"Bangladesh being turned into Afghanistan" says Bangladeshi journalist Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury
Choudhury's most explosive allegation centres on what he describes as a deliberate plan to reshape Bangladesh's secular foundations. "Yunus is actually having the blueprint of turning Bangladesh into a theocracy," he stated, pointing to concerning statements from key regime allies.The journalist specifically highlighted the public statements of Mufti Syed Muhammad Faizul Karim, leader of Jamaat-Char Monai and a key Yunus ally, who according to Choudhury, "publicly told media that they are willing to turn Bangladesh into another Afghanistan."This transformation, Choudhury argues, is not merely ideological but involves concrete institutional changes that threaten the country's democratic fabric.Military Intelligence Under SiegePerhaps the most alarming aspect of Choudhury's account involves what he describes as a coordinated effort to dismantle Bangladesh's counterterrorism capabilities. He revealed that "hundreds of terrorists and militants, including members of Ansar-al Islam, which is a local franchisee of Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut Tahrir, and others, they were released from the prison."The journalist made a particularly striking claim about foreign intelligence involvement: "Three brigadiers of Pakistani army, actually they are the covered officials of the ISI, they visited Bangladesh" and met with various insurgent groups. In a move that Choudhury sees as directly connected, "just in 48 hours of their departure from Bangladesh, the anti-corruption commission in Bangladesh blocked the bank account of the Directory General of Forces Intelligence [DGFI]."A Radicalised Military?When discussing the Bangladesh Army's position, Choudhury expressed deep concerns about internal divisions. While noting that "General Wakar Zaman enjoys support of the majority of the army officers and soldiers," he made a startling claim about the military's composition: "inside the Bangladesh army, a very significant portion of the armed forces, they are radicalised, at least 30%."This alleged radicalisation within the military ranks, if accurate, would represent a fundamental threat to Bangladesh's stability and secular governance.Economic HaemorrhagingThe interim government's tenure has coincided with severe economic disruption, according to Choudhury's analysis. He presented alarming figures: "during the last 10.5 months, there is not a single dollar foreign investment in Bangladesh, but almost $9 billion were smuggled out of this country. 80,000 crore taka have been looted from the Bangladeshi stock market."advertisementThese economic indicators, combined with what Choudhury describes as systematic corruption, paint a picture of a country in economic free fall.Mob Violence and Minority PersecutionWhen questioned about reports of mob violence, Choudhury highlighted the regime's concerning response. He noted that "when Yunus press secretary was asked about the mob violence, he said it's not mob violence, it's a pressure group. But this mob violence, they're attacking the religious and ethnic minorities in this country."This reframing of violence as legitimate "pressure group" activity, according to Choudhury, demonstrates the regime's complicity in attacks on vulnerable communities.International DimensionsThe journalist alleges significant foreign involvement in Bangladesh's current crisis. He claimed that "there were foreign elements, like US deep state and others including Pakistani ISI of course. And now we also can see that clearly that China was also behind the last year's jihadi coup."Regarding the current US administration's response, Choudhury expressed disappointment: "Unfortunately, that Donald Trump we knew during his first tenure term. Now during his second tenure, Donald Trump himself is a confused person. He doesn't know what to do or what he is doing."Regional Security ImplicationsChoudhury warned of serious implications for regional security, particularly for India. "For the jihadists in Bangladesh, their common enemy is India," he stated, adding that "until Yunus regime remains in power, India's national security is at risk."advertisementHe specifically mentioned the presence of terror cells: "there are many sleeper cells of Ansar al-Bangla team in particular and the Jamatul Mujahideen in Bangladesh inside some of the places in West Bengal and also in the northeastern regions."Democratic Processes Under ThreatThe journalist painted a bleak picture of Bangladesh's democratic future. He explained that "Yunus has banned Awami League" and that even the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has shifted its position after "on June 13th, Yunus had a secret meeting with the chief of BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party in London."Regarding elections, Choudhury was pessimistic: "Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist parties, they are publicly saying openly saying that elections should not be held" and "Yunus has no intention of holding elections... Bangladesh is not going to have any election even in the foreseeable future."Military Intervention as Only SolutionIn his most controversial assertion, Choudhury argued that military intervention represents the only viable path forward. "Now there is an essential need of armies military to take military initiatives, remove Yunus from power," he stated, emphasising that "the only way out is actions by our armed forces as soon as possible."- EndsMust Watch
