Diplomatic crisis between Algeria and Alliance of Sahel States calls for swift African Union mediation
The current diplomatic crisis between Algeria and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) presents recently elected African Union Commission leaders with an opportunity to mediate and regain the organisation's standing in a region crucial to Africa's security.
The dispute originates from a clash between Algeria and Mali over the destruction of a Malian drone by Algeria's army on 1 April on the border at Tinzaouaten. Algeria says the drone crossed its border; Mali says the aircraft was in its own territory.
Diplomatic relations between the two, which date back to 1960, have often been turbulen t due to the issue of northern Mali's successive separatist movements. However, this is the first time that Mali has denounced Algeria's military aggression and referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
Algeria and the AES countries
The crisis has also taken on a regional dimension, given the political, diplomatic and military alliance formed by the AES Confederation (comprising Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali). Niger and Burkina Faso have shown their solidarity with Mali by recalling their ambassadors to Algiers, as has Mali. Mali and Niger have also withdrawn from the Comité d'Etat-Major Opérationnel Conjoint (Cemoc), which had brought them together with Algeria and Mauritania's military forces.
Cemoc has not been very active since its creation in 2010, but it provided some security coordination and a useful cooperation framework, with Algeria especially providing training support.
The vast stretches of desert comprising these countries' border regions are prime transit routes for arms, drugs and migrants. These areas are largely unsupervised, especially by Mali and Niger's security forces, making them sanctuaries for armed bandits, terrorists or separatist groups.
Given that Algeria's military capabilities are unrivalled in the region, the risk of armed conflict seems minimal at this stage. Nevertheless, the interstate tensions could destabilise the buffer zone between the Maghreb and west Africa – an area already weakened by Libya's civil war and neighbouring countries' insecurity.
This new crisis should be a wake-up call for the AU. The withdrawal of AES countries from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) in January means that the regional bloc lacks the legal standing and legitimacy to mediate the crisis. This poses an unprecedented challenge to the AU's peace and security architecture and subsidiarity principle, which relies on regional bodies like Ecowas to initiate conflict prevention actions.
The AU must use the appropriate channels to rapidly re-establish dialogue and pave the way for a return to constructive relations between Algeria and the AES countries. Its Peace and Security Council should focus on the northern Mali issue, which is at the root of the dispute between Algiers and Bamako.
Mali has accused Algeria in recent months of serving as a rear base for the separatist Front de Liberation de l'Azawad (FLA), after hostilities between the group and Bamako resumed when the government recaptured Kidal in November 2023.
Shortly thereafter, Malian authorities ended the 2015 Algiers Accord, which had failed to bring peace with the separatists. Fighting resumed, with northern Mali's Tinzaouaten region becoming the flashpoint of the conflict. In July 2024, Mali's army, backed by Russia's Africa Corps, suffered heavy losses when they were ambushed by the rebels.
The current environment presents an opportunity for the AU to regain influence in the Sahel. The organisation has been sidelined over the years for numerous reasons. One is its competition with Ecowas for leadership in managing the 2012-13 Malian crisis, which ultimately led to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali's (Minusma) African contingents being placed under UN control.
The AU was also marginalised by France's activism in the Sahel and backing of the G5 Sahel as an alternative to the AU's Nouakchott Process launched in 2013. The initiative aimed to strengthen security and counterterrorism coordination between Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Successful mediation between Algeria and the AES countries could even help to revitalise this process down the line.
The AU is now well placed to fill the leadership vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western powers and Minusma, the disintegration of the G5 Sahel, including its Joint Force, and the sidelining of Ecowas.
The AU should seek to achieve three objectives. First, bring Algeria and the AES Confederation together through mediation. Second, promote a new wholly African political solution to the northern Mali crisis. And third, relaunch continental efforts to combat terrorism by revitalising the Nouakchott Process at a later date.
There are several assets the AU can use to achieve these aims. It could leverage Angola and South Africa 's excellent historical relations with both Mali and Algeria. Likewise, the AU Commission's new chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has many contacts in African diplomatic circles. Countries like Mauritania – a Cemoc member that has cordial relations with the AES countries – and Chad, with its ties to both parties could also help.
Outside the continent, the AU could informally approach Russia to facilitate. Moscow has long-standing diplomatic relations with Mali and Algeria, and is the AES countries' main military partner. It is also a strategic partner of Algeria – the third-largest importer of Russian weapons globally, and the largest in Africa.
