EU companies are 'hostage' to US-China brawl, chamber chief says
The comments to Nikkei Asia by Jens Eskelund, president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, underscore challenges in improving Sino-European trade relations ahead of a high-profile summit planned for late next month.
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Nikkei Asia
an hour ago
- Nikkei Asia
Mizuho Securities to buy UK renewables M&A advisory firm
Mizuho Securities will acquire a renewable energy M&A advisory company based in London. (Source photos by Nikkei) KODAI MIHARA TOKYO -- Mizuho Securities will acquire U.K. mergers and acquisitions adviser Augusta & Co. as part of a bid to expand its foothold in Europe and diversify revenue sources. Mizuho hopes to draw on Augusta's expertise in renewable-energy-related deals along with the Japanese group's own network of customers to take on some of the growing European M&A demand in that field.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- The Diplomat
France Refocuses Its Indo-Pacific Strategy Amid a Shifting Global Order
France's updated Indo-Pacific strategy, unveiled shortly after President Emmanuel Macron's May tour of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore, is less about grand announcements than it is about realism. It reflects a France that is recalibrating in the face of mounting geopolitical and economic constraints. The release marks the third iteration of France's Indo-Pacific vision since 2019. The last update, in 2022, came on the heels of the AUKUS shock — which saw Australia abruptly cancel a French submarine contract in favor of U.S.- and U.K.-backed nuclear subs — and coincided with the European Union's own adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategy. France, then presiding over the EU Council, hosted the first EU Indo-Pacific Forum just two days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The world has not been the same since. The new Indo-Pacific document, shaped in the wake of the updated French National Strategic Review, should be read as a strategy for times of crisis, reflecting the severe deterioration of the international order in recent years – the war in Ukraine, escalating Middle East tensions, intensifying China-U.S. rivalry, and political unrest in France's overseas territories. In this context, this article seeks to answer this question: how can France sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific — a region vital to global economic growth and strategic balance — under such tight economic and geopolitical constraints? Sovereignty First One key answer lies in a sharp refocusing of France's approach around the protection of its own sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific, namely its overseas territories and the country's vast maritime domain – France holds the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world, 90 percent of which is in the Indo-Pacific. This point is critical: it is France's overseas territories that underpin its legitimacy as a resident Indo-Pacific nation. In addition, La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia host sovereignty forces that play a significant, well-recognized, and valued role in security cooperation within their respective neighborhoods. At the same time, these territories face growing vulnerabilities and mounting threats – from climate insecurity and resource predation to transnational crime, foreign interference, and disinformation. The Indo-Pacific strategy devotes substantial attention to these territories – their challenges, needs, and agency – clearly addressing past criticism that they had been sidelined by a Paris-centric approach. This time, the strategy emphasizes co-construction, implementation coordination, and the tangible benefits that overseas territories can derive in terms of sustainable development and regional engagement. These priorities align with another central pillar of France's approach: the promotion of multilateralism, notably through active participation in and empowerment of regional organizations. That said, the document stays silent on certain sensitive issues – chiefly, the question of decolonization. Uncertainty remains about the future status of New Caledonia, as the recently agreed Bougival Accord that proposes creating a 'State of New Caledonia' within the French Republic still has to be endorsed by the FLNKS, the principal pro-independence coalition. Partnerships and Multidimensional Engagement A second notable feature of the new strategy is its emphasis on partnerships and a comprehensive, multidimensional – rather than purely military – approach, in light of constrained resources. By leveraging strategic partnerships, France seeks to amplify its efforts to uphold international law, ensure freedom of navigation, and respond to transnational risks. Key partners are named: India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. A full chapter is dedicated to the so-called 'sovereignty partnerships' by which France aims to strengthen the capacity, autonomy, and resilience of its regional partners, enabling them to better withstand hegemonic pressures and make sovereign decisions. It resonates with the 'coalition of independents' suggested by Macron in his landmark speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, if the text mentions the frequent military deployments in the region – building trust with partners is key to secure a stronghold and enable French long-distance military dispatch – there is no reference to industrial defense cooperation, actually a cornerstone of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This omission may reflect a deliberate effort to downplay the military dimension within this whole-of-government strategy – an aspect that has, until now, been the most visible and widely recognized feature of France's Indo-Pacific posture. A dedicated defense strategy for the region is expected to be developed separately at the ministerial level. The Indo-Pacific document underscores France's broad and multifaceted engagement in the region. It promotes cooperation in sustainable development, climate adaptation, connectivity, and health, while highlighting the mutual benefits of partnerships to advance digital and green transitions, trade, and the security, resilience, and de-risking of supply chains. The message is clear: France's presence in the Indo-Pacific serves regional stability but also its own economic interests, to mobilize the private sector. In this light, the updated strategy underscores synergy with the broader European strategy – crucial given the EU's exclusive competence over trade policy – and highlights that the EU and its member states are the leading providers of development aid, foreign direct investment, and trade in the Indo-Pacific. References to instruments such as the Global Gateway and efforts to deepen ties with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) reinforce the notion that France's Indo-Pacific approach is aligned with, and strengthened by, collective European initiatives. Sharper Tone Toward China – But Strategic Autonomy Remains Perhaps the most notable shift in the new strategy is France's more explicit criticism of China, mentioning Beijing's 'growing assertiveness,' the rapid buildup of the People's Liberation Army, and its advancing nuclear capabilities. It