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Time of India
34 minutes ago
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Acquitted in 11/7 Mumbai train blasts, duo recalls prison trauma and lost joys
Mumbai: A day after the Bombay high court judgment acquitted him from the charge of conspiracy in the 11/7 train blasts, Mohammed Ali Shaikh's Govandi residence was filled with relatives and neighbours who greeted him with sweets, while phones buzzed with congratulatory calls. "The happiness of reuniting with my family cannot be described. After 19 years, I sat with my wife, children, brothers and sisters and had food," said Shaikh (56), as he sat with the TOI reporter at the threshold of his house on Tuesday. "The HC has freed us. Truth has triumphed. We will fight our case in Supreme Court if need be, and are sure to win," he added. Shaikh received word about their acquittal during an online court hearing. "Ehtesham Siddiqui and I were released from Nagpur jail on Monday evening and flew to Mumbai at 3.30am Tuesday." "We were falsely implicated, tortured, and humiliated. Even my 11-year-old son was slapped by an ATS officer," he recalled. "ATS officers would visit my house and harass my family. They threatened me at gunpoint and asked me to become approver, even offering me Rs 10 lakh, a job in Dubai and Rs 10,000 monthly expenses if I complied. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Why Crypto CFDs May Suit Your Portfolio IC Markets Learn More Undo But I did not accept as we were innocent." The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had claimed that a Pakistani had visited Shaikh's home and manufactured the bombs that were planted on the trains on July 11, 2006. "Everything was a lie. They tarnished our image, imprisoned Shaikh and ruined our families," said a relative. When lodged in Thane jail, Shaikh had applied for parole after his brother Munawwar passed away, but it was rejected. Later his father died. "This time, they sanctioned parole, but the fee for police escort from Thane jail to Govandi was Rs 1.7 lakh. How could I afford it?" he rued. In jail, Shaikh passed two courses in tourism, completed graduation in Arts, and appeared for the first-year exam for MA (History). He plans to complete his post-graduation. Meanwhile, Zameer Shaikh (50), a key-maker from Worli who was released from Amravati jail on Monday evening after his acquittal, told TOI over the phone: "I am thankful to Allah. I am travelling right now." He said his son, who was in Class 1 when he was arrested in 2006, has become a mechanical engineer and his daughter is also studying. He added that he misses his parents, who died when he was in jail. Zameer was sentenced to life imprisonment by a trial court for allegedly receiving arms training in Pakistan and for alleged links with the Matunga train blast.
News18
5 hours ago
- News18
Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line
Last Updated: From January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently In a move justified through bureaucratic reasoning but deeply rooted in longstanding sectarian inequalities, the Pakistani government has unveiled extensive new measures that will significantly affect the country's Shia community. On July 15, interior minister Mohsin Naqvi announced that, starting from January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently. Instead, such religious journeys must be conducted exclusively in closely monitored groups, overseen by government-certified operators known as Zaireen Group Organisers (ZGOs). Presented as a necessary reaction to diplomatic concerns from Iran and Iraq regarding visa overstays and unauthorised activities, the newly announced policy has raised more concerns than clarity, drawing attention to the pronounced sectarian bias embedded within it. The government's rationale fails to hold under closer examination, particularly when contrasted with its tolerant approach to similar violations committed by Sunni pilgrims visiting Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this directive represents more than a mere procedural alteration—it conveys a veiled message to Pakistan's Shia population that they are not deemed trustworthy to travel independently. The double standard is unmistakable. For example, in December 2024 alone, Saudi Arabia deported nearly 5,000 Pakistani citizens in just one month—primarily Sunni pilgrims who had overstayed their Umrah visas and were found begging. This issue is not limited to Saudi Arabia; other Gulf nations such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also deported hundreds of Pakistanis for similar infractions. In fact, in April 2025, Saudi authorities imposed a temporary visa ban on 14 countries, including Pakistan, citing the need to curb unauthorised Hajj participation and widespread visa violations. Despite these developments, the Pakistani government has not implemented any restrictions on individual Sunni