However, to succeed, the AU's new leadership must assess the political and security threats facing west Africa, and reposition itself at the centre of responses.
While the conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also emergencies, the Sahel cannot wait. The AU should rethink its wait-and-see attitude of recent years, a posture illustrated by the vacancy of the position of high representative and head of the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (Misahel) since August 2023.
Beyond the current crisis, the new AU Commission chair should appoint a high representative and bolster Misahel's mandate to provide it with the means and flexibility to operate effectively and constructively in a volatile geopolitical environment. DM
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The Star
3 days ago
- The Star
The MKP's two-faced foreign relations on Western Sahara
THE Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a complete African Union (AU) member state and is recognised by more than 40 United Nations (UN) member states. Despite decades of occupation by Morocco and the ongoing struggle for self-determination, its existence is a testament to the resilience of its people and the enduring principles of international law regarding decolonisation. The UN classified this contested territory as a non-self-governing territory in 1963, following Spain's submission of information under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. However, the territory has remained in a state of legal limbo despite multiple resolutions, diplomatic interventions and a protracted conflict involving Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria. This status affirms that the Sahrawi people have yet to exercise their right to self-determination under international law. The recent political stunt by Jacob Zuma's Umkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party), which dismissed this right as 'Balkanisation', reflects a troubling ahistorisation of a people's identity and a flagrant disregard for international legal norms. South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relied on its reputation for principled support of the occupied peoples. The MK Party's stance on Western Sahara would cripple this moral standing, inviting accusations of hypocrisy. Worse, Zuma's use of the national flag during party-to-government talks with Morocco was improper, as he acted solely in his MK Party capacity, not in any official national role. In an op-ed, MK Party parliamentarian Mzanyele Manyi attempts to reframe the party's position as a rejection of 'Eurocentric binaries' and a commitment to precolonial African structures. A closer examination reveals a deeply contradictory and, frankly, two-faced approach that undermines the very principles the MK Party claims to uphold. Manyi's argument hinges on a romanticised and selective interpretation of history, conveniently overlooking the realities of international law and the fundamental right to self-determination that the AU has consistently championed. To suggest that Western Sahara was merely 'integrated with Morocco' through 'trade, kinship and religious institutions' before colonialism, and that this somehow equates to legitimate sovereignty, is to deliberately blur the lines between historical influence and political dominion. While precolonial connections existed, they do not negate the distinct identity of the Saharawi people or their internationally recognised right to choose their destiny. The assertion that Moroccan Sultans exercised 'spiritual and political suzerainty' akin to the British monarch's role over the Commonwealth is a disingenuous comparison. Based on colonial logics, the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of so-called independent states. Thus, it does not provide a historical justification for territorial claims over a people who have consistently sought their statehood. Furthermore, equating Morocco's actions in Western Sahara to an 'African character' while simultaneously dismissing the Saharawi's struggle for independence as 'intellectually lazy and historically dishonest' reveals a profound bias. Who, then, defines 'African character' in this narrative? Is it only those who align with pre-colonial monarchies, regardless of the aspirations of indigenous populations? Nevertheless, the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion found no ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco. Manyi's dismissal of this advisory opinion as 'just that… an opinion, not a binding judgment' is a classic legal evasion, as it ignores its foundational role in the UN and AU's stance on decolonisation. While advisory opinions are not directly binding in the same way as contentious judgments, they carry significant legal weight and are highly influential in international law. The ICJ explicitly stated that it 'did not find any ties of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity'. This critical finding, conveniently downplayed by Manyi, directly challenges the MK Party's narrative of historical Moroccan suzerainty. To suggest that those who rely on this opinion are 'disingenuously using it as a hammer' is to accuse the international legal framework itself of being disingenuous when it doesn't align with the MK Party's preferred outcome. Furthermore, it is crucial to recall that Spain's 1975 tripartite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, which ceded administrative control of Western Sahara without a referendum, was a direct violation of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which affirms the right to self-determination for all colonial territories. The MK Party's purported 'rejection of the Balkanisation of Africa' is perhaps the most glaring hypocrisy. For a party to claim it stands 'firmly against the further splintering of our continent into externally sponsored micro-states' while simultaneously advocating for the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco is a monumental contradiction. The Saharawi Republic is a member of the AU, recognised by a significant number of African states, including South Africa. Its struggle is one of decolonisation and self-determination, not 'external sponsorship' designed to create a 'micro-state' for foreign interests. This is a classic case of projection, where the MK Party attributes to the Saharawi what many accuse Morocco of pursuing: territorial expansion under the guise of