Govt bans use of fine nets in coastal waters
According to sources, the said ban has been imposed to save the rapidly depleting fish stocks in the province's maritime boundaries. However, according to fishermen's leader Abdul Majeed Motani, such bans have been imposed before but have never been implemented.
Talking to The Express Tribune, he said that there is a need to ensure the implementation of this ban. He said that the use of fine nets is threatening the complete extinction of 35 species of fish, including shrimp. These species of fish breed in the roots of mangroves. They are being eliminated due to the use of fine nets.
It should be noted that the order banning the use of fine nets has been issued through the amendments recently introduced in the Sindh Fisheries Ordinance 1980. According to the amendment in sub-rule (2) of Rule 25-A: "No person shall be allowed to fish with encircling net or improvised purse seine nets locally called 'wire net' or 'ring net' and bottom trawl locally called 'trawls' or 'Gujja', 'Gujjo' or 'Gujji' in the creek areas of the province of Sindh and up to twelve nautical miles from the shore along the coast and territorial waters of the province of Sindh."
Whereas the amendment in sub-rule (3) of Rule 25-A states that: "Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, a fishing license granted under the Ordinance or rules made thereunder shall not entitle or authorise the licensee to fish with encircling net or improvised purse net locally called 'wire net' or 'ring net' in the creeks, internal waters and twelve nautical miles from the baseline and shall fish by gillnets with a mesh size not less than 120mm (stretched) and shrimp fishing net with a mesh size not less than 60mm (stretched) beyond internal waters and twelve nautical miles away from the baseline along the coast of the province of Sindh, and shall not disrupt already laid fishing nets. Set bag nets locally called 'Bulla' or 'Bullo' nets (estuaries and creeks set bag net) and seine nets locally called 'Katra' are prohibited for such creeks and territorial waters of the province of Sindh."
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Express Tribune
6 days ago
- Express Tribune
Afghan refugees risk billions in losses
Afghan refugees arrive from Pakistan at the border in Spin Boldak district of Kandahar province on December 3, 2023. PHOTO: AFP Listen to article As the status of over one million Afghan citizens holding Proof of Registration (PoR) cards hangs in the balance after expiry of their stay limit last month, the refugees are worried about economic losses due to possible disposal of their assets in haste that they built in the past five decades. Although there is slow implementation of the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan, the refugees are concerned that they may be forced to sell their valuable assets at throwaway prices in case the validity of their cards is not extended further. Due to security and economic considerations, the Pakistani authorities decided to repatriate all illegal foreign immigrants in November 2023. Pakistan has so far repatriated approximately 1.3 million Afghans and still there are about 1.6 million staying back, according to the data compiled by a United Nations entity. These include over one million refugees who have PoR cards but these documents expired on June 30, 2025. The government is considering two options, either giving a temporary extension or offering these PoR card holders a long-term visa, according to officials dealing with the subject. So far, no decision has been taken to extend the PoR cards but the government is working on a new visa policy for foreigners, said Chaudhry Talal, the Minister of State for Interior, while talking to The Express Tribune. The matter to give an extension had also been discussed in the federal cabinet but no decision was taken. Talal said that the new visa policy would offer incentives for foreign investment in Pakistan and the Afghan citizens can also take advantage of that. Beyond Boundaries, an initiative of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, has been working for the resolution of the Afghan refugees' issue. It is advocating a permanent solution to the problem so that the refugees who came to Pakistan after 1979 are not forced to sell their assets at discounted prices and these people can also positively contribute to the local economy. Only Dostokhail tribe people are holding approximately Rs52 billion in assets in Peshawar in the shape of movable and immovable properties in others' names, said Ahmad Shah, a trader from the tribe. Affluent Afghans should not be deported, as it is mutually beneficial for them as well as for Pakistan, said Ahmad Shah. Shah claimed that they are not allowed to own assets and cannot open bank accounts. But the central bank authorities said that thousands of PoR card holders were having bank accounts. Shah said that his tribe also contributed over Rs14 billion or $51 million in foreign remittances last year. These remittances are sent by the tribe members working in Europe, Canada, and the United States, he added. "Our family does not have any criminal record, and we are traders doing business in black tea, tyres, and batteries," said Ahmad Shah. "My children are born in Pakistan and they do not want to go back to Afghanistan," said Shah, who is worried about selling off his benami assets at throwaway prices if the government finally decides to repatriate all Afghan refugees. "We are traders because we do not have permanent residence status and cannot legally invest in Pakistan," said Mohammad Bakhtiar, another member from the Dostokhail tribe. However, for Pakistani authorities, $51 million in