The Israel-Iran ceasefire — managing the blowback

The Hindu

2 days ago

The cessation of Israel-Iran hostilities, announced by United States President Donald Trump, sets the stage for the denouement of the horror drama that began on October 7, 2023, with Hamas launching its Operation Toofan al-Aqsa. While the fog of war and rounds of one-upmanship make the immediate foreground inexact, unless the choreographers take due care, the finale is certain to be as disruptive as the main act has been.
Over the past 21 months, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), backed by the U.S., has scored a set of spectacular though pyrrhic military victories. In Gaza, the IDF has decimated Hamas, even as some Israeli hostages remain in Hamas captivity. Lebanon's Hezbollah, considered the world's most formidable non-state actor with an estimated 1,00,000 missiles, has been neutered with its leadership in disarray and its arsenal gone. Syria's al-Assad regime, Israel's rejectionist foe for 54 years, has been replaced by a weak Islamist government that poses no threat to Israel. Yemen's al-Houthis did manage to disrupt maritime traffic and lob missiles at Israel, but have been cowed down by the disproportionate IDF and U.S. military responses. Lastly, after 12 days of high-intensity aerial exchanges, Israel and the US claimed to have 'obliterated' the nuclear option that Iran doggedly pursued for over two decades. Tehran has also suffered strategic losses of its missile force and has had targeted assassinations of its top military personnel and nuclear scientists. While single-mindedly pursuing its military options, Israel's ultra-right government has ridden roughshod over the domestic opposition and brushed aside foreign criticism and attempts at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice to put it on a legal mat.
The course for Iran
'Where does West Asia go from here?' It is a difficult question to answer for several reasons. The situation, to quote Churchill, 'is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma…' The dramatic and unprecedented turn of events notwithstanding, the resultant geopolitical entropy would unfold only glacially. With the three main stakeholders all claiming victories and jostling for influence over the outcome, controlling the blowback and avoiding revanchism would be a challenge. The putative military victors, namely Israel and the U.S., would aim for a permanently favourable geopolitical architecture, while the countervailing forces, including Iran, try to turn their military stalemate into a political victory.
Setting the future course of Iran would be the biggest challenge for two reasons: First, as the most populous country in the region, it is intrinsically important. Second, as Israel's most implacable foe, it has been the region's biggest disruptor and political determinant. Despite its economy hobbled by 'maximum pressure' sanctions and a devastating war, Tehran remains a regional geo-strategic pivot. While the victors may have publicly avowed their disinterest in regime change in Tehran, an unrepentant Mullah regime would signify their 'unfinished agenda'.
The necessity of keeping Tehran in check on its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ambitions by continued sanctions and strict and intrusive supervision by international inspections would preoccupy the U.S., Israel and the pro-West regimes in this region. This would create an unsteady political dynamic similar to Iraq during 1991-2003 after Saddam's forces were evicted from Kuwait. Further, Tehran may become a countervailing pole to the Pax Americana in the region — a prospect anathematic to 'the winner takes it all' absolutists in power in Washington and Jerusalem.
On the other hand, having a West-leaning regime in Tehran would be a profound gain. It would create a comprehensive Pax Americana in West Asia, allowing the U.S. to control the strategic region's hydrocarbon resources. Moreover, the huge pent-up Iranian demand for projects, merchandise and services can then be cornered by the American multinationals. Lastly, a friendly government would put a firm lid on the regional proxies created by Iran in the past.
The goal of a friendly regime
Therefore, installing a friendly regime in Tehran is of primordial importance for Israel and the U.S. But this mission presents a huge dilemma. Although large sections of its population are politically alienated due to corruption and the high-handedness of authorities, as well as high inflation, they would stand up against any foreign occupation and imposed government. So, boots-on-ground to effect a regime change would be counterproductive and can be ruled out. Moreover, attempts by the U.S. in the past at forced regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq were costly and messy failures.
Iran is a large country with a deeply entrenched current government structure. Though some exiled Iranian groups, such as Pahlavi Royalists and Mujahedin al-Khalq exist, their local support is highly uncertain, making an externally sponsored takeover unlikely. There is also a danger that destabilisation of the current regime could unleash centrifugal forces among various ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Azeris, Arabs and Sunnis, who constitute nearly 40% of the population. This would create a Libya, Sudan and Somalia type of anarchy, which is in no one's interest.
Hence, the best possible scenario for the Americans is to glacially reorient the current regime. This would be a challenge as the radicals supported by the Republic Guards currently control the parliament and clergy, with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, favouring them. Therefore, pressure to being applied to get the 86-year-old Khamenei, at the helm for 36 years, to either discreetly abandon WMD ambitions or relinquish power and be replaced by a pro-West moderate. While the hardliners in power may resist a change at the top at this critical juncture, their policies have not worked.
The two front-runners in the contest — to be decided by the Guardian Council — are likely to be the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei and the grandson Hassan Khomeini of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. They are both in their fifties. While Khamenei junior has continuity of lineage and policies, Hassan Khomeini is bereft of any such baggage. As the only transition at the Supreme Leader level was 35 years ago, this is largely uncharted territory, but with serious implications for the country and the region.
The Gaza situation
The second issue awaiting resolution is the Israel-Palestine dispute, which the recent events have made even more convoluted. The just concluded war with Iran would allow the IDF to refocus on the Gaza situation, where mass starvation competes with the high death toll of civilians every day due to Israeli fire. It is a desperate situation. The occupied West Bank is facing a deteriorating situation due to Jewish settlers on the rampage and the long-suspended transition of the Palestine Authority under President Mohammed Abbas, who is close to 90. A post-conflict euphoria may allow Mr. Trump to refloat his bizarre idea of mass deportation of Gazans to build an 'international riviera.' While the war-numbed Gazans are desperate for survival, it is still difficult to see this as a part of the solution.
The end of the war would finally allow Israeli society greater normalcy, permitting an objective and rational analysis of its recent extraordinary experiences. The clamour for the early release of remaining hostages is likely to intensify, and the governance and intelligence failings of the current regime may come under harsh spotlight. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's suspended trial on corruption charges may resume. The economic and social costs of the war may haunt Israel for a long time, giving it a reality check. Israel's post-war recovery and political reset towards moderation would be pivotal for the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
After this apocalyptic conflict, the West Asian region yearns for peace and stability. If the three main actors, viz., Iran, Israel and the U.S. avoid triumphalism and transit instead to moderation and nation-building, this aspiration can be realised. The region and the world would benefit from lower oil prices, smoother logistics and reduced radicalisation and terrorism. Otherwise, the region would go back to business as usual: cyclicity of the conflicts punctuated by an interregnum of tense peace.
Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador specialising in West Asia and oil affairs