ISS describes infighting within SAPS as a setback in building public confidence
His comments come a day after KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi went public with damning allegations against Police Minister Senzo Mchunu and other high-ranking officials. Mkhwanazi claimed there is a powerful organised criminal syndicate operating across the country's crime-fighting institutions. Newham said allegations of this magnitude need to be the subject of an inquiry.
"Had the government implemented its own recommendations in the National Development Plan, which came out in 2012, which identifies the crises of top management in the SAPS as a key issue that needs to be urgently addressed, had they addressed those issues back in 2012, we wouldn't be here today."
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IOL News
3 hours ago
- IOL News
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IOL News
4 hours ago
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A SA Police Service (SAPS) officer attempting to stop looting during the unrest that rocked KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng in July 2021. Image: | DOCTOR NGCOBO Independent Newspapers Clyde N.S. Ramalaine South Africa's winter has long echoed historic burdens, most notably the 1976 student uprising and the July 2021 unrest. The latter, labelled an insurrection by the Ramaphosa-led state, served as a politically expedient move, deflecting accountability while exposing racist violence in Phoenix, state brutality, and broken democratic promises. But July 2025 signals a new chapter, marked by exposures, high-level suspensions, and institutional decay, especially within the South African Police Service (SAPS). This 'Winter of Discontent' reveals not just negligence but a disturbing nexus of criminal syndicates, compromised police structures, and political interference. This is about more than corruption; it is about the erosion of command and a nation caught between exposure and accountability. 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SAPS confirmed the ballistics-linked weapons to at least ten cases, giving credibility to Mkhwanazi's claims and undermining counter-narratives, particularly Minister Senzo Mchunu's initial denials, later followed by admissions. Criticism of Mkhwanazi's motives came from UJ academic Steven Friedman, who suggested the disclosures reflected SAPS factionalism. But dismissing hard evidence as political theatre lacks integrity. Such scepticism risks masking the reality beneath elite commentary. The forensic backing and arrests demand honest reckoning, not theoretical dismissal. Another twist came via former Hawks boss Godfrey Lebeya, who admitted to receiving a tip-off—allegedly from someone linked to Molefe- about a Hawks operation. Lebeya redirected the Hawks, leading to an almost confrontation with SAPS. He has refused to name the caller, citing the pending Madlanga Judicial Commission. 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Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ Mogotsi's ambiguous role, shadowy operative or media-seeking hero, underscores the breakdown of command in SAPS and the alarming closeness between politics and policing. His public activity illustrates political interference cloaked as operational engagement. The allegations surrounding Mchunu and Sibiya suggest obstruction. 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Justice demands urgency, but also coherence. We've seen this before: Phala Phala produced more noise than resolution. Overlapping mandates, jurisdictional confusion, and political manoeuvring tactics create a fog that allows the guilty to vanish, locked in a sealed status. The more disjointed our accountability processes, the easier they become to manipulate. As July ends, one wonders: Will the judiciary be next? If Mkhwanazi's revelations are accurate, the rot reaches further into the justice system. Is South Africa ready for that confrontation? This winter may not deliver justice, but it has begun a reckoning, driven not by politicians but by a police commissioner with evidence. Mkhwanazi's bravery has shattered the silence. He's shown us a state entangled with criminality, protected by privilege, and nearing institutional collapse. As the Madlanga Commission awaits commencement, the spread of unaligned investigations risks confusion over clarity. Without coherence, justice may again be buried under politics. July 2025 has not answered every question, but it's raised the ones we can no longer ignore. Whether this moment becomes a turning point or deepens the national malaise will depend on what follows. South Africa stands at a precipice, its guardians exposed, its institutions tested, and its people impatient for action. * Clyde N.S. Ramalaine is a theologian, political analyst, lifelong social and economic justice activist, published author, poet, and freelance writer. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
Daily Maverick
12 hours ago
- Daily Maverick
In league with bandits — how a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria's capital
New evidence shows how the JAS group's Shiroro cell adopts a flexible approach that tolerates local bandits and their vices. The Shiroro cell of a Boko Haram faction in Niger State, near Nigeria's capital Abuja, is the group's furthest and most successful expansion outside the Lake Chad Basin. Until now, information about the cell of the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) group sketched its existence, but left many questions unanswered. New evidence from ongoing Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research includes interviews with defectors, local victims and women who escaped JAS after being married to some of its fighters. The information sheds light on the Shiroro cell's operations and alliances, and what they mean for counterterrorism in Nigeria. Audiovisual material and corroborating reports show JAS embedded deeply in Niger State's forested communities, blending jihadism with local Fulani banditry – the main source of insecurity in the area. By tolerating the bandits' non-adherence to its strict religious code, JAS benefits from their weapons, fighters and knowledge of