However, tariffs and broad uncertainty over US policy may encourage a gradual shift away from dollar holdings—initially toward the euro, and potentially later to the Chinese yuan or other currencies. The acceleration of deal settlements in alternative currencies, driven by sanctions on Russia, has already led to increased use of the UAE dirham, the Russian rouble and the Chinese yuan, as well as attempts to use the Indian rupee. Saudi Arabia has at times expressed openness to settling some of its oil trade in yuan, and possibly in euros or Japanese yen. (10) These shifts are likely to continue even as oil pricing remains dollar-denominated, due to familiarity, convenience, existing contracts, and the dominance of US-based futures exchanges. Future Outlook Uncertainty has persisted since the announcement on 9 April of the 90-day pause in trade tariffs. The Trump administration has given mixed and conflicting updates on the status of its trade negotiations with China. At the same time, several key political and macroeconomic developments could profoundly impact the energy sector. Attempts to broker a Russia-Ukraine truce have stalled amid ongoing heavy airstrikes and mutual accusations of violations. Peace talks remain far apart, as Russia demands territorial concessions and limits on Ukraine's military capabilities, while the US has resumed arms supplies after a brief pause. Meanwhile, talks with Iran over its nuclear programme and oil-related sanctions remain complicated. Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities in June have escalated tensions. Iran insists on guarantees against further attacks before resuming negotiations and rejects US claims that it has requested talks. Meanwhile, fresh US sanctions targeting Iran's oil trade and Hezbollah funding were imposed in July. On the oil supply front, the 5 May meeting of the eight OPEC+ countries adhering to voluntary production limits resulted in an accelerated output increase of 411,000 bpd for June. Subsequent decisions included a 5 July agreement to add 548,000 bpd in August, with plans to fully unwind production cuts by September. However, some members have expressed interest in pausing further increases after September due to concerns over price pressures. In monetary policy, the US Federal Reserve held interest rates steady at 4.25%-4.5% during its 6-7 May meeting, citing risks of higher inflation and unemployment. Chair Jerome Powell noted that tariffs could indirectly weaken the economy, potentially reducing energy demand. Finally, Trump's 13-16 May visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE resulted in over $2 trillion in deals covering energy, defence, artificial intelligence and infrastructure. Notably, the UAE pledged $440 billion and Saudi Arabia $5 billion in US energy investments aimed at boosting LNG production and offsetting drilling slowdowns. These deals strengthen strategic alliances with significant implications for global oil supply and energy technology. Partial relaxations and pauses in tariffs occurred throughout June 2025. Notably, the tariff on Chinese goods was reduced from 145% to 30% as part of a 90-day temporary deal starting 14 May, with China reciprocally lowering its tariffs on US goods to 10%. Implementation of country-specific reciprocal tariffs was also delayed until 1 August (initially set for 8 July). Additionally, amendments provided exceptions for certain products, such as UK aerospace goods, effective 23 June. These adjustments contributed to a market rally, with the S&P 500 reaching record highs by late June, and helped boost macroeconomic sentiment. However, they were framed as negotiated pauses rather than full reversals, accompanied by apparent concessions from trade partners, including mutual tariff reductions and pledges on issues like border enforcement. Nevertheless, much of the economic damage had already been done by the April shock to confidence, which caused a stock market crash and led to downgraded GDP growth projections (for example, the Federal Reserve revised its 2025 growth forecast down to 1.4%). Volatile economic policymaking continues amid ongoing threats, such as new Canada-specific tariffs threatened on 27 June, court battles with stays keeping disputed tariffs in effect pending appeals due 31 July, and frequent announcements via social media.
Al Jazeera
2 hours ago
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Iran in the Israeli Calculus: What Comes Next?
At the end of its 12-day campaign against Iran in June 2025, Israel revised its strategic calculations based on key national security objectives: eliminating the Iranian nuclear project, undermining Iran's regional influence and destroying its missile power, and bringing down the Iranian regime or at least hastening its collapse. Estimates of the damage sustained by Iran's nuclear programme vary widely, but the consensus is that it was not irrevocably incapacitated. After the ceasefire, the Iranian leadership pledged to continue uranium enrichment and suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it accused of failing to honour its obligations. The departure of IAEA staff from Iran and the suspension of its periodic reports compromises the ability of Tel Aviv and Washington to monitor the status of Iran's nuclear programme. In response, the Israeli leadership will likely exaggerate the threat to lay the groundwork for a new attack. Both Israel and the United States will also likely attempt to build a UN consensus for severe sanctions on Iran to force renewed IAEA inspections, though Russia and China could thwart their attempts to secure a resolution in the UN Security Council. In terms of the conventional military balance between the two countries, the war revealed Israel's military edge. Israel carried out sophisticated intelligence operations that allowed it to act freely within Iranian territory and gave it near-total air supremacy in Iranian skies. The Axis of Resistance was shown to be severely fragmented and largely ineffective, while Israel's own defence system proved highly effective, intercepting 60–90 percent of Iranian missiles. Despite this disparity, Iran's missile strikes inflicted heavy losses on Israel, with estimates indicating that 77 of the 550 missiles hit their targets, and Israel's air defences lost effectiveness with time. Though presently weakened, the Axis of Resistance remains capable of inflicting harm on US and Israeli interests in the region. As for Israel's goal of regime change, the war exposed the unreality of its expectations. Despite Israeli appeals urging Iranians to liberate themselves, there were no anti-regime protests, and, in fact, most Iranians rallied in defence of their country, seeing the attack on nuclear facilities as unprovoked aggression. Given that Israel was unable to completely eliminate perceived Iranian threats to its national security, it is expected to continue pursuing its goals. New assaults are unlikely in the near future because it needs to assess the impact of its attacks on nuclear facilities, replenish its stock of interceptor missiles, and coordinate with the US, all of which will take time, especially considering the depletion of the US's own stock of THAAD interceptors. These obstacles may spur Israel to focus on intelligence and cyber operations, which have proven effective against the nuclear programme in the past. It may also act to weaken pro-Iranian armed factions, especially Hezbollah, to prevent their resurgence. In parallel, it may seek to isolate Iran regionally by expanding normalisation agreements in the region, betting on its successful deterrence of Iran to bring Arab states on board. But the outcome of the war makes this unlikely. Israel needed direct US intervention to defend itself, and it is unclear whether Israel was capable of continuing or ending the war on its own. Iranian missiles also proved increasingly effective in penetrating advanced Israeli defence systems. If Iran found itself without better options, it might shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which would harm everyone. In the medium term, Israel will adapt to Iranian behaviour. If Iran proceeds with uranium enrichment with the goal of obtaining a nuclear weapon, Israel will again attempt to thwart it with further attacks on nuclear facilities. The cost for Israel, however, will be steeper because Iran will have corrected its own shortcomings exposed by the war and will certainly continue to develop its ballistic missiles. It will also move its nuclear facilities to highly fortified mountainous areas inaccessible to Israeli or US warplanes. If Israel cannot disrupt the nuclear programme, it will prioritise the overthrow of the Iranian regime, which would entail more assassinations of political, military and security leaders, and the sabotage of communications, electricity and water networks with the aim of fomenting chaos and thereby weakening the regime's ability to control the street. In the final analysis, the 12-day war brought the confrontation between Israel and Iran out of the shadows and into the open. Unless both sides radically change their perceptions of the nature of external threats, the most recent confrontation will be a prelude to future rounds or a long-term war.
