South Africa's taxpayers burdened by Police Minister Senzo Mchunu's suspension
Image: Independent Media
The suspension of embattled Police Minister Senzo Mchunu will further cost taxpayers due to double pay.
President Cyril Ramaphosa has appointed an executive outsider to hold the fort as acting police minister.
Ramaphosa announced the appointment of Professor Firoz Chachalia as acting police minister, effective August, while Mchunu remains on paid leave.
Mchunu will be taking a leave of absence from his official duties following serious allegations levelled against him by the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi.
Mkhwanazi accused Mchunu and Deputy National Commissioner for Crime Detection Lieutenant General Shadrack Sibiya of corruption, political interference, and drug cartel involvement during a media briefing last Sunday.
Central to the controversy is the disbandment of the political killings task team, the freezing of posts for crime intelligence, which has left KZN with vacant positions, among others.
In response to the announcement by Ramaphosa, Acting Deputy Chief Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga will establish and chair a Judicial Commission of Inquiry.
Mchunu on Monday welcomed the decision and expressed his full support for the process.
"I welcome and respect the President's decision and pledge my commitment to the process. Honour and integrity are the virtues I personally subscribe to and which we all need to make efforts to uphold. I stand ready to respond to the accusations against me and account to the citizens of the Republic, fully and honestly so," Mchunu said.
However, EFF national spokesperson, Sinawo Thambo, criticised the appointment, saying that it would further burden taxpayers.
"The taxpayers will pay for Mchunu's vacation and time off to go and consolidate his associates in the syndicates exposed by Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi," he said.
Thambo also questioned the constitutional validity of Cachalia's appointment, arguing that Section 91 (3) (c) of the Constitution does not apply to the appointment of an acting minister.
"The President of the Republic is therefore either surrounded by incompetent advisors, legally and otherwise, or he is surrounded by advisors so cunning that they have weaponised our Constitution to enhance ANC patronage and defend the corrupt," said Thambo.
"The EFF is appalled by the decision of President Cyril Ramaphosa to place Minister Senzo Mchunu on 'special leave' instead of removing him entirely from his position. This so-called 'special leave' is a cowardly deflection, designed to shield a corrupt minister whose involvement in organised crime has been laid bare by Mkhwanazi."
uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) spokesperson Nhlamulo Ndhlela said Ramaphosa had had an opportunity to take South Africa into confidence and to deal with these issues decisively.
'Instead, he calls for a commission of inquiry, and he expects South Africa to be patient when people are dying on a daily basis,' Ndhlela said.
Serving as acting police minister is a commitment for Cachalia, a Wits University law professor and former Gauteng Community Safety MEC.
Cachalia, said: "I'm still wrapping my head around what the priorities need to be."
He believes the focus should be on "the effectiveness of the police in dealing with crime, particularly those that have a strong impact on communities."
Ramaphosa announced the appointment of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry to probe Mchunu's alleged interference in police work and is instructed to deliver its preliminary report within three months and its full report within six months.
Ramaphosa said the allegations against Mchunu, if not addressed, would have a negative impact on the country.
Meanwhile, high office bearers within Ramaphosa's Cabinet have revealed that Mathale was angry at being overlooked to take over from Mchunu.
Mathale has been the deputy police minister since former president Jacob Zuma's tenure.
'The question as to why comrade president (Ramaphosa) has appointed an outsider remains unknown because Mathale has been in the game for a long time… he has been overlooked because he has since been known as a Zuma person.
'It's a little strange, really, as to why it was not automatic that either Polly Boshielo or Cassel Mathale had not taken over,' the source said.
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