remittances is not much compared to the cost that they believe the Pakistani economy was paying due to the presence of Afghan refugees. The cost is in the shape of the role of Afghan refugees in illegal trade of currency and smuggling of goods under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement. In the last fiscal year, Pakistan received a record $38.2 billion in foreign remittances that helped post a current account surplus of $2.1 billion. But there are questions on the sustainability of these remittances due to the federal government's decision to freeze subsidies for remittances. It has also reduced the benefits on foreign remittances, but a decision remains pending on who would foot the bill. Building foreign exchange reserves is the responsibility of the central bank, thus, it should be funding the scheme, Finance Secretary Imdadullah Bosal told the National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance this week. Bosal said that the federal government did not have funds to continue the Pakistan Remittances Initiative scheme. The secretary said that the finance ministry was working with the central bank to find a solution, as no money is kept in the new budget. "As against Rs89 billion budgeted allocation in the last fiscal year, the finance ministry received nearly Rs200 billion claims from the central bank ... that is quite a substantial chunk," said Bosal. He said one of the options was for the central bank to deduct the cost upfront from the profits it transfers to the federal government. However, the challenge is that it would still be treated as part of the primary expenses. After multiple rounds of background discussions, Beyond Boundaries has recommended streamlining visa processes for traders of Afghan origin and granting them residency, enabling them to invest in Pakistan.
Business Recorder
18-07-2025
- Business Recorder
Virtual assets law: a faulty approach
The emergence of Pakistan's regulatory framework for crypto assets unfolds not through a linear evolution but as a series of abrupt pivots, uncertain mandates, and fragmented institutional posturing. Initial state responses oscillated between prohibition and passive ambiguity, particularly crystallized through the State Bank of Pakistan's 2018 circular barring financial institutions from engaging with crypto-related activity. However, a noteworthy departure has occurred with the promulgation of the Virtual Assets Ordinance, 2025 ('the Ordinance') on July 8, 2025. This Presidential Ordinance, issued under Article 89 of the Constitution becoming effective immediately, defies parliamentary process and oversight as no emergency existed for not presenting it as a Bill before the Parliament. It reveals an institutional attempt to assert authority over a previously unregulated domain. Yet rather than embodying a product of rigorous legislative deliberation, the Ordinance resembles an amalgam of foreign statutes hastily adapted to domestic soil, lacking coherence and structural fidelity to Pakistan's socio-legal ecosystem. The Ordinance introduces a licensing and regulatory regime under which Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) are to operate drawing clear inspiration from frameworks such as the European Union's Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) Regulation, the United Arab Emirates' VARA rulebook, and Singapore's Payment Services Act. For instance, the classification of VASP categories, as outlined in Schedule 1, closely mirrors MiCA's broad taxonomy of crypto-asset services. Inclusion of custody, exchange, and token issuance services under one regulatory umbrella reflects a consolidation seen in Singapore's Monetary Authority guidelines. Furthermore, capital requirements imposed under Schedule 2 strongly resemble United Arab Emirates' licensing prerequisites. Despite these parallels, the Ordinance suffers from superficial mimicry rather than thoughtful transposition. The Ordinance appears to have been drafted in undue haste, attempting to regulate a highly volatile and technically nuanced sector without erecting a solid and reliable institutional or legal foundation. References made to other existing Pakistani laws within the Ordinance, such as Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, Securities Act, 2015, and Companies Act, 2017, are broadly worded failing to adequately address issues specific to virtual currencies. These laws, originally fashioned for traditional financial instruments and corporate structures, lack definitional clarity and enforcement mechanisms appropriate for digital assets. Moreover, to date, no substantive amendments have been made to these foundational statutes to incorporate the realities and peculiarities of blockchain-based assets. Mere invocation of these statutes in the Ordinance does not bridge this gap. The use of generic cross-references to legacy financial legislation creates interpretive ambiguity, risking inconsistent application and regulatory arbitrage. The resulting legal uncertainty may inhibit development of a stable and predictable crypto-asset ecosystem. Ordinance's overreliance on non-specific statutory references undermines its credibility as a standalone regulatory framework exposing it to challenge both from a constitutional and administrative perspective. Inclusion of Schedule 1 in the Ordinance categorizing 'Virtual Asset Services' deserves scrutiny. The definitions employed, such as 'broker-dealer services' and 'exchange services', are broadly phrased and lack operational precision. For example, classification of 'broker-dealer services' in clause (c) as including trading on one's own account may inadvertently encompass individuals or businesses engaged in proprietary trading