Nelson Mandela Bay council to decide this week if electricity tariff will rise by 12%
The Nelson Mandela Bay metro has admitted in its own Integrated Development Plan that it is to present before council this week that electricity outages in the metro are at an all-time high.
Yet the budget for the 2025/2026 financial year proposes that consumers pay 12% more for electricity.
The plan notes that the Average System Interruption Frequency Index, which measures how often the average customer experiences outages, has reached record levels, primarily due to high-voltage events. These are caused by cable faults, theft and vandalism of fibre cables that trigger unnecessary feeder trips. The document also notes that outages last longer, with forced load reductions worsening reliability indicators.
Meanwhile, the metro's Electricity and Energy Directorate is in a financial crisis, operating at a R1.2-billion loss as it struggles to curb illegal connections, vandalism and the collapse of grid infrastructure.
One visible example of municipal inaction is the Grogro informal settlement, where illegal electricity connections stretch across Kragga Kamma Road to a substation. These makeshift cables frequently catch fire.
In a letter shared with residents, ward councillor Margaret de Andrade wrote, 'My office has engaged in numerous meetings with the relevant departments on this matter, and we have received commitments on several fronts. However, to date, there has been no meaningful feedback or coordinated action.
'As one of your officials previously stated, 'I have forgotten about Grogro'.
'If this sentiment reflects the current level of attention, it is deeply concerning and unacceptable given the gravity of the situation.
'Unrest risk imminent'
'This is no longer just an operational issue — it is a volatile crisis. The community is growing increasingly frustrated due to the lack of visible intervention, and tensions are rising. The risk of unrest, fires and harm to both residents and municipal staff is imminent.
'I strongly urge all departments to urgently coordinate and communicate with one another. We need immediate alignment between Electricity and Energy, Safety and Security, Legal Services, Human Settlements and Disaster Management.'
In addition, according to the metro's reports, about 22% of residential electricity meters have been tampered with.
In the proposed budget, it is stated: 'As previously reported to Council, it is important to note that the financial position of the Electricity Service is under immense pressure due to the extent of electricity losses, which impact significantly on the financial sustainability of the municipality. This is supported by the fact that the budget for Electricity Bulk Purchases exceeds the total Electricity Service Charges budget. This means that the Electricity Service, which is a Trading Service, is operating at a substantial deficit, requiring support from property rates.'
The 12% proposed tariff hike still needs approval by the National Energy Regulator, and if granted, will kick in on 1 July.
However, CEO of the Nelson Mandela Bay Business Chamber Denise van Huyssteen said they had not seen the metro's application to Nersa.
This is the first year that Nersa will publish all applications on its website; the metro's application also doesn't appear there.
Van Huyssteen pointed out that the manufacturing industry was the metro's largest electricity consumer (about 59%) and as a result, organised business in Nelson Mandela Bay would like to have more input on the electricity budget.
Van Huyssteen warned that, at the current trajectory, there was a real risk that the municipality might default on its Eskom bulk electricity payments. She noted that if the increase remained capped at 12%, business was unlikely to oppose it.
In 2022, the metro led litigation against Nersa, securing a ruling that the general guideline and benchmarking method the regulator had used to determine increases was unconstitutional. The metro argued that the municipality should be required to show Nersa how much it cost to distribute electricity bought from Eskom.
Van Huyssteen said programmes such as the geyser control initiative should be reinstated, as it had collapsed.
'We want to add that the municipality needs the urgent support of Eskom to fix its infrastructure,' she said.
An additional threat to the metro's electricity security is the temporary repairs to the high-voltage line that collapsed last year.
In April, one of the pylons partially collapsed again, damaging the temporary fix.
Ward councillors Sean Tappan and Dries van der Westhuyzen said earlier this month that there was now a temporary repair to the temporary repair.