historical claims. The appeal to 'African sovereignty' and the 'legitimacy of political structures that preceded colonial conquest,' specifically the Moroccan monarchy, is a dangerous precedent. While respecting indigenous institutions is crucial, it cannot come at the expense of human rights or the universally accepted principle of self-determination. If the MK Party genuinely champions African Renaissance, it should uphold the rights of all African peoples, not just those aligned with powerful historical monarchies. To suggest that the AU's decision to readmit Morocco was purely an act of 'African agency' without considering geopolitical manoeuvring or economic influence is naive at best and intellectually dishonest at worst. Morocco had voluntarily left the continental body in 1984 because it disagreed with the decision of the AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to admit the Sahrawi Republic as a full member — effectively refusing to share a room with the very people it claims to share heritage and historical ties with. What Manyi omits to mention is that Western Sahara suffered a similar fate to that of black South Africans during the 1960s, when Britain conferred political independence on Afrikaners. Spain ceded the territory to Rabat instead of the Sahrawi people, leading to a political standoff with Mauritania, which had also made a concurrent claim. Following the colonial terra nullius myth, Afrikaners also make false claims that the land was empty or unused prior to their arrival and that Black South Africans were latecomers, erasing centuries of indigenous presence, land use, and political organisation by African communities. Moroccans follow almost an identical logic in Western Sahara, portraying the territory as historically ungoverned or inherently part of Morocco, thus denying the Sahrawi people's longstanding political identity and their right to self-determination. Like Zambia and others, MK Party appears to have also fallen under the spell of the despotic foreign policy of a pariah state that seeks validation from former colonial powers. In effect, Morocco exercises what Moses Ochonu calls 'colonialism by proxy', a form of indirect rule on behalf of European interests eager to exploit Western Sahara's rich mineral wealth, particularly phosphates and iron ore, without Sahrawi consent. Phosphates are crucial for fertiliser production and global agriculture. Morocco's extractivist agenda violates international law and entrenches neocolonial control over resources that rightfully belong to the Sahrawi people. The export of phosphates from Boucraa has been the subject of international legal challenges, including rulings by the European Court of Justice that trade agreements with Morocco cannot legally include resources from Western Sahara without the consent of the Sahrawi people. Beyond phosphates, Morocco has developed significant wind and solar farms in the occupied territory, such as Nareva's 50MW Foum el Oued farm, specifically powering the Bou Craa phosphate mines. Furthermore, European Union (EU) and Russian fishing fleets continue to plunder Western Sahara's rich Atlantic waters under trade agreements that, per ECJ rulings, cannot lawfully apply to Sahrawi territory. Similarly, Morocco has permitted large-scale agribusiness exports, including citrus and tomatoes, using water-intensive farming on occupied Sahrawi land, exacerbating local water scarcity and environmental degradation. Under international law, primarily UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (1962) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the Sahrawi people are the rightful owners of these resources. However, as the territory remains non-self-governing and partially occupied by Morocco, any extraction or export without their free, prior and informed consent is considered illegal by many legal scholars, the AU and the UN. Despite international efforts to find a resolution, including the Baker Plans (Baker I and Baker II), which proposed varying degrees of autonomy for Western Sahara followed by a referendum on self-determination, viable alternatives remain underdeveloped. These UN-backed proposals, though at times accepted by one party and rejected by the other, represent pathways that prioritise the Sahrawi people's right to choose, offering a stark contrast to Morocco's unilateral autonomy initiative. Beyond the MK Party's internal contradictions, Rabat's international manoeuvring also merits scrutiny. France's 2024 endorsement of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, following the US recognition, indicates a concerning shift by major powers, prioritising geopolitical interests over international law and Western Sahara's self-determination. This trend is further amplified by Morocco's strategic utilisation of Israel normalisation, particularly through the Abraham Accords. This exploits a complex regional dynamic to garner global support for its occupation, at the expense of established principles of decolonisation and human rights. The MK Party's position on Western Sahara, as articulated by Manyi, is not a nuanced 'African-centred reading of history'. It is a thinly veiled justification for an international relations position that prioritises a selective historical narrative and the interests of a specific state over the fundamental right of a people to determine their future. MK Party's stance effectively legitimises resource theft disguised as anti-Western posturing. Therefore, the MK Party's foreign relations strategy is not only inconsistent but also fundamentally two-faced: it champions African unity and decolonisation in rhetoric, while actively undermining it in practice, particularly concerning the Saharawi people. The 'ghosts of colonial borders' that Manyi wishes to reject seem to linger quite strongly in the MK Party's approach, but only when it suits their political agenda. There is a need to address the MKP's rhetoric-reality gap, evident in their endorsement of Morocco's 'autonomy plan' as 'decolonisation' while simultaneously silencing Sahrawi self-determination. This constitutes a colonial proxy masked in anti-Western slogans. Siyayibanga le economy! * Siyabonga Hadebe is an independent commentator based in Geneva on socio-economic, political and global matters. ** The views expressed here do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL. Get the real story on the go: Follow the Sunday Independent on WhatsApp.