pilgrimages to Mecca or Medina, nor has it introduced a system of regulated group travel for them. If the core concern truly lies in visa breaches and diplomatic pressures, it raises a pressing question: why has only one sect been subjected to such punitive regulation, particularly when Gulf monarchies have consistently expressed concerns about Pakistani nationals engaging in begging and other illicit activities? The stance adopted by the Pakistani government reveals a clear sectarian inclination and forms part of a broader, long-standing pattern of discriminatory practices against the Shia minority, which constitutes an estimated 15-20 per cent of the national population. For decades, Pakistan's Shia citizens have faced state-backed marginalisation —ranging from explicit exclusion in key government positions to more covert institutional apathy that overlooks violence perpetrated by the Sunni majority, as notably seen in Parachinar within the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While many such forms of bias are subtle, others have been overt and violently repressive. Viewed within the broader historical context, the newly introduced pilgrimage regulation is merely another addition to a persistent trend of policies that have implicitly, if not explicitly, relegated the Shia community to a subordinate status. This so-called 'administrative requirement" fails to withstand scrutiny when placed against the wider backdrop of the state's consistent alignment with Sunni orthodoxy. For many Shia Muslims, visiting the sacred sites of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, as well as Qom and Mashhad in Iran, represents more than merely a religious duty—it serves as a profound emotional, spiritual, and cultural connection. These pilgrimages, primarily undertaken during the Islamic months of Muharram (for Ashura) and Safar (for Arbaeen), are vital expressions of faith and identity within the Shia tradition. Under the newly imposed regulations, such pilgrimages must now be conducted exclusively through state-approved organisers, many of whom impose prohibitively high charges and operate with little transparency. Independent travel options, which tend to be more affordable and allow for greater flexibility, will be rendered unlawful under this system. As a result, this policy effectively marginalises low-income Shia families and places additional constraints on their already restricted religious liberties. The disparity is striking. Sunni pilgrims travelling to Saudi Arabia for Umrah continue to benefit from a largely unmonitored travel framework, despite persistent reports of visa overstays, unlawful employment, and even infractions such as widespread begging. The government's reaction has typically been to ignore these issues or, at most, issue mild advisories—without imposing any broad restrictions or invoking claims of 'administrative necessity". Although it is accurate that the Iranian and Iraqi authorities have raised concerns about certain pilgrims, particularly during mass gatherings like Arbaeen, it is misleading to argue that the new restrictions are solely a response to these issues. If that were genuinely the case, the Pakistani government would have already put in place a regulatory policy addressing Umrah travel to Saudi Arabia—especially given Riyadh's repeated complaints regarding visa violations and begging by Pakistani citizens. Yet, instead of devising such a framework, Islamabad has consistently chosen to overlook these infractions committed by Sunni nationals deported from these Gulf states. The sole discernible distinction appears to lie in sectarian affiliation. Pakistan's centres of power—particularly its military-intelligence apparatus and dominant Sunni religious institutions—have long influenced the definition of full citizenship. Consequently, this measure does not merely constitute a travel regulation; it symbolises what appears to be a litmus test for citizenship, wherein a Pakistani Shia is denied the right to undertake pilgrimages independently, while a Sunni remains free to do so. By implementing such exclusionary travel protocols, the state not only marginalises a segment of its population but also risks exacerbating sectarian divisions in a nation already burdened by deep polarisation, political suppression, and widespread instability. Historically, Pakistan's constitution guaranteed equal rights to all citizens regardless of their faith or sect, although it has explicitly discriminated against the Ahmadiyya community—another oppressed group alongside Hindus, Shias, and Christians. Yet, for many within the Shia community, as with other religious minorities, that constitutional assurance has rarely translated into practice. The introduction of the new travel regulation serves as a stark reminder that in the Islamic Republic, religious liberty is not a universal entitlement but rather a tightly controlled and selectively granted privilege, managed and rationed by the state. Although visa enforcement, like border control, is a legitimate responsibility of the state, its impartiality is compromised when its execution aligns with sectarian fault lines. At that point, it no longer remains a neutral administrative act but becomes a vehicle for