How Will New Delhi Navigate the Dalai Lama Succession Row?

The Diplomat

11-07-2025

Just a few days ahead of his 90th birthday, the 14th Dalai Lama announced at Dharamshala in India, where the headquarters of the Tibetan exile government is located, that his trust, the Gaden Phodrang, would have the 'sole authority' in deciding who his successor would be. This remark has not only sparked outrage in Beijing, but also generated some friction in China's ties with New Delhi. The decision regarding the Dalai Lama's reincarnation is inherently political and intricately linked with the Sino-Indian border dispute.
The PRC — which has ruled Tibet since 1950 — has consistently maintained that the next Dalai Lama incarnation will be born inside China and approved by the Chinese government, even introducing legislation in 2007 titled 'Measures on the Management of the Reincarnations of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhis,' which lays out strict rules governing reincarnations. As a result, the Dalai Lama's comments provoked a strong reaction from the Chinese government, which considers the 14th Dalai Lama a 'splittist.'
Beijing also reacted sharply to what it viewed as Indian 'interference in China's internal affairs' after an Indian minister endorsed the Dalai Lama's authority to choose his successor. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned New Delhi to 'exercise caution in its words and actions….and avoid impact on the improvement and development of the China-India relationship.' Subsequently, India's Ministry of External Affairs clarified that New Delhi 'does not take any position or speak on matters concerning beliefs and practices of faith and religion,' effectively distancing itself from the Dalai Lama succession issue.
Historically, New Delhi has sought to emphasize predictability and worked on preventing the differences between Beijing and the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA), as the Tibetan government-in-exile is known, from derailing Sino-Indian ties. Back in 1954, New Delhi accepted Tibet as a 'region' of China and in 2003, during Vajpayee's visit to China, explicitly recognized that the 'Tibet Autonomous Region is an integral part of the People's Republic of China.' Since then, India has maintained a delicate balance between providing refuge to generations of Tibetan communities, while maintaining a strong economic and political relationship with Beijing.
Since 2014, the BJP government — which prides itself on adopting a more muscular approach towards China — has taken a somewhat different approach by periodically using the 'Tibet card' to gain leverage in its bilateral dealings with Beijing. Most prominently, in a stark departure from the past, in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited Lobsang Sangay, then head of the CTA, to attend his swearing-in ceremony. The following year, Modi for the first time publicly greeted the Dalai Lama on his birthday, a tradition which he has followed every year since, including this year.
Despite such acts of overt proximity, the Modi government has been careful not to cross what the Chinese would consider 'red lines.' Due to the sensitivities involved, Modi changed track by not inviting the Tibetan leader to his second swearing-in ceremony in 2019. Many analysts view such an 'uncoordinated' — largely reactionary approach — as advantageous to Beijing's interests over New Delhi's.
Nevertheless, India's approach to the Tibet question has so far allowed India and China to keep aside historical disagreements and advance bilateral ties during periods of calm in Tibet. However, during periods of unrest, as in 2008, the Tibet question re-emerges as a source of tension.
The revival of the question of the Dalai Lama's succession brings an unwelcome level of uncertainty to an already fragile Sino-Indian bilateral relationship. New Delhi finds itself in a particularly difficult spot, both internally and externally. Internally, the Modi government will have to face criticism from the domestic public, especially the Tibetan community—as it did in 2012 and 2018, when it restricted Tibetan political activities in a bid to develop ties with Beijing—if it appears to be placating Beijing. Externally, there is a possibility of a resurgence of Chinese pressure along the Sino-Indian border, especially in Sikkim, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, where sizeable Tibetan-Buddhist populations live.
Only last year, New Delhi and Beijing arrived at a fragile border agreement, after a prolonged border conflict, which began with bloody clashes in June 2020 at Galwan.
Chinese pressure could take the shape of intensification of well-recorded Chinese espionage activities in Dharamshala, targeting the Tibetan diaspora and the exile community.
At the same time, New Delhi should be worried about the growing strength of a more fervent form of Tibetan nationalism, especially among younger Tibetans, who oppose the current Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' or Umaylam approach, which calls for meaningful autonomy rather than formal independence. This approach has played an important role in sustaining the process of normalization of Sino-Indian ties, and if discarded by the next Dalai Lama, would undoubtedly derail ties, potentially to a point of no return. New Delhi will also not be comfortable with the growth of a separatist militant movement on Indian soil, which could fuel similar sentiments in sensitive areas such as Jammu and Kashmir or the Northeast.
Buddhism is an important frontier in the India-China rivalry, with both sides using it as a tool to increase their soft-power attractiveness in Asia. How they handle the reincarnation issue will shape the trajectory of their regional influence in the long run. Beijing is unlikely to deviate from its strategy of biding time until the current Dalai Lama passes away, after which it will push to install its preferred successor. In light of the challenges raised by the question of the Dalai Lama's reincarnation, New Delhi needs to decide whether it is worth provoking Beijing. Its traditional balancing act and historically cautious approach seem unsuitable.