Japan's Nikkei Stock Average Meanders on US Trade Deal Uncertainty; Steelmakers Jump
The Nikkei 225 Index edged 0.1% lower as of the morning break while the broader Topix was down 0.3%.
Prolonged trade negotiations with the U.S. have yet to produce a deal, with President Donald Trump recently threatening even higher tariffs on Japan.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said on Wednesday he was determined to protect Japan's national interests, while chief trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa was reported to be organizing his eighth visit to the U.S. as early as this weekend.
'If the negotiations do not produce results, it will be a major blow to the Japanese economy,' said Nomura strategist Fumika Shimizu.
There were 112 advancers on the Nikkei index against 110 decliners. The biggest percentage losers on the gauge were Muji-brand retailer Ryohin Keikaku, down 6%, followed by NH Foods, which slid 4.9%.
JFE Holdings surged 4.9%, leading an advance among iron and steel makers, which were the biggest gainers among the Tokyo Stock Exchange's 33 industry sub-indexes.
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