discrimination. If Pakistan genuinely seeks to foster national unity, it must reject the selective application of the law and commit to governance grounded in fairness—applying rules uniformly across all communities without favour or prejudice. This approach should also support, rather than restrict, religious expression, regardless of sectarian identity. Crucially, it requires avoiding the misuse of bureaucratic mechanisms as tools of sectarian exclusion. top videos View all Until such principles are upheld, the concept of 'equal citizenship" in Pakistan will continue to ring hollow—serving more as a bitter irony than a constitutional assurance. This is particularly evident for communities that are repeatedly compelled to demonstrate their loyalty, even in their most sacred journeys of faith. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : pakistan Shia sunni view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 22, 2025, 19:32 IST News opinion Global Watch | Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
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First Post
6 hours ago
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How state plunder and CPEC have made Balochistan Pakistan's Achilles' heel
Pakistan's focus on external threats over internal reconciliation highlights its failure to assert sovereignty through governance, leaving Balochistan a battleground for both local aspirations and global ambitions read more In the past week, the BLA has launched a deadly assault on Pakistani security forces, killing 29 people in Quetta and Kalat. The attack targeted a bus reportedly carrying over 48 passengers, including Pakistani soldiers. Image: AFP The Balochistan Liberation Army's (BLA) relentless campaign against Pakistani forces has thrust Pakistan's largest yet most marginalised province into the spotlight of a deepening crisis. In the first half of 2025 alone, the BLA claimed responsibility for 286 attacks, resulting in over 697 Pakistani military personnel killed and significant territorial gains, including the seizure of 45 strategic locations. In the past week, the BLA has launched a deadly assault on Pakistani security forces, killing 29 people in Quetta and Kalat. The attack targeted a bus reportedly carrying over 48 passengers, including Pakistani soldiers. This incident marks one of the deadliest strikes in recent months, pushing the military's casualty count to its highest in the past six months. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD These audacious operations, marked by sophisticated tactics and coordinated assaults on military infrastructure, signal a reinvigorated insurgency that challenges Pakistan's sovereignty over its resource-rich western frontier. The BLA's actions, including high-profile attacks like the Jaffar Express hijacking in March 2025, underscore a growing defiance rooted in decades of grievances—political exclusion, economic exploitation, and systemic human rights abuses. Balochistan, despite its vast reserves of gas, gold, and copper, remains Pakistan's poorest region, with 70 per cent of its population living in multidimensional poverty. The province's strategic significance, amplified by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has only intensified tensions, as Baloch nationalists view such projects as tools of external exploitation rather than local development. Pakistan's heavy-handed military response, characterised by enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, has further alienated the Baloch, swelling the ranks of insurgent groups with educated youth and even women. This escalating conflict exposes not only Pakistan's failure to integrate Balochistan but also its inability to reconcile with a population demanding autonomy or independence. The BLA's growing sophistication and public support signal a broader rejection of Islamabad's authority, raising questions about the state's capacity to maintain control over a region integral to its geopolitical ambitions. As the violence intensifies, the roots of this conflict—historical neglect, resource disputes, militarisation, and external influences—demand closer examination to understand why Pakistan's grip on Balochistan is slipping. Historical Neglect and Broken Promises The roots of the Pakistan-BLA conflict trace back to the forced annexation of Balochistan in 1948, when the princely state of Kalat was coerced into joining Pakistan despite its brief declaration of independence. This historical grievance set the stage for recurring rebellions, with five major uprisings since 1947, each driven by the Baloch people's sense of betrayal. The Pakistani state's early policies, such as the One-Unit scheme of 1955, which merged Balochistan into West Pakistan, stripped the region of its distinct identity and political agency. