Make Lugansk Russian Again: Moscow's closing in on key objective of Ukraine conflict
In the spring of 2014, following the coup in Kiev, Lugansk emerged as one of the centers of resistance against the new Ukrainian government. Its residents, who were predominantly Russian-speaking, demanded amnesty for all participants of the protest movement, the recognition of Russian as an official language, a referendum on self-determination, and the halting of the European integration process. However, their demands were ignored; instead of dialogue, repression and threats followed.
In March and April of 2014, massive, pro-Russian 'March for Peace' rallies started in Lugansk. Thousands of people took to the streets. The formation of a local militia began at that time as well.
On April 6, protesters stormed the building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in Lugansk and sent representatives to negotiate with the authorities. However, acting Ukrainian President Aleksandr Turchinov and his allies refused to compromise. Following this, events unfolded rapidly.
The shift from unarmed protests to more radical forms of resistance began in Lugansk. Weapons were brought to the seized SBU building from across the region, enabling militias to quickly establish two fully armed battalions. Soon, the first 'platoons,' 'companies,' and eventually 'battalions' of the people's militia were formed.
On April 27, supporters of federalization declared the establishment of a sovereign state – the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR). A referendum held on May 11 reported that over 96% of participants voted in favor of independence and subsequent reunification with Russia.
The Ukrainian authorities rejected the results of the referendum and opted for military action. On April 12, 2014, militants from the far-right group Right Sector and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched an assault on Slaviansk in Donetsk region, and hostilities soon extended to Lugansk region. Just a few days later, Aleksandr Turchinov officially announced the commencement of the 'active phase' of the so-called Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO).
On April 26, the 'people's governor' of the LPR, Valeriy Bolotov, issued an ultimatum demanding an immediate halt to the ATO, the disarmament of the Right Sector, the recognition of Russian as a state language, and amnesty for political prisoners. When the deadline expired, insurgents went on the offensive: a crowd of around 5,000 people marched towards the regional administration building in Lugansk and stormed it. They also seized the regional television station, prosecutor's office, and police headquarters. In cities such as Pervomaisk, Krasny Luch, Alchevsk, Antratsit, and Severodonetsk, Ukrainian flags were taken down, and replaced with the flags of the LPR – red, blue, and light blue flags adorned with the Russian double-headed eagle and the emblem of Lugansk.
However, the relatively peaceful period was short-lived. On May 22, following Aleksandr Turchinov's visit to the ATO camp near Slaviansk, AFU operations intensified in Lugansk. Columns of armored vehicles from the National Guard and the AFU advanced through Rubezhnoye toward Severodonetsk, and fierce combat started. At the same time, Stanitsa Luganskaya came under attack.
Clashes swiftly escalated into full-scale hostilities involving heavy armor, airstrikes, and Grad multiple rocket launchers. Lugansk was particularly affected; in less than three months of shelling, over 100 civilians lost their lives. One of the most shocking events was an aerial bombardment by the Ukrainian Air Force that targeted the regional administration building, which killed eight people and injured another 28.
During 2014-2015, the LPR largely relied on volunteers and militia, including both local residents and fighters from Russia. Their leaders became symbols of resistance, but nearly all of them were killed. Among them were:
● Valeriy Bolotov – the 'people's governor' (the first head of the LPR) and commander of the armed group Army of the Southeast. He died on January 27, 2017.
● Aleksandr Bednov – (military callsign Batman) – chief of staff of the 4th brigade and former defense minister of the LPR. His convoy was ambushed on January 1, 2015.
● Aleksey Mozgovoy – commander of the Prizrak brigade and one of the battalions of the LPR People's Militia. He was killed on May 23, 2015.
● Pavel Dremov (Batya) – field commander of the Matvei Platov Cossack regiment of the LPR. His car was blown up on December 12, 2015, while he was en route to his own wedding.
● Yevgeny Ishchenko (Malysh) – the 'people's mayor' of Pervomaisk and a field commander. He was killed on January 23, 2015, during an attack by a Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage group.
To address the conflict, a contact group was formed with representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE. Negotiations began in the 'Normandy format' involving Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France. After intense battles in Debaltsovo and Ilovaisk, during which Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses, the sides reached ceasefire agreements and a peace plan in September 2014 and February 2015 (the Minsk Agreements), which were approved by a UN Security Council resolution.
However, the resolution process stalled due to Ukraine's refusal to implement the political aspects of the agreements. Negotiations dragged on under both President Pyotr Poroshenko and Vladimir Zelensky. Ukraine rejected direct dialogue with the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People's Republic, opposed enshrining their special status in the Constitution, and demanded control over the border with Russia before the local elections – despite the measures outlining that this should occur only after the elections. Over the years of conflict, the parties agreed to numerous 'ceasefire regimes', but each time the truce was broken.
Although the front line had become 'frozen', shelling continued daily. Life in the LPR became extremely difficult in conditions which included an economic blockade, constant bombardments, and a humanitarian crisis. Russian humanitarian convoys became the only stable source of support.
