The Hong Kong government's latest craze? Marinas for millionaires
This used to be a non-topic. An occasional superyacht (no agreed definition, but generally over 24 metres long and with a crew of at least eight) would arrive and tie up at Ocean Terminal for a while.
Well-off local residents owned less super yachts (under 24 metres long, with a crew between one and 10) which they kept at the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club or the marina on Discovery Bay. This supported a small industry – someone once described a yacht as a hole in the sea that you pour money into – and attracted no official or political interest.
Lately, though, our local leaders seem to have decided that this is a cow which can be milked.
The South Lantau Eco-recreation Corridor (how do they think these names up?) has now graduated from a mention in last year's policy address to an outline which includes a marina for 150-200 yachts, up to 50 metres in length.
Then there is Skytopia (see comment on names above), which is planned by the Hong Kong Airport Authority, will be built next to the airport and will have 500 berths. We now also have the proposed development of land around the Hong Kong Coliseum, which will include a marina with space for 200 yachts; size not specified yet.
These plans have sparked a certain amount of scepticism. The owners of large crewed yachts can choose from a wide range of cruising grounds. The overwhelming favourites are the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. Your yacht can combine these by spending the summer in the Med and crossing the Atlantic to the Caribbean in the winter.
The leading home port for big yachts is Fort Lauderdale, Florida. About a quarter of all superyachts are owned by Americans. Most of the rest are owned in West European countries or Russia.
There is a growing interest in Asian cruising, but this demands dependable sunshine and a supply of interesting destinations, so most of the traffic is in the region of Southeast Asia, such as Singapore and Indonesia. Whatever facilities are built here, Hong Kong will always have one serious drawback: typhoons.
In short, this is not really a global industry. There are some rather outdated lists of top locations of yachts, leading marinas, and most ownerships. The idea that there are 900 or so big yachts out there just waiting for Hong Kong to provide parking spaces seems a bit of a stretch.
Some cynical observers have suggested that Hong Kong might be interested in a niche market: moorings for yachts whose owners would fear confiscation or other problems if they were moored in Europe, or even Singapore. But there is already a very nice marina in Hainan which shares our political peculiarities, such as they are.
Another disreputable theory is that owning a big yacht in Hong Kong might offer mainland millionaires a large floating asset – albeit a very expensive one to run – which could literally sail away at short notice. But of course, our government would not dream of conniving at that sort of thing.
Given Hong Kong's highly uneven income distribution, it is difficult to see an expensive watery hobby producing a huge spurt in local demand.
Indeed, a striking feature of Hong Kong life is the government's total indifference to the possibility that large numbers of people might enjoy messing about in boats. It is interesting to consider the contrast between Chichester Harbour and Tolo Harbour.
Chichester Harbour, in England, is a heavily tidal mudflat on which everything runs aground twice a day. It is, nevertheless, usually full of boats and occasionally, indeed, congested.
Tolo Harbour, in Hong Kong's northeastern New Territories, is big, sheltered and virtually non-tidal. It would be an ideal place for kids to catch the boating bug at little expense. There are big waterside towns in Sha Tin, Tai Po, and Ma On Shan.
Facilities could be provided within walking distance of millions of people. They are not.
Tolo Harbour, whatever the weather, is usually completely empty.
We are apparently more interested in providing facilities for millionaires than facilities for the masses. Shame.
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