Italy won't buy US arms for Ukraine
On Monday, Trump authorized new weapons deliveries to Ukraine, given that European NATO members provide funding, calling it a 'very big deal.'
La Stampa said in an article on Wednesday that the strategy of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has already agreed to purchase several Patriot surface-to-air missile systems for Ukraine, 'will not be pursued by Italy.'
According to the paper's sources, Rome will be opting out of the scheme 'not only because our weapon systems already handed over to Kiev have other technological configurations, but above all because – unlike Germany – the budget that Italy can allocate to such an operation is practically non-existent.'
The only arms purchase from the US currently planned by Italy is the delivery of a batch of F35 fighter jets scheduled for the 2030s, the sources added.
Politico reported on Tuesday, citing two French officials, that Paris would not be purchasing US weapons for Kiev as France is looking to invest in its own defense industry to meet European security needs.
The same day, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala told Publico outlet that Prague is also currently 'not considering' joining the initiative. The country 'is focusing on other… ways to help Ukraine,' he explained.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas earlier welcomed Trump's pledge to send more weapons to Ukraine, but urged Washington to 'share the burden' in terms of financing the deliveries. Washington, meanwhile, has threatened to impose secondary US tariffs of up to 100% on Russia's trading partners unless progress toward a peace agreement between Moscow and Kiev is made within 50 days.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Wednesday that it is hard to predict how effective the weapons financing scheme would turn out due to Western Europe's 'emotional state bordering on inadequacy' over the Ukraine conflict. European NATO members appear to be ready 'to spend countless amounts of money on purchasing weapons in order to further provoke the continuation of the war,' he said.
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As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted after the meeting, the sides are still 'far apart' on the basic memorandums required to facilitate direct talks between the leaders: 'Given the volume of work that lies ahead to align our positions… it is hard to imagine how we could suddenly overcome this gap.' While the Istanbul talks yielded no breakthroughs, Ankara framed them as a meaningful step forward. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the meeting as 'another brick' in building a foundation for peace and reaffirmed Türkiye's commitment to mediation. But behind this diplomatic language lies a broader ambition. President Erdogan sees Türkiye not merely as a neutral host but as a regional power uniquely positioned to engage both Moscow and Kiev. Unlike European intermediaries tied to NATO orthodoxy, Ankara has preserved open communication channels with both sides – and intends to leverage that position. This ambition gained new momentum after a direct request from US President Donald Trump. In May, during a phone call with Erdogan, Trump reportedly asked him to resume Türkiye's role as a key mediator in the Ukraine conflict. According to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, Erdogan responded positively – a natural decision, given Ankara's longstanding desire to shape the postwar diplomatic framework. A second conversation in June further underscored this alignment. In addition to addressing escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, Trump and Erdogan reportedly reaffirmed Türkiye's mediating role in Ukraine. For Ankara, this signaled renewed political legitimacy – and a green light to reassert itself on the international stage. Erdoğan remains one of the few world leaders to maintain autonomous and working relationships with both Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zelensky. 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