Germany halts Afghan refugee admission flights pending new government decision
BERLIN (Reuters) - Germany's outgoing government has suspended flights for voluntary admissions of Afghan refugees for two weeks pending a decision by the next government on how to proceed, the foreign ministry said on Wednesday.
Earlier this month, the future governing coalition of conservatives and Social Democrats (SPD) agreed to curb irregular migration, reflecting a mounting public backlash after several violent attacks by migrants as well as increasing pressure on housing and other infrastructure.
After the Western allies' hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Germany felt a strong obligation to protect former local staff of German agencies and humanitarian organisations there, and established several programmes to resettle them along with particularly vulnerable Afghans.
According to the Federal Foreign Office, a total of 36,000 people have entered Germany under such voluntary programmes, including a good 20,000 who were local staff and their families.
Around 2,600 people approved for admission by Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) are currently waiting in Pakistan for a German visa and charter flights, 350 of whom are former local employees, the foreign office added.
In addition to receiving admission approval, applicants must complete a visa process and security screening involving the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Police, and the Federal Criminal Police Office.
The current Greens-led foreign ministry said that existing admission confirmations were legally binding and could only be revoked under specific conditions. This meant it could be difficult for the new government to cancel them regardless of who takes over the interior or foreign ministries.
Germany's outgoing government arranged several resettlement flights in recent weeks, drawing criticism from conservative politicians who argued that the SPD-Greens coalition was rushing to admit new arrivals before it hands over.
"For several weeks now, we've been seeing planes arrive in Germany on a daily basis. I believe that's wrong. It creates the impression that an outgoing federal government is trying to establish facts on the ground in its final days," Thorsten Frei, a parliamentary leader of the conservative bloc, said.
ProAsyl, a German NGO providing legal help to asylum seekers, warned that halting the final rescue flights would leave vulnerable Afghans at risk of torture or death if returned to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
"The German government itself has determined their endangerment ... A return or deportation to Afghanistan could mean torture or even death for them," said Wiebke Judith, ProAsyl legal policy spokesperson.
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USA Today
39 minutes ago
- USA Today
Iranian nuclear program degraded by up to two years, Pentagon says
WASHINGTON, July 2 (Reuters) - The Pentagon said on Wednesday that U.S. strikes 10 days ago had degraded Iran's nuclear program by up to two years, suggesting the U.S. military operation likely achieved its goals despite a far more cautious initial assessment that leaked to the public. Sean Parnell, a Pentagon spokesman, offered the figure at a briefing to reporters, adding that the official estimate was "probably closer to two years." Parnell did not provide evidence to back up his assessment. "We have degraded their program by one to two years, at least intel assessments inside the Department (of Defense) assess that," Parnell told a news briefing. U.S. military bombers carried out strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 using more than a dozen 30,000-pound (13,600-kg) bunker-buster bombs and more than two dozen Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles. More: Iran enacts law suspending cooperation with UN nuclear watchdog The evolving U.S. intelligence about the impact of the strikes is being closely watched, after President Donald Trump said almost immediately after they took place that Iran's program had been obliterated, language echoed by Parnell at Wednesday's briefing. Such conclusions often take the U.S. intelligence community weeks or more to determine. "All of the intelligence that we've seen (has) led us to believe that Iran's -- those facilities especially, have been completely obliterated," Parnell said. Over the weekend, the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, Rafael Grossi, said that Iran could be producing enriched uranium in a few months, raising doubts about how effective U.S. strikes to destroy Tehran's nuclear program have been. Several experts have also cautioned that Iran likely moved a stockpile of near weapons-grade highly enriched uranium out of the deeply buried Fordow site before the strikes and could be hiding it. But U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said last week he was unaware of intelligence suggesting Iran had moved its highly enriched uranium to shield it from U.S. strikes. A preliminary assessment last week from the Defense Intelligence Agency suggested that the strikes may have only set back Iran's nuclear program by months. But Trump administration officials said that assessment was low confidence and had been overtaken by intelligence showing Iran's nuclear program was severely damaged. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, the strikes on the Fordow nuclear site caused severe damage. "No one exactly knows what has transpired in Fordow. That being said, what we know so far is that the facilities have been seriously and heavily damaged," Araqchi said in the interview broadcast by CBS News on Tuesday. (Reporting by Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)