for treasury management purposes, creating overregulation and deterring legitimate activity. The exemption carved out for sole-account dealers is not sufficiently delineated and could be manipulated to escape oversight. Such drafting anomalies reflect a limited understanding of digital asset market dynamics. The category of 'custody services', defined as safekeeping or controlling virtual assets or means of access on behalf of customers, lacks an articulation of technical standards for security, segregation of assets, and recovery protocols in the event of platform insolvency or cyber compromise. In jurisdictions such as Switzerland and Germany, regulations include specific custody protocols and operational audits, with agencies like BaFin requiring compliance with these standards. Absence of these benchmarks in the Ordinance reveals a superficial regulatory posture. The 'exchange services' classification aggregates fiat-to-crypto and crypto-to-crypto conversions, as well as matching orders and maintaining order books. However, it provides no indication of technical, operational, or liquidity benchmarks for functioning as an exchange. No clear definition and requirements are laid down regarding prevention of wash trading or liquidity mirroring. The oversight of algorithmic trading and market manipulation risks, well-acknowledged internationally, is glaringly missing. The lack of granularity in these definitions may lead to both overreach and under-enforcement. Inclusion of lending and borrowing services appears forward-thinking, yet the clause fails to distinguish between collateralized, over-collateralized, and algorithmic lending models. Given the global controversies surrounding platforms like Celsius and Terra-Luna, the omission of risk buffers and liquidity thresholds in such definitions may lead to replication of failures within Pakistan's regulatory purview. The provision on derivatives services also lacks clarity on permissible underlying assets, leverage caps, margining, and clearing obligations. The Schedule's provision on fiat-referenced token issuance services, analogous to stablecoin issuance, requires a more robust framework. The Ordinance mandates establishment and administration of reserve assets but fails to define the nature, composition, and auditability of such reserves. This is in stark contrast to frameworks like MiCA, which require regular attestation of reserves, segregation of backing assets, and mandatory redemption rights. Without such safeguards, Pakistani consumers and investors remain exposed to systemic vulnerabilities. The capital requirements prescribed in Schedule 2 amplify the Ordinance's exclusionary tendencies. Imposing a minimum paid-up capital of billion on exchanges and token issuers effectively prohibits startups, SMEs, and even well-established fintechs from entering the market. This figure, though inspired by UAE and EU standards, disregards the local financial and technological environment. The Rs 100 million requirements for broker-dealer services and Rs 200 million for custody services are similarly prohibitive, especially when coupled with compliance, infrastructure, and legal costs. The Ordinance appears designed for incumbents and well-capitalized foreign players, erecting entry barriers that stifle domestic innovation. The economic impact of these high thresholds is likely to be severe. Startups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) constitute the bulk of Pakistan's fintech and blockchain innovation ecosystem. By mandating paid-up capital far exceeding industry norms within Pakistan's own regulatory infrastructure (e.g., NBFCs, mutual funds), the Ordinance reflects a protectionist rather than enabling character. It renders Pakistan's virtual asset environment an exclusive domain for the privileged, in direct contradiction to the digital financial inclusion objectives articulated in the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS). The designation of 'Significant Issuers' under sections 26-27 [Schedule-3] and related threshold market capitalization exceeding Rs 5 billion or five million domestic users introduces further complications. Though the intention to impose enhanced governance on systemic actors is commendable, the provision is poorly calibrated. The mandatory requirement for significant issuers to maintain 3% of reserve assets as own funds, capped at Rs. 2 billion, does not consider market volatility or token model diversity. In the absence of clear stress testing frameworks or audit requirements, such thresholds may inadvertently penalize token issuers experiencing organic growth rather than managing genuine systemic risks. The Ordinance's regulatory philosophy appears inherently conservative, prioritizing compliance and capital buffers over innovation, inclusion, and agility. The pace of technological evolution in the blockchain domain renders such rigid structures counterproductive. The sandbox rules sections, 42-44, lack clear eligibility criteria, transparent evaluation metrics, and defined procedures for transitioning successful innovations to full licensing, creating uncertainty for innovators. The no-action relief mechanism offers limited legal certainty, as relief letters can be withdrawn arbitrarily without safeguards, potentially deterring participation. Enforcement powers granted to the Authority are broad but lack procedural oversight, risking overreach. Penalties, including fines up to Rs 100 million or 5% of turnover, may disproportionately burden firms. The Authority should clarify sandbox participation and exit criteria, strengthen legal certainty around no-action relief, introduce independent oversight of investigatory powers, scale penalties