7 African countries affected as Saudi Arabia suspends blockwork visa
Saudi Arabia has suspended Block Work Visas for nationals from seven African and seven additional countries.
The suspension affects new and pending Temporary Work Visa applications and interrupts labor migration and remittance flows.
The move impacts sectors reliant on foreign labor, raising concerns about migrant workers' conditions and economic implications both domestically and internationally.
The suspension of Saudi Arabia's block work visa, which affects 14 countries in total, halts both new and pending Temporary Work Visa (TWV) applications.
The affected African countries include Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco. Other impacted nations are Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Block visas allow Saudi employers to recruit foreign workers through pre-approved quotas.
Envoy Global reports that the removal of the blockwork visa quota was observed on the Qiwa platform, Saudi Arabia's labor management portal, creating uncertainty in sectors heavily dependent on foreign labor, particularly construction and domestic work.
While no official reason has been given, the freeze coincides with increased Saudization efforts, which mandate higher employment of Saudi nationals in sectors like tourism, with quotas set to rise between 2026 and 2028.
Reports suggest the suspension will remain in place until the end of the Hajj season in June 2025, potentially signaling a broader shift in Gulf labor dynamics and Africa–Saudi employment ties.
Africa's workforce in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia hosts a significant number of African migrant workers, particularly in the domestic and low-wage sectors. Among these, Ethiopia and Kenya are notable contributors.
In recent years, Ethiopia has initiated programs to send up to 500,000 women to Saudi Arabia for domestic work. This initiative is seen as a means to alleviate economic challenges at home, despite concerns over labor conditions in the Kingdom.
Kenya also has a substantial presence, with approximately 150,000 Kenyan nationals employed as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. The Kenyan government has been encouraging labor migration to Gulf countries to address domestic unemployment issues.
However, African migrant workers in Saudi Arabia often face significant challenges. Reports have highlighted issues such as exploitation, abuse, and lack of legal protections.
The country's Kafala sponsorship system has been criticized for enabling employers to exert excessive control over workers, leading to situations where workers are vulnerable to mistreatment.
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