Lebanese depositors to get frozen funds back over time, Economy Minister pledges
The state, central bank and lenders in the country will share the burden of repairing the crisis-stricken economy, he told Bloomberg TV in an interview on Monday.
'Depositor protection is an extremely important part of the objectives that we have in place. That may require instruments, that may require delays, or some time passage in order to pay, but the idea is that nobody would lose their deposits. But it may take time,' Mr Bisat said.
The commitment to depositors, who have been waiting for their funds to be released for years, is part of an attempt to break a stalemate on reforms, which are needed to unlock fresh funds from the International Monetary Fund and help the country emerge from one of the world's worst financial crises.
Officials have struggled to reach a deal for years, with local lenders refusing to shoulder the bulk of losses and forced consolidation to strengthen institutions and increase the size of their balance sheets.
In September last year, Lebanon's then-interim central bank governor Wassim Mansouri said giving people their funds would not be 'impossible' and depositors should not 'have to wait for an extended period'.
People in Lebanon have been waiting to access to their life savings stuck in banks since 2019, as the country endures a severe financial crisis. Lebanese banks imposed arbitrary restrictions on their clients since after the state failed to honour its bond commitments. The economy went into a tailspin and the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the country's economic crisis to historic proportions.
The 2019 economic collapse was blamed on decades of financial mismanagement and corruption by Lebanon's ruling elite. Former central bank governor Riad Salameh has also been accused of helping to embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars from the central bank.
Lebanon in March appointed wealth manager Karim Souaid central bank governor, filling a position that had been held by the interim chief since July 2023.
Changes to Lebanon's banking sector are among the key reforms demanded by international backers and lenders before the country can receive assistance.
In April 2022, Lebanon reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF on a comprehensive economic reform programme supported by a 46-month extended fund facility, proposing access to about $3 billion. However, Lebanese authorities have been accused of dragging their feet on the required reforms.
Mr Bisat, a former BlackRock executive, on Monday said the country's financial crisis requires a 'collective solution'. But it also needs to ensure the survival of the banking sector and the central bank's ability to conduct monetary policy, he said.
'There's a limit to how much we can impose on each of them,' he told Bloomberg.
The minister said the a law approved last week to lift banking secrecy will be passed in parliament in the next few weeks, giving the government a better sense of the capital gap in each of the banks.
From 2016, the central bank began to channel billions of dollars of depositor funds to cover the government's deficits and finance the peg.
Lebanon estimates its overall losses to surpass $70 billion, more than triple the size of the country's economy.
Beirut aims to organise an investor conference in September, which Mr Bisat told Bloomberg he hopes it would tell the world that "Lebanon is back in business".
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Middle East Eye
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The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded today the 2025 Article IV consultation with Equatorial Guinea. IMF Management approved in June the combined first and second reviews under the Staff Monitored Program (SMP) and a 12 month SMP extension. Equatorial Guinea registered a mild economic recovery in 2024, but the economy is projected to grow weakly and a drain on regional reserves is expected to continue in the medium term as hydrocarbon production declines. The banking sector is showing clear signs of improvement. Performance under the program has been strong, with significant reforms implemented and a substantial fiscal adjustment that met the SMP conditionality. However, contrary to longstanding commitments, the authorities decided not to publish asset declarations of public officials. The program extension will provide the authorities with an opportunity to complete an alternative governance reform measure aimed at strengthening transparency in the extractive sector. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Equatorial Guinea.[1] IMF Management approved the completion of the first and second reviews and a 12-month extension of the Staff Monitored Program (SMP) for Equatorial Guinea on June 25, 2025. The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2] Equatorial Guinea registered a mild economic recovery in 2024, growing by 0.9 percent following a strong contraction in 2023. However, non-hydrocarbon GDP growth slowed in 2024 to 1.3 percent, and the economy is expected to grow only modestly in the medium term as hydrocarbon production declines. Inflationary pressures have persisted, with inflation increasing from 2.5 percent in 2023 to 3.4 percent in 2024. The banking sector showed clear signs of improvement in 2024 but remains undercapitalized. The average capital adequacy ratio of the system is marginally below the regulatory minimum, but substantially higher than at the end of 2022. The authorities' substantial fiscal adjustment in 2024 improved the non-hydrocarbon primary balance from -22.3 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2023 to -17.0 percent in 2024. Public debt decreased from 39.1 percent to 36.4 percent of GDP. Equatorial Guinea's contribution to foreign reserves at the regional central bank remained negative in 2024, following a reserve loss in 2023. The authorities planned further fiscal adjustment will aim to keep public debt below 50 percent of GDP despite the projected decline in hydrocarbon revenues and restore external balance in the medium term. The authorities have implemented substantial reforms over the past year in the context of the SMP. The significant fiscal adjustment in 2024 helped initiate stabilization of the public debt dynamics and restoration of external balance. They enacted a new tax law that broadens the tax base, prepared a plan to phase out fuel subsidies, began making payments under a new arrears clearance strategy and reformed the customs administration. The authorities took concrete steps toward restoring the health of the financial sector. In an effort to improve