Time Magazine
42 minutes ago
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Who Could Be Thailand's Next Prime Minister? Scenarios, Explained
History has a habit of repeating itself—but rarely as frequently as it does in Thailand. It was less than a year ago when the country ousted its fifth Prime Minister in 20 years, and already it looks set to oust another. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who succeeded her fellow Pheu Thai party member Srettha Thavisin in August 2024, was suspended by the Constitutional Court on July 1 pending a ruling on an ethics complaint stemming from her controversial handling of a border dispute with Cambodia. Paetongtarn's deputy, Suriya Juangroongruangkit, initially stepped in as caretaker, though his rein was short-lived as he was soon replaced on July 3 by Pheu Thai veteran and former Defense Minister Phumtham 'Big Comrade' Wechayachai, following a cabinet reshuffle. Whether by court order, resignation, or political maneuvering, experts say, it's unlikely Paetongtarn will ever return to the premiership. What comes next, however, is far from clear. The populist Pheu Thai party—which has largely been seen as a political vehicle for Paetongtarn's influential father, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra—took power after 2023 elections in which it finished second to the progressive reformist Move Forward party. In what was described at the time as a devil's bargain, Pheu Thai partnered with conservative and military-aligned parties it had campaigned against to form a fragile coalition government. In recent weeks, that fragile coalition has fallen apart. Its second-largest member party, Bhumjaithai, defected to the opposition. And remaining member parties have demanded concessions and threatened to leave, too. Should Paetongtarn be removed or resign, the Thai National Assembly will have to vote on a new Prime Minister—but only Prime Minster candidates from the 2023 election would be eligible. If a majority of lawmakers can't agree on a new leader, the caretaker would stay in place until the deadlock is broken. But if a majority of lawmakers can't agree on a new leader but can get behind a no-confidence vote on the Pheu Thai-led government, then parliament would be dissolved and fresh elections would be held—two years ahead of schedule. As much as the broader view of Thai politics seems to end up in the same place over and over again, the details of its twists and turns along the way can also be unpredictable, and no one knows exactly what lies ahead. Here are four possible paths to know. Read More: Exclusive: Thai Princes Banished Again as Eldest Says 'I Did Nothing Wrong' The ruling party holds on, with another new leader Pheu Thai fielded three candidates in the last election: Srettha, Paetongtarn, and Chaikasem Nitisiri. With Srettha gone and Paetongtarn likely on her way out, Chaikasem would be its last option. Chaikasem, who turns 77 in August, has extensive government experience: a former attorney general, he served as Minister of Justice under former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinwatra—Thaksin's sister and Paetongtarn's aunt—until that government was overthrown in 2014. But there are a number of issues surrounding Chaikasem that 'his opponents could exploit,' Napon Jatusripitak, visiting fellow and acting coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, tells TIME. Chaikasem has previously expressed openness to amending Thailand's controversial lèse-majesté law, which crosses a red line for many conservative royalists. His health has also been a concern, after he suffered a stroke while on the campaign trail in 2023. Chaikasem has tried to allay concerns about his health, telling reporters recently: 'The stroke issue is no longer a problem. The large and small blood clots in my neck have dissolved, and my life is back to normal. I was able to play golf comfortably yesterday.' He offered himself as ready albeit reluctant to step up. 'I would be willing to serve if assigned. But if I had a choice, I'd rather not — that would suit me just as well,' he said. 