US and China Are Diverging on Strategies to Power the AI Boom
The US and China have starkly divergent visions of the future of energy, and they're bringing them to play in the race to power artificial intelligence.
Running the computers needed to train and run the ChatGPTs and DeepSeeks of the world requires a lot of electricity. Total consumption from data centers is set to quadruple during the next decade to 1,600 terawatt-hours a year, according to BloombergNEF.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Yahoo
27 minutes ago
- Yahoo
Brazil's BRF minority shareholders back Marfrig deal
By Ana Mano SAO PAULO (Reuters) -The majority of minority shareholders of Brazilian poultry and pork processor BRF have approved a proposed tie-up with beefpacker Marfrig, according to a securities filing on Saturday. The move will create another global food company with origins in Brazil and factories in South America, North America, the Middle East and China. The filing showed 71.4% of minority shareholders in BRF approved the terms of the deal with Marfrig, not including abstentions. Shareholders representing 90% of BRF's free float cast their votes, the filing said. The results indicate support for the deal's completion ahead of an extraordinary general shareholders meeting scheduled for August 5. In May, Marfrig unveiled a plan to complete its takeover of BRF, a move that could be followed by the listing of shares of the combined corporate entity, to be called MBRF, in the United States. In public disclosures, Marfrig and BRF said the proposed deal would involve a share swap whereby BRF shareholders would receive 0.8521 shares of Marfrig for each BRF share they own. MBRF will also control Marfrig-owned National Beef, a meat processor based in the United States. Sign in to access your portfolio
Wall Street Journal
29 minutes ago
- Wall Street Journal
Unemployed Americans Endure Longer Job Searches in a Cooling Market
Job seekers are out in the cold this summer. Especially the ones who have been hunting for a while. Beyond the headline-grabbing top-line numbers in the jobs report for July was another striking piece of data: The number of people unemployed for at least 27 weeks topped 1.8 million, the highest level since 2017, not counting the pandemic's unemployment surge. The median length of unemployment in the U.S. has also ticked up, from a seasonally adjusted 9.5 weeks in July 2024 to 10.2 weeks last month.
Yahoo
an hour ago
- Yahoo
A Chinese blockade could cripple Taiwan's electricity, war game warns
A Chinese blockade could cut Taiwan's electrical generating capacity so much that the island is unable to function, according to war games conducted by a U.S. think tank. 'Energy is the weakest element in Taiwan's resilience against coercion,' warned the report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. 'The overwhelming preponderance of energy must be imported and is thus vulnerable to a blockade.' China could supplement a blockade with attacks on Taiwan's electrical grid, as Russia has done with some success in Ukraine. 'Total electricity production might be reduced to 20 percent of pre-blockade electricity levels,' CSIS said. At that level, all manufacturing ceases – including computer chips vital to the U.S. and the global economy. These conclusions came from a series of 26 war games run by CSIS to test a blockade of Taiwan, an attractive option for Beijing that offers the prospect of Taiwan agreeing to 'reunify' with China, without the need for a bloody and risky Chinese amphibious invasion. Train like you fight: Taiwan comes to grips with an old military adage CSIS researchers matched up various combinations of variables in each scenario, with the scenarios simulating 20 weeks of game time. For example, the severity of China's blockade ranged from a mere China Coast Guard stop-and-search operation to an all-out military effort that launched missiles at U.S. and Japanese bases. Other variables included hardening Taiwanese infrastructure and anti-invasion defenses, procuring additional cargo ships for convoys, more lethal Chinese missiles, whether Japan chose to defend Taiwan, and whether the fighting extended beyond the local blockade zone. The CSIS report admitted that some of these scenarios 'are uninteresting because of the force mismatch: No one could doubt that a China willing to embark on a wider war against a constrained Taiwan could completely cut off imports to Taiwan.' Yet assuming various changes in U.S., Taiwanese and Chinese policy, strategy and forces had a major impact on scenario outcomes. For example, a nightmare scenario depicted attacks on Taiwan's electric grid and strikes on American airbases in Japan and Guam, while the U.S. refrained from hitting airbases on the Chinese mainland. Chinese air forces 'were able to crowd into forward coastal air bases without risk of being hit by air strikes,' while 'the escalation level greatly improved the survivability of Chinese warships and submarines, which took shelter as needed in ports or other areas immediately offshore,' the report said. In that game, the U.S. and Taiwan lost 33 surface warships – including two aircraft carriers – and 153 merchant ships. With Taiwan's electrical generation meeting just 24 percent of demand, the result would be 'not just economic collapse but also the failure to meet even minimal health and safety activities for the population.' But in another scenario, Taiwan hardened its electrical infrastructure, the U.S. took a more aggressive posture, and large numbers of merchant ships were available to carry supplies to Taiwan. In this iteration, Chinese air and naval losses rose sharply, more cargo ships successfully ran the gauntlet to reach Taiwan, and there was sufficient electricity to meet most of the island's demand. Interestingly, five of the 26 scenarios were 'free play' games where players could choose to escalate, deescalate, or negotiate an 'off ramp' to end the conflict, rather than being locked into a course of action. Most players seemed reluctant to escalate, CSIS noted. Yet they often made 'small escalations' to signal the opposition, who responded with counter-escalations. In all five games, naval forces fired upon each other and suffered losses. While a blockade would be grim for Taiwan, it is not hopeless. For example, the capability to assemble large numbers of merchant ships – and the necessary crews – would be the most important preparation that Taiwan and the U.S. can make, according to CSIS. This includes sufficient liquified natural gas tankers crucial to meeting Taiwan's energy needs, as well as providing governmental insurance to replace commercial insurers who avoid war zones. Transshipment will be key: most merchant ships won't run a blockade, but their cargo can be unloaded in Japanese ports, and then reloaded aboard vessels that will make the Taiwan run. Taiwan can also reduce its dependence on imported energy. This could include boosting its reserves of oil, natural gas and coal, and even reopening its last nuclear plant, which shut down in May. Meanwhile, the island's electrical grid could be hardened, including stockpiles of spare parts such as transformers and turbines. For its part, the U.S. could increase its air transport capacity for a Berlin 1948-style airlift. While insufficient to meet all of Taiwan's needs, 'in some circumstances, an airlift could have a powerful moral effect and provide some breathing room,' CSIS said. In addition, the U.S. Navy will need to improve its capability for convoy escort. Ultimately, perhaps the most crucial step is to ensure that diplomacy is always an option. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan – and retaliation by the U.S. and its allies – could devastate the global economy, and not least the economies of China and America. 'Creative offers by the United States and Taiwan might allow China to declare victory and lift the blockade at an acceptable cost to the coalition (e.g., Taiwan agreeing to international observers in customs houses; reiterating the 1992 Consensus verbatim),' CSIS concluded. Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Business Insider, Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
