Careem's exit from ride-hailing market

Business Recorder

2 days ago

In June 2025 Careem, the Dubai-based ride-hailing pioneer (now part of Uber), announced it would suspend its Pakistan operations on July 18 after nearly a decade in business. In a LinkedIn post Careem CEO Mudassir Sheikha called it 'an incredibly difficult decision,' attributing the withdrawal to 'the challenging macroeconomic reality, intensifying competition, and global capital allocation' that made it impossible 'to justify the investment levels required to deliver a safe and dependable service'.
Careem's exit marks the end of an era for Pakistan's ride-hailing scene. The company – which helped introduce app-based booking, cashless payment and women's mobility to Pakistani cities – said it would continue other tech activities (including development of its regional 'Everything App') out of Pakistan. Nonetheless, the core taxi service itself is being wound down, underscoring deep strategic, operational, and economic headwinds in this market.
Strategic and Operational Challenges in Pakistan
From its launch in October 2015, Careem led Pakistan's nascent ride-hailing industry. It grew to over 12.5 million users and some 820,000 drivers in Pakistan before exiting. It offered a range of services (standard, premium, flexi bidding) and in-ride safety features, and even 24/7 helplines – at considerable cost. But over the last few years this position proved increasingly untenable.
On the cost side, Careem repeatedly cited volatile fuel prices as a major constraint. Its local management noted that 'fluctuating fuel prices posed difficulties in adjusting fares to remain affordable for customers while ensuring fair payouts for captains'.
Worsening that problem, Pakistan's road infrastructure is notoriously uneven: many highways and city streets are in poor condition, driving up vehicle wear-and-tear and maintenance costs. These factors squeezed Careem's margins. At the same time the company faced increased regulatory compliance costs.
From its start, Careem had to work with authorities to legalize a new service model – as one spokesperson put it, being pioneers meant 'introducing the concept of ride-hailing in an unaccustomed market and navigating regulatory hurdles'.
The industry even asked the government for special Standard Operating Procedures, fair taxation, and clearer rules for digital platform transportation. In this tough environment, scaling sustainably required constant adjustments (for example, Careem introduced a bid-based 'Flexi' pricing mode like its competitors, backed by shorter drives and dynamic demand models). But even those efforts could not fully offset the rising input costs and compliance challenges.
Intensifying Competition
Careem's exit also reflected a fierce competitive landscape. Over the last two years several new players have gained ground. The Russian-backed app Yango and the Latin American firm InDrive aggressively expanded in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, attracting price-sensitive riders with low fares and flexible bidding features.
InDrive reports 26% year-on-year growth in rides and a 25% jump in active users in Pakistan during 2024, crediting its 'fair price' negotiated-fare model for winning market share. Careem introduced similar bidding mechanics, but even then analysis found Yango often had the cheapest promotional fares, making Careem relatively more expensive.
Likewise, domestic start-ups filled niches: Bykea's motorbike-taxi network now handles millions of monthly rides in major cities, and even launched some four-wheel services. The upshot is that never-strong margins in emerging markets were squeezed even further.
As the Economic Times noted, Ride-hailing giants worldwide (Uber, Lyft, Grab) have been 'exiting unprofitable markets, narrowing focus or pivoting to delivery' as 'rising costs, regulation, and thin margins in emerging markets' bite. Pakistan is no exception.
One can also point to Uber's strategy shift as precedent. In late 2022, Uber announced it would cease its own app in five Pakistani cities (leaving only Lahore on its platform) and redirect users to Careem, its 2019 acquisition. Effectively Uber conceded to Careem in those markets. Uber said the change (announced amid a national economic crisis) was aimed at 'minimizing impact' on drivers and riders, as Pakistan grappled with floods and financial turmoil.
Careem at the time became the sole on-demand transport platform for many customers. Yet even that consolidated position proved insufficient as new rivals eroded share. Reuters reports that 'newer entrants such as Russia-backed Yango and Latin America's inDrive have expanded in major cities, offering low-cost models,' coinciding with Careem's pullback.
Economic and Macro Constraints
Beyond competition, Pakistan's macro-economy has been exceptionally unforgiving. Since 2022 the country has endured a currency collapse, brutal inflation and dwindling investor confidence – creating an environment hostile to loss-making platform businesses. The Economic Times and Dawn both document that between 2022 and early 2024 Pakistani inflation surged to around 38% (far above the 5–10% typical range), before moderating in 2025. Consumer demand correspondingly fell; luxury or discretionary expenditures like ride-hailing softened as households grappled with high living costs. Venture funding for tech startups also dried up during the global and local downturn. Many local startups – including Airlift (hyperlocal delivery), Swvl (bus service), VavaCars (used cars) and Truck It In (logistics) – have already shut down or scaled back under the strain. As one analysis put it, Pakistan's digital economy has been 'under pressure' by record inflation and weak consumption.