IOL News
25-07-2025
- IOL News
Leaders should save Africa to preserve Kwame Krumah's legacy
Sandile Gumede Image: File 'Do you like Kwame Krumah?' This is a question that was asked by George Apple-by-Smith to Makhaya Maseko in Bessie Head's book called 'When Rain Clouds Gather'. In this fictional situation, the policer in question was asking Maseko this question so that he could decide whether to grant him a political asylum after escaping from South Africa to Botswana, at the height of political chaos, with apartheid forces pouncing on those who fought injustices. Maseko, who understood the tricky question as an activist and a journalist, simply answered: 'No'. However, this is no book review, but it is meant to emphasise the role that the likes of Kwame Krumah played in the liberation of the African continent. Krumah and others like Julius Nyerere, Idi Amin and Patrice Lumumba to mention a few, played a crucial role in mobilisation of African leaders in efforts to unite the continent for its prosperity. In pushing the Pan Africanism agenda an Organisation of African Unity was conceived, which expedited the project of winning back Africa from the colonial masters – at least this is what they thought. I am not oblivious of the fact that these leaders were fallible – of which it is a nature of a human being. But they did a lot of groundwork, and had great vision which could have helped the continent from being too dependent on handouts from Asia and the west. The continent currently needs courageous leadership, who will be brother's keepers, not people who keep quiet, yet human rights are violated, or corruption happens unabated. African countries are rich in mineral resources, but these hardly benefit the majority of citizens except providing labour for European or Chinese companies. Instead, there are coups in our continent. We fight each other; not because we are trying to rescue the lives and livelihood of the people simply because the next leader feels that it is his time to benefit. There are leaders like Paul Biya who has been in power since 1982, but not much is being done to change the lives of Cameroonians. This results in compatriots emigrating to the very same France that had oppressed them. In Zimbabwe we have a similar challenge; the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans mean nothing. They end up emigrating to Britain and neighbouring countries. One of the biggest challenges is that every now and then these African leaders would meet in AU summits or SADC meetings cheering each other; dining expensive cuisine forgetting to address the core issues faced by their people. The reality is that Zimbabwean issues become our issues as people flee the country for various reasons. Even the situation for South Africa is getting worse; with infrastructure dilapidating and scarce job opportunities there is growth in South Africans emigrating to Asia and Gulf states to teach English and other subjects. Whatever that Yoweri Museveni does in Uganda, it affects neighbouring countries like Tanzania and Kenya in that East region. Issues in DR Congo, also affect Rwandans and other neighbouring countries; therefore, the entire continent is interdependent. And this requires bold leadership from all walks of life whereby they can be honest with each other. That is what the AU summit should be about – not just talk shop and to be a boys' club with no clear vision for the continent. If we are reclaiming mines owned by foreigners in our countries, that should be the African agenda not just General Ibrahim Traore or Dr. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah's pet projects as this will result in their countries being alienated by the west, whereas if this is done in unison it will be difficult to sanction the entire continent. This cannot be achieved by leaders who are there for themselves instead of the people. This cannot be done by leaders who are afraid of calling their counterparts into order. They should use the AU and other regional economic bodies to develop Africa, not buying properties in foreign countries or travelling abroad for shopping sprees or medical attention. This should be done by all those who claim to hold leaders like Kwame Krumah in high regard, not those who pay lip service. Sandile Gumede is sociopolitical writer and PhD candidate at the University of Witwatersrand in the Media Studies Department. SUNDAY TRIBUNE
TimesLIVE
25-07-2025
- TimesLIVE
Just what is Zuma's motive for Morocco visit?