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The later transaction advice given to CEF by Mazars lists two contact people: Taona Kokera, a director at Mazars, and Oneyka Ojogbo, a director and lawyer from consulting firm CLG. Mazars acted as the lead transaction adviser from 2021 through to its completion, and there is only one other mention of CLG in the documents that Open Secrets has access to: in a number of comments made in track changes on the draft Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) between BP, Shell and CEF dated 2 May 2024, a couple of weeks before the purchase was announced. Founded by prominent oil and gas lobbyist NJ Ayuk, who has since stepped down as CEO, CLG is often referred to in the media as a 'South African legal firm'. However, it is not registered with the Legal Practice Council and is more accurately understood as a typical professional services firm that provides a broad range of consulting, legal and other services under one roof. CLG has 25 offices and more than 300 attorneys and 'business advisers', with major offices in nine African countries, including its Sandton office in South Africa. CLG describes itself as an 'undeniable leader' in oil and gas development. Its office at Suite 43, Katherine and West, in Sandton, is the same address linked to the African Energy Chamber (AEC), where Ayuk is chairperson. The AEC is overtly an oil and gas lobby organisation aiming to attract investment and build capacity in the oil and gas sector across Africa and hosts the annual 'African Energy Week' in Cape Town, focused on developing the oil and gas sector across the continent. There is also a notable South African political connection in the AEC. Nosizwe Nokwe-Macamo is on the advisory board, and sits on the 'Local Content Committee', 'Investment Committee', and 'Natural Gas Committee' of the advisory board. Nokwe-Macamo was the CEO of PetroSA for three years between 2012 and 2015, but was suspended and ultimately left after the state-owned entity posted a nearly R15-billion loss in 2015. In 2024, she made a return to state-owned oil and gas when she was appointed by Gwede Mantashe to the board of the brand-new South African National Petroleum Corporation (SANPC). It is unclear when exactly CLG was contracted to work on the project, but the advice that it contributed to was certainly more supportive of the decision to purchase the refinery and more bullish on the future of the oil refinery business. Their advice on this transaction also overlapped with the period Mazars and CLG were giving dubious advice to CEF's then subsidiary – PetroSA – on a separate oil and gas deal. In February 2025, amaBhungane revealed that Kokera had led the Mazars team that gave the green light to three dubious deals between PetroSA and Gazprom, and PetroSA and Lawrence Mulaudzi. Mazars was brought on to advise on the deal in September 2023 and provided a final due diligence report in October 2023. The due diligence labelled Mulaudzi as a 'low-risk' partner, despite publicly available information that he had been involved in alleged corruption in his own business dealings. The PetroSA deal fell apart in June 2024 after Mulaudzi and EquaTheza failed to provide the R227-million that was promised. Mazars has come under fire for its involvement in this deal for several reasons. The final due diligence report it provided was insufficient and left out crucial details it had identified in earlier due diligence about the risks associated with Mulaudzi, his company Equator Holdings, and the financial and technical capabilities that EquaTheza had to take on a project of this nature. Mazars has denied any wrongdoing. Additionally, Mazars was also accused of overcharging PetroSA for the work it did. Mazars had sub-contracted CLG in its work for PetroSA, and Ojogbo had billed as if she had worked on the project from 8am to 7pm every day of the week for two months, charging R4,160 per hour. PetroSA's internal audit team alleged that Ojogbo and Mazars had engaged in 'double dipping'. PetroSA has since written to Mazars, demanding a refund of just over R1-million, but it is unclear whether this has happened. Additionally, the audit team raised questions around Mazars' potential blacklisting by National Treasury for future business with the state if Mazars had, in fact, overcharged and underdelivered. PetroSA's internal audit team also pointed out that CLG had an obvious conflict of interest. In advising PetroSA, they would draft contracts and undertake due diligence on Mulaudzi and his companies. Yet Equator's bid to PetroSA listed CLG as its partner. Mazars and CLG – led by Kokera and Ojogbo – were thus advising CEF on its decision to purchase the Sapref refinery at the same time as providing advice to PetroSA which has since been called into serious question. Both Mazars and CLG failed to respond to detailed questions from Open Secrets regarding the due diligence, the discrepancies in the transaction advice provided to CEF in 2021 and 2023, and their views on the serious concerns raised by other firms in the due diligence process. CEF board signs off and then stalls Regardless of the motivations of those providing the advice to CEF, its board – chaired by Ayanda Noah – still had the responsibility to carefully apply its mind to all of the advice before making the decision to purchase the refinery and on what terms. The scramble to create the South African National Petroleum Company (SANPC), a merger of CEF's subsidiaries – PetroSA, Strategic Fuel Fund and iGas – to spur investment in the country's oil and gas sector has also been a large factor behind the acquisition of Sapref. While it is speculative, it may be that the desire to rapidly consolidate the SANPC and expand its operations led the CEF board to gloss over the very real consequences of purchasing a defunct refinery, taking on its enormous liabilities and the myriad risks identified in the due diligence phase. Despite the more positive tone of the later advice from Mazars and CLG, it still called for further due diligence and a 'comprehensive review of financial records, legal documents and environmental assessments'. Crucially, the CEF board motivated to proceed with the sale just one month after receiving this advice, insufficient time for a further comprehensive due diligence process. Open Secrets sent detailed questions about the transaction to both the Central Energy Fund and Department of Petroleum and Mineral Resources but received no response from either. Since the purchase, CEF and the SANPC (now officially in operation and staffed) have argued that the rehabilitation of the refinery is the answer to national energy security and job creation. They have repeatedly indicated their aim to increase the refinery's capacity from 180,000 barrels per day to 600,000 barrels (bbl) per day, to create a 'mega-refinery'. Yet there is no sign of any progress in this regard. In fact, in February 2025 reports arose suggesting that the state was realising it could not afford to rebuild the Sapref refinery nor expand its capacity to 600,000bbl on its own. Deputy director-general in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources department, Tseliso Maqubela, and Minister Gwede Mantashe told Parliament in February 2025 that they were looking to regional partners – including Angola's Sonangol or Botswana Oil – to help rebuild the refinery. The state thus now sits with a defunct and out-of-date refinery with enormous social and environmental liabilities. It may not have the capital to get it going again, and even if it does, many experts suggest it will be a stranded asset in the near future. Its former owners, Shell and BP, have disappeared into the sunset. All the while, the communities of South Durban continue to bear the disastrous health costs and environmental devastation caused by the refinery. DM Open Secrets is a nonprofit organisation which exposes and builds accountability for private-sector economic crimes through investigative research, advocacy and the law. 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