Careem's leaders explicitly cited this tough finance backdrop. The CEO noted that global capital flows into frontier markets have tightened, making it hard to justify further investment in a low-return project. In plain terms, pouring money to subsidize rides became untenable when both currency and income levels were unstable. Rising fuel costs (Pakistan imports much of its oil) and interest rates further squeezed margins.
Industry participants like Bykea's founder even lamented that their $30 million in startup funding was a 'fraction of what was spent on the Islamabad metro bus project,' arguing that 'crowd-sourced mobility solutions' deserve more policy support than capital-intensive infrastructure. Careem's trajectory underlines this point: success depended not only on technology and service, but on macroeconomic stability and accessible capital.
The business environment was complicated by Pakistan's regulatory landscape. While app-based taxi services offered clear safety and convenience advantages (real-time tracking, vetted drivers, cashless payment), they initially clashed with legacy taxi laws. Ride-hailing firms have long lobbied for fair taxation and clear rules. For example, industry associations urged the government for 'standard practices, reasonable taxation, and fair competition', arguing that these would encourage growth. Careem itself highlighted that its platform delivered 'significant public goods: digital infrastructure, trust, regulation, capability, [and] confidence,' building a foundation for future ventures. But persistent regulatory uncertainty and sometimes retroactive policy moves (like attempts to apply heavy levies on app operators) have weighed on long-term planning. Thus even after nearly $4?billion in payouts to Pakistani drivers (with $500?million of that in Pakistan), Careem could not secure the policy tailwinds needed for profitability.
Comparative Market Context
Careem's difficulties in Pakistan contrast with its broader success in other markets. The app remains a leading platform across the Gulf and North Africa: today Careem operates in 70+ cities across about 10 countries (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.). In the UAE (its birthplace) Careem coexists with Uber, typically weathering economic shifts better than in Pakistan. And in Egypt – a 100-million-person market – Careem competes closely with Uber and local apps, suggesting huge latent demand. Indeed, a 2019 Reuters report noted that in Egypt the 'biggest players are Careem and Uber,' and ride-hailing is seen as still in a growth phase thanks to underdeveloped public transport. By comparison, Pakistan's market is smaller and more brittle: fewer overall riders per capita, and far more severe currency and inflation cycles. This helps explain why Uber (Careem's owner) maintained investment in the UAE and Egypt, even as it withdrew from Pakistan. Notably, Careem had no substantial India presence, where Uber and domestic Ola dominate; that means Careem had little cushion from nearby South Asian markets.
Regional competitors' experiences in Pakistan also illuminate the challenges. Global rideshare operators often rationalize out of markets where profits prove elusive. For instance, Uber's Middle Eastern arm recently exited markets like Algeria and Tunisia for similar reasons of low margins. InDrive, for its part, is doubling down on Pakistan, reporting double-digit growth – but even it acknowledges hurdles. inDrive Pakistan's PR lead noted that like others, they face 'regulatory hurdles, infrastructure limitations, and ensuring driver and passenger safety,' and have rolled out special insurance and driver support centers to cope. Yango (a less well-known app) has reportedly engaged in deep discounting and even currency manipulation to gain riders, raising questions about sustainability. All these firms are learning that high operating costs and macro headwinds can swamp rapid growth.
Implications for Pakistan's Tech Ecosystem
Careem's exit sends a sobering message to Pakistan's startup community. It underscores that global capital retrenchment and local economic challenges can quickly scuttle even successful platforms. Investors and entrepreneurs see that market potential alone isn't enough: reliable macro policy, exchange-rate stability, and supportive regulation are also critical. Already, experts have argued that the startup sector needs more domestic investment buffers, disciplined growth models, and government tech-friendly policies to survive a 'startup winter'. Careem's leadership, for its part, tried to highlight a positive note: its Pakistan tech workforce (nearly 400 engineers) will continue building a regional 'super-app,' with plans to hire 100 more local graduates. This suggests Pakistan remains a source of talent and a base for regional fintech ambitions, even if the ride-hailing chapter closes for now.
For policymakers, the episode offers lessons. Ride-sharing has demonstrably created jobs, improved transport options, and even nurtured digital payments usage (Sheikha noted Careem 'helped normalize digital payments' in Pakistan). Sustaining such gains may require more stable tax and regulatory frameworks and perhaps public–private collaboration on digital infrastructure. As one local CEO pointedly remarked, gig-economy firms in Pakistan have raised modest sums compared to government spending on ill-fitting transit projects; he urged a shift of investment toward 'crowd-sourced mobility solutions' that leverage technology to serve commuters more efficiently.
In the end, Careem's Pakistan withdrawal is a cautionary tale about the limits of ride-hailing growth amid economic slowdown. It confirms that structural issues – inflation, fuel shocks, poor roads, limited consumer spending and funding – can overwhelm market-leader advantages. As Pakistan's digital economy matures, the hope is that regulators and entrepreneurs alike take these signals to heart: build sustainable models, seek steady funding, and push for an enabling policy environment. Only then can future tech ventures avoid the fate of Careem's ride-hailing arm in Pakistan.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025