appropriately, define emergency intervention protocols, ensure tribunal independence, and provide detailed transitional guidelines. Additionally, the Ordinance does not distinguish between low-risk innovation (such as community tokens) and high-risk instruments (such as leveraged derivatives), thereby imposing a one-size-fits-all model that is bound to fail. The overarching legal inconsistencies further delegitimize the Ordinance. Although the document cites Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016,Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010, and other laws, they do not specifically address blockchain traceability, private key security, or decentralized finance activities. Similarly, Income Tax Ordinance 2001 is silent on the classification of gains from crypto trading, whether they constitute business income, capital gains, or speculative gains, resulting in tax ambiguities that may lead to litigation and non-compliance. The lack of legislative amendments to the underlying laws renders the Ordinance an isolated and unsupported enactment. This legal vacuum prevents consistent enforcement and frustrates expectations of VASPs seeking certainty. The result is an underdeveloped ecosystem governed by disconnected laws. Provisions related to 'closed ecosystems' or 'closed-loop systems', and critical analysis of definitions e.g., consumer protection, AML-CFT framework, and taxation-related provisions will be analyzed in our coming articles. Failure to integrate the Ordinance with a broader digital economy vision dilutes its impact. The uncoordinated insertion of regulatory obligations, unsupported by infrastructure, legal amendments, or tax clarity, will most likely hinder rather than harness the potential of crypto technologies. Implementation of the Ordinance, in its current form, could entrench systemic challenges, deter foreign direct investment, and exclude domestic talent from participating in the digital asset revolution. The absence of consultative processes and empirical market assessments reveals a policy framework reactive to compliance optics rather than developmental objectives. The government must reconsider its approach by (i) introducing a risk-based, tiered licensing regime; (ii) aligning existing laws through amendments specific to virtual assets; and (iii) developing consultative mechanisms with industry stakeholders and technical experts to ensure adaptive regulation in this dynamic field. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Business Recorder
18-07-2025
- Business Recorder
PPRA approves new set of rules
ISLAMABAD: The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) has approved new set of Public Procurement Rules 2025 including procedure for blacklisting of parties, methods of procurement, bids validity, sources told Business Recorder. Sharing the details, PPRA initiated a consultation process with concerned ministries and relevant procuring agencies on 5th June 2024, and consolidated their recommendations on improvement of procurement framework. The Prime Minister, while chairing meetings on tendering/procurement on August 23, 2024, followed by a review on 21st November 2024, expressed concerns about the adequacy of the PPRA institutional and legal framework. In this context, following directives were issued by the Prime Minister: (i) PPRA shall review its regulatory framework on an urgent basis to determine whether it is in accordance with the international best practices of transparency, economy, efficiency, and facilitates ease of doing business or not ;(ii) procurement rules shall be reviewed by adopting the best international practices and principles of transparency and fairness, ensuring that there should be no conflict of interest at any level, e.g., composition of procurement committee, bid evaluation process, complaint Redressal Committee, etc; (iii) While drafting new rules, PPRA shall ensure that a Complaint Redressal Committee/Grievance Committee and Inspection Committee are completely independent of the influence of the Procuring Agency and Procurement Committee; (iv) while drafting new rules, PPRA shall ensure a system of pre-shipment inspection by independent assessors at the cost of the procuring agency, for all significant and/or international procurements; and (v) PPRA shall create checks in ePADS and ensure that Procuring Agencies have conducted Third Party Evaluation in the spirit of directions conveyed vide PMO's. The directive stipulates, 'Third Party Evaluation/validation of development projects' shall be mandatory for all projects above RS 70 million. In compliance with the PM's directives, PPRA with the support from the World Bank Pakistan engaged a consultant, Peter Trepte, an international procurement lawyer, to undertake a comprehensive review of the PPRA's legal and institutional framework, including the PPRA Ordinance 2002, and the Rules 2004. Following extensive consultations with the Federal PPRA management, the World Bank experts, Provincial PPRAs, and key stakeholders from procuring agencies, the international consultant identified strengths, weaknesses, and missing elements in the existing regulatory framework of PPRA and presented a preliminary report during the 82nd meeting of the PPRA Board, held on September 27, 2024. The following were the main recommendations for regulatory reforms: (i) the Ordinance should be amended to include additional functions for PPRA; (ii) Rules should be revised in their entirety (using MAPS and the UNCITRAL Model as guidance) - retaining the positive elements of the current rules but expanding on them to provide more details and filling the identified gaps. Critical elements of this exercise will be (a) the mandatory creation of