governance and transparency, they also developed an AML/CFT strategy and published contracts in the extractive sector and an audit of spending following the accidental explosions in Bata in 2021. The authorities' policies have allowed them to meet almost all of the SMP's quantitative conditionality as well as complete actions related to most of their structural reform program commitments in the areas of governance, financial sector development and structural fiscal policy. The authorities missed two structural benchmarks following their decision not to publish the asset declarations of public officials. The 12-month SMP extension will afford the authorities the opportunity to complete an alternative governance reform measure – the publication of an extractive industry transparency report in line with EITI standards – while continuing to implement their broader reform agenda. Executive Board Assessment[3] Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. Directors welcomed the authorities' progress on their reform agenda under the Staff‑Monitored Program, noting its 12‑month extension. They stressed, however, that the macroeconomic environment remains challenging, particularly because of the continued decline in hydrocarbon production that is placing sustained pressure on fiscal and external balances. Directors urged steadfast reform implementation going forward, particularly to address long‑standing and serious governance challenges, which would help economic diversification and lay the foundation for private sector‑led, sustainable, and inclusive growth. Directors welcomed the authorities' decision to anchor public debt to preserve debt sustainability and restore external balance. They emphasized that this will require a gradual and sustained fiscal adjustment in the face of declining hydrocarbon revenues. Directors welcomed the commitment to achieving the 2025 budget and stressed the need for continued efforts to mobilize domestic non‑hydrocarbon revenues and strengthen fiscal institutions. Improving public financial management remains essential. Directors called for ambitious social spending reform to improve social outcomes and boost human capital development. They stressed the importance of approving the social protection law to enable the building of comprehensive social safety nets. Directors commended the progress made toward restoring the health of the financial sector—including the completion of the audit of the systemic public bank and the creation of an arrears clearance strategy—but noted that vulnerabilities remain. Directors highlighted the importance of obtaining approval from the regional banking supervisor for the arrears clearance plan, further strengthening private banks' balance sheets, and implementing the financial inclusion strategy. Directors urged the authorities to redouble their efforts to substantially improve transparency and governance. They regretted the authorities' decision to step back from the long‑standing commitment to publish asset declarations of public officials, and many Directors urged the authorities to reconsider this option. Directors considered that the publication of an annual report on financial flows in the extractive sector could help demonstrate the authorities' commitment to address their governance deficit. They recommended further governance reforms to address issues highlighted in the 2019 governance diagnostic, including implementing the AML/CFT strategy. A predictable and transparent business environment with reliable and efficient application of laws is needed to create a level playing field that would attract domestic and foreign investment. It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Equatorial Guinea will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle. Table 1. Equatorial Guinea: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2024–26 Estimates Projections 2024 2025 2026 (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise specified) Production, prices, and money Real GDP 0.9 -1.6 0.5 Hydrocarbon GDP1 0.4 -6.4 -2.6 Non-hydrocarbon GDP 1.3 2.3 2.8 GDP deflator 2.5 3.0 1.0 Consumer prices (annual average) 3.4 2.9 2.9 Consumer prices (end of period) 3.4 2.9 3.5 Monetary and exchange rate Broad money 2.6 2.7 2.9 Nominal effective exchange rate (- = depreciation) … … … External sector Exports, f.o.b. -7.1 1.6 -8.7 Hydrocarbon exports -8.4 1.7 -10.2 Non-hydrocarbon exports 2.6 1.8 1.0 Imports, f.o.b. -8.9 2.2 -1.9 Government finance Revenue -14.3 0.7 -5.0 Expenditure -0.7 4.9 -1.3 (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) Government finance Revenue 17.9 17.8 16.7 Hydrocarbon revenue 14.5 14.3 13.0 Non-hydrocarbon revenue 3.4 3.5 3.7 Expenditure 18.5 19.1 18.6 Overall fiscal balance (Commitment basis) -0.6 -1.3 -1.9 Overall fiscal balance (Cash basis) -1.0 -2.0 -2.6 Non-hydrocarbon primary balance2 -11.7 -12.6 -12.3 Non-hydrocarbon primary balance (as percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP) -17.0 -17.4 -16.4 Change in domestic arrears -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 External sector Current account balance (including official transfers; - = deficit) -3.2 -3.3 -4.5 Imputed Foreign Reserves (net), US$billion 0.4 0.4 0.2 Debt Total public debt 36.4 37.0 38.4 Domestic debt 28.7 28.0 27.9 External debt 7.8 9.0 10.5 External debt service-to-exports ratio (percent) 6.2 5.7 6.2 External debt service/government revenue (percent) 7.9 7.4 7.7 Memorandum items Oil price (U.S. dollars a barrel)3 79.9 67.7 63.3 Nominal GDP (billions of CFA francs) 7,740 7,846 7,959 Nominal GDP (millions of US dollars) 12,769 12,881 13,138 Hydrocarbon GDP (billions of CFA francs) 2,401 2,193 1,971 Non-hydrocarbon GDP (billions of CFA francs) 5,340 5,653 5,987 Government deposits (in percent of GDP) 17.7 17.5 17.2 Oil volume (crude and condensado, millions of barrels) 29.1 26.8 25.1 Gas volume4 (millions of bbls oil equivalent) 51.8 49.2 49.5 Total Hydrocarbon Volume (in millions of barrels of oil equivalent) 81.0 76.0 74.7 Exchange rate (average; CFA francs/U.S. dollar) 606.2 … … Sources: Data provided by the Equatoguinean authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1 Including oil, LNG, LPG, butane, propane, and methanol. 2 Excluding hydrocarbon revenues, hydrocarbon expenditures, and interest earned and paid. 3 The reference price for crude oil is the Brent. 4 Includes LNG, propane, butane and methanol. [1] Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. [2] Under the IMF's Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the page. [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: Distributed by APO Group on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).
