Chinese sales of foreign phone makers, including Apple, drop 9.7% in May
Apple
Inc, fell 9.7% year-on-year in May, according to data released by a government-affiliated research company on Friday.
Calculations based on the data from the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) showed that May shipments of foreign-branded phones in China fell to 4.54 million handsets from the same month last year.
As the largest foreign mobile phone maker in China's smartphone-dominated market, Apple's performance plays a significant role in the overall data on foreign-branded phone sales in the country.
Apple has faced increased competition from domestic rivals and has cut prices to stay competitive. Chinese e-commerce platforms offered discounts of up to 2,530 yuan ($351) on Apple's latest iPhone 16 models in May.
The CAICT data did not give specific figures for Apple.
Shipments of phones within China were down 21.8% year-on-year to 23.72 million handsets for the month, the data showed.
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