warns that a high-intensity conflict in the Taiwan Strait would carry major global consequences – marking the first time France's Indo-Pacific strategy has so clearly and directly addressed the Taiwan issue. The document also implicitly targets China in its references to unilateral reinterpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to 'certain arbitration decisions not being respected,' a clear allusion to Beijing's rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling. Beyond the region, the document explicitly acknowledges China's role as a facilitator of Russian aggression since 2022. For the first time, France's Indo-Pacific strategy also refers to NATO, calling on 'regional powers to act responsibly by not supporting Russia's war effort or undermining European security.' While France has consistently opposed a greater NATO role in the Indo-Pacific, this reference marks a shift in tone. The rhetoric echoes Macron's recent speech in Singapore, where he reaffirmed and warned that China's inaction – especially on North Korean participation in the Ukraine war – could invite greater NATO involvement. At the same time, the strategy reaffirms France's key position of strategic autonomy, advocating for a 'close and rigorous' dialogue with China at the highest level, while seeking convergence on global challenges 'when possible.' Vis-à-vis the United States, France reaffirms its posture as 'allied but not aligned.' The strategy expresses concerns over U.S. President Donald Trump's 'peace through strength' approach, his containment-driven China policy, and a transactional diplomacy that risks disrupting regional alliances and economic stability. A Realist Strategy for Turbulent Times Strictly speaking, the document does not constitute a full-fledged strategy, as it lacks a clear articulation of objectives, means, and a dedicated budget. It reflects a conservative posture shaped by tighter geopolitical and fiscal constraints, with a clear intention to showcase France's concrete engagement – though at times this approach makes it resemble a catalogue of ongoing initiatives. This sober, pragmatic approach is welcome, reflecting an effort to make France's Indo-Pacific presence more coherent, credible, and realistically aligned with its actual resources. Ultimately, the strategy aims to build lasting legitimacy by grounding rhetoric in tangible national priorities and constraints, while avoiding overpromising that could lead to disappointment. More grounded and restrained than earlier versions, it embodies hard lessons learned and seeks a careful balance between ambition and limitations.
Japan Today
7 hours ago
- Japan Today
UK, French and German leaders hold a call on Gaza after Macron backs a Palestinian state
By JILL LAWLESS The leaders of Britain, France and Germany will hold an emergency call Friday about the growing hunger crisis in Gaza, after French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his country will become the first major Western power to recognize a Palestinian state. The surprise announcement exposes differences among the European allies, known as the E3, over how to ease the worsening humanitarian crisis and end the Israel-Hamas war. All three support a Palestinian state in principle, but Germany said it has no immediate plans to follow France's step, which Macron plans to formalize at the United Nations General Assembly in September. Britain has not followed suit either, though Prime Minister Keir Starmer on Thursday came closer than ever before, saying 'statehood is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people.' Starmer said he, Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz will speak Friday about 'what we can do urgently to stop the killing and get people the food they desperately need while pulling together all the steps necessary to build a lasting peace.' 'The suffering and starvation unfolding in Gaza is unspeakable and indefensible,' said Starmer, who is under mounting pressure to formally recognize Palestinian statehood, both from opposition lawmakers and from members of his own Labour Party government. Health Secretary Wes Streeting on Tuesday called for an announcement 'while there's still a state of Palestine left to recognize.' More than 140 countries recognize a Palestinian state, including a dozen in Europe. But France is the first Group of Seven country and largest European nation to take the step. Israel and the U.S. both denounced the decision. Britain has long supported the idea of an independent Palestinian state existing alongside Israel, but has said recognition should come as part of a negotiated two-state solution to the conflict. Any such solution appears far off. There had been no substantive Israel-Palestinian negotiations for years even before the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people and sparked the current war. The worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, where hunger is spreading and children have starved to death, has caused alarm even among Israel's closest allies. Germany has traditionally been a particularly staunch ally of Israel in Europe, with relations rooted in the history of the Holocaust. It says recognizing a Palestinian state should be 'one of the concluding steps' in negotiating a two-state solution and it 'does not plan to recognize a Palestinian state in the short term.' But Berlin, too, has sharpened its tone recently, describing the Israeli military's actions in Gaza as unacceptable and pushing for greater humanitarian aid, but still appears to favor trying to influence Israeli officials by direct contact. The German government said in a statement Friday that it is in a 'constant exchange' with the Israeli government and other partners on issues including a ceasefire in Gaza and the need to drastically improve humanitarian aid. It said it is 'prepared to increase the pressure' if there is no progress, but didn't elaborate on how. Britain has halted some arms sales to Israel, suspended free trade talks and sanctioned far-right government ministers and extremist settlers, but Starmer is under intense pressure to do more. Labour lawmaker Emily Thornberry, who chairs Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, said a majority of committee members supported immediate recognition of the state of Palestine. 'We've been in favor for 40 years of a two-state solution, and yet it's been drifting,' she told Times Radio, saying Macron's announcement should be a 'kickstart' for the peace process. Also weighing on Starmer is his desire to maintain good relations with the U.S. administration, which has strongly criticized France's decision. The British leader is due to meet President Donald Trump in the next few days while the president is in Scotland visiting two golf courses he owns there. Yossi Mekelberg, a Middle East expert at the international affairs think-tank Chatham House, said Macron's decision to defer finalizing recognition until September 'creates some space' for other countries to get on board. 'We know that the U.K. is close, but not there,' he said. 'This might encourage Starmer, who we know is not one to rush such a decision. … This might create some momentum, some dynamic, for the U.K.' Associated Press writer Geir Moulson in Berlin contributed to this story. © Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.