the local terrain, enabling the group to gain a strategic foothold in Central Nigeria. The cell is led by Abubakar Saidu, alias Sadiku. A native Babur from Biu in Borno State, Sadiku was sent to Niger State in 2014 by late JAS leader Abubakar Shekau. He was part of a seven-man team directed to meet remaining members of the ultra-Salafist Darul Islam group. After being dislodged from its headquarters in Mokwa by a 2009 police raid, members had fled north into Nigeria's largely ungoverned forests. Unlike the doctrinal and tighter command discipline of rival Boko Haram faction Iswap, JAS thrives on ideological fluidity and predation. Although Darul Islam had earlier rejected Boko Haram's overture for alignment, Sadiku found fertile ground among its dispersed followers and started the Niger State cell along with his comrades from Borno. He began shuttling between Borno and Niger states, gradually embedding himself in the Alawa Forest Reserve area, and coordinating with the local Fulani. This culminated in escalating attacks by the group in 2021. From forest camps like Kugu and Dogon Fili, the group attacks security forces and civilians in villages and towns, and on roads in the Shiroro, Munya and Rafi local government areas. It has killed hundreds, displaced thousands and planted many improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A Premium Times investigation and ISS interviews reveal the abduction of boys who are forced into an indoctrination programme at Islamic schools, and forced labour. Women and girls are kidnapped and forced into marriages with fighters. Strongholds of JAS' Shiroro cell in Niger State, Nigeria Unlike the doctrinal and tighter command discipline of rival Boko Haram faction Islamic State West Africa Province's (Iswap), JAS thrives on ideological fluidity and predation. Militants raid villages, carrying out kidnapping and extortion, which they justify as 'fayhoo' (spoils taken from civilian 'unbelievers'). This flexibility appears key to its entrenchment in Niger State. The Shiroro cell is not structured under the traditional Boko Haram command system, but under kachallas (warlords or strongmen), which shows an embracing of bandit terminology. The fusion of jihadists and non-ideological armed criminals is not new. In Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, jihadists have worked with local criminals for a stake in illegal gold mines. But the Shiroro cell's local integration stands out, especially its tolerance of the bandits' use of alcohol, drugs and prostitution, which contravene the cell's strict religious doctrine. A woman formerly married to a fighter recalled Boko Haram clerics from North East Nigeria expressing disapproval, but Sadiku argued that the Fulani would 'change with time'. It is, however, doubtful whether the bandits would ever cooperate with jihadists out of religious conviction. The Shiroro cell is not structured under the traditional Boko Haram command system, but under kachallas (warlords or strongmen), which shows an embracing of bandit terminology. Notorious bandit leader Dogo Gide served under Sadiku as kachalla before their fallout – though ISS interviews suggest that Bakura Doro, the Lake Chad-based overall commander of JAS, may be mediating a reconciliation. According to defectors and women who lived in the camps, Doro supplies weapons from his base on Lake Chad's Barwa Island. One video, seen by ISS, shows weapons wrapped in grass and fish, hidden on boats bound for Shiroro. This arms flow is complemented by locally sourced weapons, seized from security forces or trafficked through Sahelian smuggling networks, using the group's bandit alliances. Money also flows from Shiroro to Doro, underscoring how territorial expansion is a tactic to also finance terrorism. The Shiroro cell is dispersed across forest communities, including Kugu, Maganda and Dogon Fili, to avoid detection by Nigeria's largely aerial military campaign. The military's ground assets were withdrawn after facing repeated deadly attacks. Further complicating the situation is the Lakurawa, a Sahelian-rooted Fulani armed group designated a terrorist organisation by Nigeria in 2025. While espousing jihadism, Lakurawa is predatory and operates in northwestern Sokoto and Kebbi states along the Niger Republic border. Geography amplifies the Shiroro threat… Arrests in July of Boko Haram-linked women heading to the Borgu axis suggest the cell is eyeing broader expansion. According to a defector and an expert on the conflict, Lakurawa's emissaries have visited Sadiku in Shiroro annually since 2023, providing the first credible evidence of Lakurawa-JAS interactions and possible alignment. Sadiku sent fighters to reinforce Lakurawa, which in turn approached another notorious Fulani bandit leader, Bello Turji, ostensibly to replicate the JAS-style alliance in the country's North West. The convergence of armed groups raises the threat of a wider coordination of violence. The 2022 Kuje prison attack in Abuja involved a rare Iswap-JAS-Ansaru collaboration. A defector who participated in the 2022 Kaduna train attack and kidnapping told ISS the assault was executed by Sadiku's fighters using IEDs from Borno, and partnering with bandits. Meanwhile, Iswap has long sought to expand beyond Lake Chad, even targeting southern states like Oyo to access coastal west Africa. ISS research shows it sent five commanders with 25 fighters each to Central Nigeria in April, maintaining a presence in Kogi's Okene axis. Yet its success has been limited compared with JAS' Shiroro stronghold. Geography amplifies the Shiroro threat. Niger State connects north and south Nigeria and borders Benin through porous forest corridors linking to the Sahel. Arrests in July of Boko Haram-linked women heading to the Borgu axis suggest the cell is eyeing broader expansion. Yet, Nigeria's strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism remains largely Lake Chad-focused. The Shiroro case shows the need for a recalibrated threat map. Responses must include forest surveillance, road security and partnerships with local vigilantes under accountability frameworks. Finance routes must be disrupted and gender-responsive reintegration programmes must be run for defectors. DM