a procurement cell (appropriate to the level of procurement spend) in each procuring agency, together with an evaluation committee and Procurement Oversight Committee, all with detailed responsibilities; (b) revision of grievance redressal committee; (c) revision of appellate body and its procedures; and (d) centralization of blacklisting procedure; and (iii) PPRA should be restructured according to the amendments made, under-staffing will need to be adequate, and appropriate tools provided. The PPRA Board broadly agreed with the recommendations of the consultant and asked for preparation of a draft new set of rules outlining the entire spectrum of activities to be performed in the procurement process, including TPE, TPV, and the establishment of Procurement Cell along with well-defined roles & responsibilities within the procuring agencies as well as at the regulatory level. The international consultant, in consultation with local consultant Shan Gul, former Advocate General Punjab, submitted the initial draft of the Public Procurement Rules 2025 on 30th December 2024. The draft was examined by the PPRA team and was also disseminated to stakeholders, including procuring agencies. It was made publicly available via the PPRA website on January 17, 2025 for feedback. Comments and observations received from procuring entities, bidders, suppliers, and the general public were thoroughly examined and duly incorporated after detailed deliberations. An improved version of PP Rules 2025 was placed before the 88th, 89th, 90th and 91st consecutive meetings of the PPRA Board, held on January 21st, 23rd, 27th, and 28th, 2025, respectively. The Board members examined the existing rules of 2004 and the proposed amendments, discussed details, and finalized a draft new set of PP Rules 2025. The Board directed PPRA to share it again with the international and national consultant(s), and the feedback received from these quarters be incorporated, and a fresh set of rules be presented for a final review and approval by the Board. The updated draft (New Set of Public Procurement Rules, 2025) was submitted to the international consultant on 31st January 2025 for evaluation and feedback. The input received from the international consultant was shared with the local legal consultant Usama Siddique on February 6, 2025 for review. Subsequently, the draft was also referred to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) on February 14, 2025 for guidance on financial thresholds in case of TPE and TPV, as procuring agencies had expressed serious reservations on low thresholds for TPV/TPE. According to procuring agencies, inclusion of TPV/TPE in the bid evaluation process, that too with low financial thresholds will result in delayed procurement at an extra cost. The procuring agencies also expressed concerns on the involvement of bid evaluators and members of grievance redressal and inspection committees from outside the domain of procuring agencies, as that would complicate the procurement process. In order to address these issues, a consultative meeting was held at the PMO on April 10, 2025 in the presence of the Advisor to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Economic Affairs Division, where some strategic guidelines were suggested to enhance effectiveness of procurement rules and to institutionalize capacity building of procuring agencies through a well-defined competency framework to be developed by PPRA. Another meeting on the subject was again held on May 19, 2025 in the PMO chaired by Minister for EAD, to deliberate upon the financial thresholds of TPV/TPE and issues like independence of grievance redressal and inspection mechanism, rationalization of blacklisting mechanism and definition of mis-procurement. The guidance, so provided by the PMO was incorporated in the new set of draft Public Procurement Rules, 2025. The revised draft of Public Procurement Rules 2025 was placed before the Board for approval in its 96th and 97th meetings held on June 19 and 20, 2025 respectively, where MD (PPRA) once again presented the salient features of the draft Public Procurement Rules 2025 in comparison with PP Rules 2004 and proposed amendments in line with the outcomes of the discussion with all stakeholders. The Board also examined afresh each provision of the draft Public Procurement Rules 2025, the proposed amendments, and deliberated on all aspects of regulatory framework. The Board endorsed the proposed amendments and revisions to the definitions of key terms, including bid, blacklisting, competitive bidding, cross-debarment, ePADS, e-procurement, force account, GRC, and standard bidding documents etc. Further, the Board reviewed and endorsed the proposed adjustments concerning the responsibilities related with Procurement Cells, Bid Evaluation Committees, TPV/TPE, GRC & inspection committees, procurement methods, procurement of second-hand goods, entry into force of the procurement contract, and settlement of disputes, their mechanisms, and timelines. After detailed discussion, the PPRA Board finalized and endorsed new set of Public Procurement Rules 2025, and decided that, pursuant to Section 26 of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, the new set of Public Procurement Rules 2025 should be forwarded to the Cabinet Division for further processing and submission to the Federal Cabinet for final approval. The PPRA Board acknowledged the efforts and hard work of the PPRA Management and appreciated the strategic guidance provided by the PMO in finalizing the new set of Public Procurement Rules, 2025. The Board also appreciated the technical support extended by the World Bank in this regard. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