Last week, former president Jacob Zuma quietly travelled to Morocco, where he declared support — albeit in his capacity as MK Party president — for the country's colonial domination over the people of Western Sahara. During a televised meeting with a delegation of the Moroccan government, with the South African flag as a crucial backdrop, Zuma said Morocco must retain sovereignty over Western Sahara. The MK Party, through Zuma's comrade and nephew Magasela Mzobe, announced a policy position aimed at bringing about a practical solution to the long-standing conflict over Western Sahara's independence. 'While taking into account the growing international and continental support that the Moroccan autonomy proposal has gained over the past couple of years, our party believes that this proposal allows for significant local governance by the people of the Sahara region, while (also) ensuring that Morocco retains its crucial sovereignty over the Sahara region. 'This approach offers a balanced path forward that promotes both stability, peace and development in the region. We call on the international community to support Morocco's autonomy plan as a possible effective way to ensure peace, stability and prosperity for the people of Western Sahara. Our party recognises this historical and legal context that underpins Morocco's claim to Western Sahara and views that Morocco's effort to reclaim its full territorial integrity aligns with our commitment to preserving the sovereignty and the unity of the African state,' Mzobe said on behalf of Zuma. This statement has obviously triggered a lot of emotion for many in South Africa, none more so than the ANC — a party with which Zuma has been fighting tooth and nail to regain his membership. Not long after the televised address, the ANC released a statement condemning the use of the national flag as part of the theatrics. 'This reckless and provocative act constitutes a flagrant violation of international diplomatic norms and an unacceptable intrusion into South Africa's internal political affairs. It is a dangerous attempt to delegitimise our constitutional order and discredit the authority of a democratically elected government. The inclusion of our national symbols in partisan activities hosted by foreign powers is not only misleading but also part of a broader agenda of foreign interference,' the ANC wrote. The ANC called out Zuma as being shameful, betraying its historical mission and showing his true colours. The recently ousted secretary-general of the MK Party, Floyd Shivambu, felt vindicated after having accused the Moroccan government of trying to buy Zuma's support by offering money in exchange for support for its actions in Western Sahara. The ANC during the Zuma years resolved to intensify the call for the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, with a view to enable these countries and people to effectively exercise sovereignty. In the AU, South Africa has frequently raised concerns about Morocco's admission to the body. Some may call the former statesman a sellout, but to others, this came as no surprise. In 2004, during the Thabo Mbeki era, the Moroccan government recalled its ambassador from South Africa when the then-president recognised the Western Sahara. Zuma, shortly before his exit from office in 2017, publicly went against the ANC position, resetting relations with the North African country. In an interview with the City Press at the time, Zuma said: 'Morocco is an African nation and we need to have relations with them ... We never had problems with them anyway; they were the first to withdraw diplomatic relations ... They [Morocco] felt that even if we differ on the Western Sahara issues, the two countries should have a relationship.' Despite this deviation from established ANC policy, the party cowered under pressure, standing behind its president as it had done by protecting Zuma one scandal after another. Reacting to Zuma at the time, the ANC said there was no ANC policy to isolate Morocco. Whether Zuma's recent actions are, if Shivambu is believed, a consequence of transactional politics or are merely aligned with his historical views which run counter to ANC policy, will be hard to ascertain. What is clear though is that Zuma has been consistent in his flip-flopping. We should have seen it coming. If Zuma could defy the ANC by setting up meetings with the Moroccans as its president, what would prevent him from further solidifying that relationship with his own MK Party stokvel? What must worry us is the patent abuse of the South African flag, our national symbol. Whether this is because of 30 pieces of silver is neither here nor there. Zuma is free to pursue whatever agenda at a cost — what he must never pretend to do is represent the will of the South African people. The flag that should have went up in been displayed at that meeting with his handlers in Morocco is the MK Party flag.