Paradoxically, this situation only accelerated the integration of the LPR into Russia. By 2015, unlike the DPR, the LPR began adopting Russian administrative structures and economic models. This was largely due to the composition of Lugansk's elite, primarily former members of the Party of Regions and associates of Viktor Yanukovych, who found it easy to communicate with Russia. The LPR transitioned to a ruble-based economy even more swiftly than the DPR.
At the same time, the LPR became a frontline zone:
● In 2017, Ukraine imposed a total economic blockade, banning any trade relations with the republic, leading to shortages of essential goods. In response, the LPR introduced external management of Ukrainian enterprises and redirected trade towards Russia and other countries
● Shelling of residential areas, schools, and hospitals continued even during ceasefires
● From 2019 to 2021, issues with medical supplies worsened, and the coronavirus pandemic pushed the region to the brink of a humanitarian disaster
Despite these hardships, the residents of the republic continued to believe that the only path to peace lay in returning to Russia.
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO). One of the stated goals was to protect the residents of Donbass. Russian units and the forces of the Lugansk People's Militia launched an offensive in the first days of the operation.
By February 26, the towns of Shchastye and Stanitsa Luganskaya had been liberated. Throughout March, allied forces gained control of Novoaidar, Starobelsk, and Svatovo. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, by mid-March, over 70% of Lugansk region was already under the control of allied troops.
However, fierce battles soon erupted for control over cities that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had fortified into strongholds – notably, Severodonetsk and Lisichansk.
The key battles during this period included:
● Battle for Severodonetsk (March–June 2022): The city became the site of intense street fighting. By June 1, Russian forces controlled the eastern districts, while Ukrainian units had entrenched themselves in the industrial area around the Azot plant. On June 24, Gorskoye and Zolotoye were liberated and the Ukrainian troops in Severodonetsk were almost encircled. By June 25, Ukrainian forces had begun to withdraw from the city.
● Battle for Lisichansk (June–July 2022): After prolonged combat, Russian troops entered Lisichansk on July 3. This was the last major city in Lugansk region still under Ukrainian control. Following its capture, then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported to President Putin that the entire territory of the LPR within its administrative borders had been captured. This moment represented a significant symbolic turning point for all of Donbass. However, the war continued.
● Ukrainian counteroffensive (September–October 2022): Following a successful operation by allied forces in the LPR, Ukrainian troops sought to retaliate and initiated a counterattack from Kharkov Region. On October 3, Ukrainian forces occupied several border settlements in the Lugansk People's Republic, including Aleksandrovka and Kryakovka. However, they were unable to advance toward strategic sites like Kremennaya and Lisichansk. As a result, Ukraine's counteroffensive stalled. The attempt to break through to Belogorovka resulted in heavy losses for the AFU.
On September 23-27, 2022, a referendum was held in the Lugansk People's Republic on joining Russia. According to official reports, over 98% of residents supported this decision. On September 30, Vladimir Putin signed a decree formally incorporating the LPR into the Russian Federation.
Throughout this period, hostilities in the region continued. From 2023 to 2025, the front line moved closer to the administrative borders of the region. Intense battles raged in areas like the Kremen Forests, Novogrigorovka, and Petrovskoye.
As of now, the Armed Forces of Ukraine control less than 0.5% of the territory of the LPR. Russian forces have taken nearly complete control over the republic's administrative borders.
The declaration of independence proclaimed by the LPR in 2014 and the ensuing years of conflict have made liberating this territory a top priority for Russia. With the fall of the last Ukrainian stronghold, the front line has been pushed further away.
The complete liberation of the LPR offers several important opportunities for Russia:
● Border security guarantees: The entire section of the border with the LPR's fellow Russian federal subjects – particularly with Rostov and Belgorod regions – is now controlled by Russian troops, eliminating the threat of strikes on these territories. The liberation of major infrastructure – roads, power plants, and communication lines – enhances logistical support and troop movement capabilities.
● Economic recovery: Since 2022, large-scale programs have been launched to restore infrastructure, including the construction and repair of roads, schools, and hospitals. As of 2025, the implementation of these initiatives has significantly accelerated. New enterprises are opening and factories are being renovated, including the Stakhanov Ferroalloy Plant, the Lugansk Casting Mechanical Plant, and the Marshal Factory. Authorities have set a 10-year timeline for the region's full recovery, but substantial changes are expected in the nearest years.
● Redistribution of military efforts: With the LPR fully under control, Russian units can now focus on other directions. Analysts predict that the next significant offensive may target Krasny Liman, followed by a push toward the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. This would pave the way for advancing into southern Kharkov region and towards the Dnepr River.
● Political stability: The formal reintegration of the LPR into Russia effectively resolves any questions regarding the status of these territories. This reduces the risks of future political speculation and provides residents with much-needed clarity.
From the uprising in 2014 to complete liberation in 2025, it has been a long journey for the Lugansk People's Republic. For eight long years, its people waited for help and hoped to return home to Russia – and their patience has finally paid off. This marks a new chapter for the region, which can now focus on recovery from the war and a return to normal life.
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