Over 100 Ocean Empire staff owed money before sudden closure, union says, with claims totalling over HK$15M
Around 110 workers were not given their wages for April, severance pay, pay in lieu of notice, and outstanding Mandatory Provident Fund contributions, the Eating Establishment Employees General Union, a union under pro-establishment party Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), said last Friday during a meeting with workers affected by the shutdown.
The union said in a statement issued after the meeting that the workers were employed as chefs, servers, maintenance workers and warehouse workers. It added that the affected workers included 19 people who were hired under the city's imported labour scheme, local media outlets reported.
The labour and welfare chef Chris Sun told reporters on Saturday morning that the Labour Department had received around 100 workers' complaints, with claims totalling HK$15 million.
The official said the government will provide assistance to both local workers and those under the imported labour scheme, adding that both types of workers enjoy the same labour rights and protections in Hong Kong. Sun urged workers who had not done so to report their cases to the Labour Department.
Founded in 1992, Ocean Empire offered Cantonese congee, rice rolls and snacks. It had seven branches in the city before its closure, according to its website. At its peak, it had around 30 branches.
Last Wednesday, the restaurant chain announced in a notice to staff that all branches would be closed on the same day, with immediate termination of all staff.
The company said in the notice that it would communicate with staff about claims while suggesting that they reach out to the Labour Department to learn about their legal rights.
However, former Ocean Empire staff said last Friday during meeting with the union that the management and founders of the restaurant chain had 'disappeared,' leaving workers lost, The Collective reported.
'Staff of Ocean Empire feel helpless in the face of the sudden closure. In the past, the company always followed procedures when closing down restaurant branches rather than announcing the sudden termination of workers' contracts,' the union wrote in the Chinese statement.
'[The sudden closure] does not take into account workers who have worked hard for Ocean Empire,' the union added.
HK$30 million invested after pandemic
Ocean Empire broke their silence on Friday evening, saying in a statement issued on Facebook that they had invested over HK$30 million to 'save the business' since the Covid-19 pandemic and that the company had been hit hard by slow business.
The founders said they sold their properties, took out loans, and allocated their assets in order to maintain the restaurant chain's cash flow.
'We… believed that the economy would improve after the pandemic… but Hong Kong's consumption habits and eatery styles changed beyond our control. People's needs for congee declined, and we had no way to tackle our deficit,' the Chinese statement read.
It added that following the withdrawal of some shareholders, the founders eventually decided to wind up and liquidate the company.
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