'Am I ready to take on the premiership? As long as I remain in politics, I must always be prepared. But do I truly want to be Prime Minister? Who would willingly take on such an exhausting job? I wouldn't. I'd rather spend time with my family and do whatever I please.' Conservatives push a military return to power Right now, the Pheu Thai-led coalition still holds a slim majority. But three medium-sized junior parties—United Thai Nation, the Klatham Party, and the Democrat Party—are sizable enough that their defection would tilt the balance. Of those, only United Thai Nation has a viable path to the premiership. United Thai Nation, the party of former junta leader Prayut Chan-o-cha, is an ultra-conservative, pro-military, pro-monarchy party that fielded two Prime Minister candidates in the last election: Prayut, a former army general who seized power in 2014 and whose premiership until 2023 was marked by authoritarianism and crackdowns on democracy, and Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, the party's current leader and a deputy prime minister and energy minister in the current government. While some observers have speculated that Pirapan could make a play for the premiership, Napon says he does not have adequate support from even within his own party. Pirapan is being investigated by a national anti-corruption commission over an alleged ethics violation. Prayut, on the other hand, could emerge as a 'wildcard' candidate, Napon says, for conservatives to unite behind, if there's an impasse in parliament. Following UTN's decisive defeat at the polls in 2023, Prayut announced his retirement from politics, though he was appointed to the King's body of advisers later in the year. While Prayut is only eligible to serve two more years before he reaches constitutional term limits, Titipol Phakdeewanich, a political scientist at Ubon Ratchathani University in Thailand, tells TIME that he could potentially pursue a comeback to lead the country until its next elections in 2027 by leveraging his 'connections with the military and the establishment' to present himself as a 'reassuring' intracoalition option for Pheu Thai patriarch Thaksin, who faces multiple legal battles including a lèse-majesté prosecution, to back. 'That means the power is still controlled by the elite and the conservative establishment,' which could be a positive for Thaksin, says Titipol, though he adds: 'I don't think it would be good for the future of Thai democracy.' A 'frenemy' rejoins the coalition to helm it—or leads a new interim government with the support of the opposition The biggest blow to Pheu Thai in recent weeks has been the defection of its largest coalition partner, Bhumjaithai. The third-largest party in parliament, behind Move Forward's new incarnation the People's Party and Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai was the largest coalition partner of the previous Prayut-led government and had made decriminalizing marijuana the centerpiece of its 2019 campaign. Its leader, former Health Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, sought the premiership in 2023 and, after joining the Pheu Thai-led coalition government—despite Pheu Thai's campaign promises to recriminalize marijuana—was placed in charge of the powerful Interior Ministry. But in June, ahead of a contentious cabinet reshuffle that was expected to see Anutin lose his post, Bhumjaithai left the coalition, and Pheu Thai quickly moved to recriminalize marijuana. Bhumjaithai originally said it would call for a no-confidence vote, but on July 3, after officially joining the opposition, it said it would hold off. The head of the opposition, People's Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, suggested that to avoid political deadlock, one scenario could be for the opposition to back a 'caretaker government' with a limited, clear mandate until new elections, focusing on stability and democratic reforms. 'I cannot speak unilaterally,' Natthaphong said. 'Ultimately, the other side—the Bhumjaithai Party and Mr. Anutin himself—must also be in agreement with us.' Anutin, however, denied agreeing to such a plan. 'I have never proposed myself as an interim prime minister. The claim is untrue,' he said, adding that further discussions would need to take place. Napon is skeptical that a Bhumjaithai-People's Party alliance would work. If the People's Party helps Anutin achieve the premiership but opts to remain in the opposition rather than joining the government, as it said it would, 'there's a real risk that the result would be an unstable minority government that struggles to pass key legislation,' says Napon. 'Would the People's Party then be expected to help get it over the line? If so, wouldn't that blur the boundary between government and opposition?' Furthermore, 'there are no guarantees that the new government would deliver on the People's Party's conditions—namely, constitutional reform and the [eventual] dissolution of the House.' But those concerns assume the plan even gets off the ground. The first issue, Napon says, is that the two parties alone fall short of a majority needed to decide the next Prime Minister. 'They would still need to court additional MPs—potentially from hard-to-please parties.' 'Even though the People's Party has backed away from its earlier push to amend the lèse-majesté law, any form of deal-making with the party could still be viewed unfavorably by the conservative establishment, which continues to wield significant influence over the scope and longevity of Thai democracy,' Napon adds. 'Such a move could backfire on Bhumjaithai and undermine its efforts in recent years to position itself as a protector of conservative interests and a reliable ally of the establishment.' Napon believes that Anutin may be using interest in cooperation from the People's Party to 'make himself appear more valuable and viable' to the conservative establishment—and Pheu Thai. 