Who is Lucy Powell? UK Labour MP under fire for her remarks on grooming gangs
, Labour's Leader of the House of Commons, is facing mounting pressure to resign following
controversial remarks
she made about
grooming gangs
during a BBC Radio 4 debate. Her comments, widely criticised by Conservative politicians and commentators, came in response to a question referencing a Channel 4 documentary, Groomed: A National Scandal, which detailed harrowing accounts from victims of sexual exploitation.
During the broadcast of Any Questions, Reform UK's Tim Montgomerie asked Powell if she had seen the documentary. Powell retorted, 'Oh, we want to blow that little trumpet now, do we? Let's get that dog whistle out, shall we?' Her use of the term 'dog whistle' triggered a backlash, with opponents accusing her of belittling the suffering of thousands of victims.
Powell has since sought to clarify her remarks, insisting that she was criticising
political point-scoring
on the issue, not the seriousness of child grooming itself.
'I was challenging the political point scoring around it, not the issue itself. As a constituency MP I've dealt with horrendous cases,' she said.
Senior Conservatives, however, were not satisfied with the explanation. Shadow Home Secretary Chris Philp called Powell's remarks a 'shocking outburst' and said they 'belittle the thousands of girls and women who were raped by grooming gangs.' Shadow Justice Secretary Robert Jenrick said her words were a 'disgusting betrayal of the victims,' while Reform UK said Powell's comments showed Labour was 'out of touch.
'
Despite the backlash, the Prime Minister's Office is understood to have accepted Powell's apology, and she remains in her Cabinet post for now. Fellow
Labour MP
Wes Streeting defended her, saying Powell was 'mortified' and that the comments had come 'in the heat of debate'.
Who is Lucy Powell?
Lucy Powell is the Labour MP for Manchester Central, first elected in 2012.
She currently serves as Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council in Keir Starmer's government.
Powell has previously held several shadow cabinet roles, including in education, business, and digital policy.
Known for championing working-class communities and promoting investment in Manchester.
As Leader of the House, she manages the government's legislative agenda and liaises with Parliament.
She has led efforts to modernise Parliament and improve working conditions for MPs and staff.
Powell has secured funding for local priorities, including healthcare, housing, and public safety.
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