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD These actions sowed seeds of distrust that have persisted for decades. Baloch nationalists argue that Islamabad's promises of autonomy and development have consistently been broken, leaving the province politically marginalised. Despite constituting 44 per cent of Pakistan's landmass, Balochistan holds only 5 per cent of its population and lacks proportional representation in federal institutions, with Punjabi elites dominating the bureaucracy. The dismissal of Balochistan's provincial government in 1973, followed by a brutal four-year insurgency, further deepened this alienation. Successive governments have failed to address these grievances, opting instead for cosmetic reforms or outright repression. The Baloch see their region's strategic importance—bordering Iran and Afghanistan, with a coastline along the Arabian Sea—as a curse, exploited by the central government for geopolitical gain without reciprocal investment in local welfare. This historical neglect has created a fertile ground for the BLA's narrative of resistance, framing their fight as a legitimate struggle against a state that has consistently failed to honour Balochistan's sovereignty or aspirations for self-determination. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Economic Exploitation and the CPEC Balochistan's vast natural resources—gas, coal, gold, and copper—should have made it a cornerstone of Pakistan's economic growth, yet the province remains mired in poverty. The central government's exploitation of these resources, often without equitable benefit to the local population, has been a key driver of the BLA's insurgency. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $62 billion infrastructure project linking China's western region to Gwadar's deep-sea port, has become a lightning rod for Baloch grievances. While CPEC is touted as a game-changer for Pakistan, Baloch nationalists view it as a symbol of external exploitation, with Chinese investments prioritising federal and foreign interests over local needs. Militarised Repression Deepens Alienation Pakistan's response to Baloch dissent has relied heavily on militarisation, exacerbating the conflict and undermining its sovereignty over Balochistan. The Pakistani military's 'kill-and-dump' policy, involving enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, has targeted thousands of Baloch activists, students, and intellectuals since the early 2000s. Estimates suggest over 20,000 Baloch have gone missing, with bodies often found bearing torture marks, fuelling public outrage. Operations like the 2025 counterinsurgency campaign, involving drone strikes and mass arrests in Quetta and Mastung, have failed to quell the BLA's momentum, instead radicalising more civilians. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The military's heavy presence—over 50,000 troops stationed in Balochistan—creates a siege-like atmosphere, with checkpoints and raids disrupting daily life. This approach has alienated even moderate Baloch, who view it as collective punishment. The BLA's recruitment of educated youth, including women, reflects this growing resentment, with groups like the BLA's Majeed Brigade conducting suicide attacks against military targets in 2025. Pakistan's refusal to pursue political solutions, coupled with its reliance on force, has strengthened the BLA's narrative of state oppression, eroding trust in federal authority. By prioritising security over dialogue, Pakistan has failed to address the root causes of unrest, allowing the BLA to gain legitimacy as defenders of Baloch rights. This militarised approach not only escalates the conflict but also exposes Pakistan's inability to govern Balochistan effectively, weakening its claim to sovereignty. External Influences and Geopolitical Stakes Balochistan's strategic location and resources have drawn external actors, complicating the Pakistan-BLA conflict and exposing vulnerabilities in Pakistan's sovereignty. Bordering Iran and Afghanistan, with access to the Arabian Sea, Balochistan is a geopolitical hotspot. The CPEC has elevated its importance, with China investing heavily in Gwadar and energy projects. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Meanwhile, Iran's concerns about Baloch militancy spilling across its border have led to joint military operations with Pakistan, further complicating the regional dynamic. The BLA's reported ties to sanctuaries in Afghanistan, where porous borders allow training and arms flows, have emboldened its 2025 offensive, with 45 strategic locations seized. These external factors expose Pakistan's failure to secure Balochistan's borders, undermining its territorial control. The involvement of global powers in CPEC amplifies local grievances, as Baloch nationalists frame their struggle as resistance to foreign-backed exploitation. Pakistan's reliance on Chinese investment to stabilise its economy ties its hands, limiting its ability to address Baloch demands for fear of jeopardising CPEC. This geopolitical entanglement, coupled with Pakistan's inability to counter external influences or secure regional cooperation, has allowed the BLA to exploit fault lines, intensifying the conflict. The state's focus on external threats over internal reconciliation highlights its failure to assert sovereignty through governance, leaving Balochistan a battleground for both local aspirations and global ambitions. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The author, a columnist and research scholar, teaches journalism at St. Xavier's College (autonomous), Kolkata. His handle on X is @sayantan_gh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