'By suggesting that the People's Party is open to backing him under certain terms, he positions himself as the candidate with the broadest potential appeal. In reality, though, it is still Pheu Thai—not the People's Party—that holds the key to delivering him the numbers. The People's Party serves more as a political prop that will allow Anutin to raise his price in the eyes of the establishment and potential coalition partners.' A renegotiation between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai is not off the table, says Titipol. The two parties have historically been 'frenemies,' he says, and while they differ on marijuana policy, they do not have any repelling fundamental ideologies that could prevent them from reconciling. Anutin, according to Napon, was already 'best positioned' to be the coalition's next Prime Minister after Paetongtarn, and the Constitutional Court dropping a case against Bhumjaithai the same day it suspended Paetongtarn sent a 'strong signal' that there's support for the party within the establishment. 'I can see a scenario where Pheu Thai would be forced to support Anutin as Prime Minister,' says Napon, 'because it has no other options' that would keep it even in proximity to power. Progressives win a fresh election A very unlikely but not technically impossible option would be for Pheu Thai to relinquish its hold on government and choose to dissolve parliament—a move which the party has already said it won't do—or for the opposition to get a majority of members to support a no-confidence motion, which People's Party leader and leader of the opposition Natthaphong has reiterated is his preferred course of action. Either scenario would fast-track a new general election, which would allow voters to have their say on who gets to replace Paetongtarn. A June poll from the National Institute of Development Administration shows that the People's Party remains the public's top choice: nearly 1-in-3 respondents picked 38-year-old Natthaphong as their preferred next Prime Minister, followed by about 13% picking Prayut and 10% picking Anutin, while about 20% of respondents said they hadn't decided on a preference yet. But as the last election showed, Thailand isn't a democracy, and the people's pick won't necessarily take power following an election. 'The establishment and the deals are always made by those who are in power, and people don't actually have much say on that,' says Titipol. Still, he adds, an election would allow people to 'express their frustration' and 'dissatisfaction.' And while 'crony politics' seems unshakeable, he says, for many, optimism is too: 'In Thailand, actually, anything is possible, even if it is impossible.'
Business Insider
42 minutes ago
- Business Insider
Israel showed that seizing air superiority isn't gone from modern warfare, but Iran isn't China or Russia
Military officials and experts warn that air superiority may not be possible in modern warfare. Israel, however, was able to quickly achieve it against Iran. Iran, though capable, isn't bringing the same fight that a foe like Russia or China could. Israel swiftly seized air superiority over parts of Iran during the latest fight, showing that it's still possible in modern, higher-end warfare to heavily dominate an enemy's skies. But there's a risk in taking the wrong lesson from that win. Iran isn't Russia or China, and as the West readies for potential near-peer conflict, it really can't afford to forget that, officials and experts have cautioned. Western military officials and warfare experts have repeatedly warned in recent years that achieving air superiority against those countries would be a daunting task. Russia and China, especially the latter, boast sophisticated, integrated air defense networks with ground-based interceptors well supported by capable air forces, electronic warfare, and reliable space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Air superiority in a limited theater is not the same as breaking through a complex anti-access, area-denial setup. Israel's victory in the air war over Iran shows that air superiority is "not impossible" in modern warfare, former Australian Army Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan, a warfare strategist, explained. That said, he continued, a Western conflict with Russia or China would be "very different." A victory in the air for Israel Israel attacked nuclear and military sites in Iran in bombing runs and eliminated dozens of Iranian air defense batteries. Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said it "highlights what you can do with a modern air force against some, on paper, fairly impressive defenses." Iran maintained a capable layered air defense network featuring domestic systems, foreign-supplied defenses, and some modernized older systems. Though only semi-integrated compared to fully networked air defenses, it presented an obstacle. Israel dismantled Iranian defenses over multiple engagements through extensive planning, detailed intelligence, and the employment of combat-proven airpower, specifically fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters built for penetration and suppression of enemy air defenses and fourth-generation F-15s and F-16s, which can also support that mission. Important to Israel's success in the latest fight with Iran were the engagements last year that substantially weakened Iranian air defense capabilities, as well as Israel's skills in this mission. Failures and aircraft losses in the 1973 Yom Kippur War led it to reevaluate how it approached enemy air defenses, in many ways leading to the emergence of the kind of missions used against Iran. Ed Arnold, a security expert at RUSI, said that Israel reporting no aircraft losses "was significant, and it just showed that, yeah, you can get air supremacy very quickly." The caveat there is that doing so requires the right tactics, weapons, and intelligence, but even then, it is not guaranteed. Retired Air Commodore Andrew Curtis, an airfare expert with a 35-year career in the Royal Air Force, told BI "the situation that everybody's been used to over the last 30 years is air supremacy," but when it comes to high-intensity war against a near-peer adverary, realistically, "those days are long gone." Russia and China Iran had air defenses, but not airpower. It's air force is largely made up of obsolete Western, Soviet, and Chinese aircraft. The ground-based surface-to-air missile batteries are more capable, but that's only one part of the defensive picture. Curtis explained that Iran has "very little in the way of air defense aircraft, whereas of course Russia, and especially China, has stacks of them." Both Russia and China field fourth-generation-plus aircraft, as well as fifth-generation fighters. China, in particular, has multiple fifth-gen fighters in various stages of development, and there are indications it's working on sixth-generation prototypes. By comparison, Iran's air force looks a lot like a plane museum. But they also boast more advanced and more effective air defenses. Bronk said Russia's defenses are "better networked, more capable, more numerous, and more densely layered than Iran's." He said that if the West rolled back the SAM threat, it would likely be able to overcome Russia's air force, but China is a different story. China has a complex integrated air defense network supported by ground-based air defenses, naval air defenses, and what Bronk characterized as "an increasingly very capable modern air force," among other capabilities. And China also has a "far greater and more sophisticated missile arsenal for striking bases" to hamstring an enemy's airpower. Additionally, it holds a strong economic position with an industrial base that is turning out high-end weapons. China has also been tremendously increasing its number of interceptors without really expending any, unlike the US, which has been burning through interceptors in Middle Eastern conflicts. Not all of China has the same protections, but breaking through defenses would likely represent a substantial challenge in a conflict, especially in something like a Taiwan contingency. A conflict between the West and China could look like "a more traditional air war" — something not seen in a long time, Curtis said, explaining that air-to-air combat could make a comeback, with pilots again shooting down enemy planes. "In a peer-on-peer conflict, certainly with China, you would see a lot of that, because China has got a lot of air assets." Future air battles Achieving air superiority, as Israel did recently and as the US did in the Gulf War in the 1990s and in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, has been crucial to the Western way of war, often serving as a tool to enable ground maneuvers. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which failed to knock out Ukraine's air defenses, now far more robust than at the start of the war, has shown what a conflict looks like when it isn't achieved. Aircraft are shot out of the sky, and ground forces are locked in grinding slogs. Devastating long-range attacks are still possible, but quick victory is generally not. It has resulted in some stark warnings for future warfare. Speaking on air superiority, Gen. James Hecker, the commander of NATO's air command, warned last year that "it's not a given." He added that "if we can't get air superiority, we're going to be doing the fight that's going on in Russia and Ukraine right now." Other military leaders have said that air superiority may only be achieved in short bursts. War is full of surprises, but evidence indicates that's a real possibility. Achieving Curtis said air planners now have to focus on specific priorities, like protecting air bases, and figuring out how to achieve a "localized time-bound air superiority or air supremacy in support of a short-term mission or operation." "It's a different mindset," he said. The key in future wars will be to seize control of as much of the aerial battlespace as possible to do what's necessary in the moment, all while holding firm defensively, as Israel did against Iran's retaliatory ballistic missile strikes, experts said. That means maintaining a strong air force and strong air defenses. "Nothing in Ukraine or Israel has shown that air superiority isn't needed in the future," Ryan shared. "I think they've both shown that having air superiority is an extraordinarily important part of warfare and remains so.
