Rednote joins wave of Chinese firms releasing open-source AI models
The approach contrasts with many U.S. tech giants like OpenAI and Google, which have kept their most advanced models proprietary, though some American firms including Meta have also released open-source models.
Open sourcing allows Chinese companies to demonstrate their technological capabilities, build developer communities and spread influence globally at a time when the U.S. has sought to stymie China's tech progress with export restrictions on advanced semiconductors.
Rednote's model, called dots.llm1, is available for download on developer platform Hugging Face. A company technical paper describing it was uploaded on Friday.
In coding tasks, the model performs comparably to Alibaba's Qwen 2.5 series, though it trails more advanced models such as DeepSeek-V3, the technical paper said.
RedNote, also known by its Chinese name Xiaohongshu, is an Instagram-like platform where users share photos, videos, text posts and live streams. The platform gained international attention earlier this year when some U.S. users flocked to the app amid concerns over a potential TikTok ban.
The company has invested in large language model development since 2023, not long after OpenAI's release of ChatGPT in late 2022.
It has accelerated its AI efforts in recent months, launching Diandian, an AI-powered search application that helps users find content on Xiaohongshu's main platform.
Other companies that are pursuing an open-source approach include Alibaba which launched Qwen 3, an upgraded version of its model in April.
Earlier this year, startup DeepSeek released its low-cost R1 model as open-source software, shaking up the global AI industry due to its competitive performance despite being developed at a fraction of the cost of Western rivals.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
&w=3840&q=100)
Business Standard
28 minutes ago
- Business Standard
Mines, magnets and Mao: How China built its global rare earth dominance
Rare earth metals were an afterthought for most world leaders until China temporarily suspended most exports of them a couple of months ago. But for almost half a century, they have received attention from the very top of the Chinese government. During his 27-year rule in China, Mao Zedong focused often on increasing how much iron and steel China produced, but seldom on its quality. The result was high production of weak iron and steel that could not meet the needs of the industry. In the late 1940s, metallurgists in Britain and the United States had developed a fairly low-tech way to improve the quality of ductile iron, which is widely used for pipelines, car parts and other applications. The secret? Add a dash of the rare earth cerium to the metal while it is still molten. It was one of the early industrial uses of rare earths. And unlike most kinds of rare earths, cerium was fairly easy to chemically separate from ore. When Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's paramount leader in 1978, he moved quickly to fix the country's iron and steel industry. Deng named a top technocrat, Fang Yi, as a vice premier and also as the director of the powerful State Science and Technology Commission. Fang immediately took top geologists and scientists to Baotou, a city in China's Inner Mongolia that had vast steel mills and the country's largest iron ore mine nearby. Baotou had already made much of the iron and steel for China's tanks and artillery under Mao, but Fang's team made an important decision to extract more than iron from the mine. The city's iron ore deposit was laced with large quantities of so-called light rare earths. These included not just cerium, for ductile iron and for glass manufacturing, but also lanthanum, used in refining oil. The iron ore deposit also held medium rare earths, like samarium. The United States had started using samarium in the 1970s to make the heat-resistant magnets needed for electric motors inside supersonic fighter jets and missiles. 'Rare earths have important application value in steel, ductile iron, glass and ceramics, military industry, electronics and new materials,' Fang declared during his visit to Baotou in 1978, according to an exhibit at the city's museum. At the time, Sino-American relations were improving. Soon after his Baotou visit, Fang took top Chinese engineers to visit America's most advanced factories, including Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas assembly plants near Los Angeles. Rare earth metals are tightly bound together in nature. Prying them apart, particularly the heavier rare earths, requires many rounds of chemical processes and huge quantities of acid. During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union had each developed similar ways to separate rare earths. But their techniques were costly, requiring stainless steel vats and piping as well as expensive nitric acid. China ordered government research institutes to devise a cheaper approach, said Constantine Karayannopoulos, a chemical engineer and former chief executive of several of the largest North American rare earth companies. The Chinese engineers figured out how to separate rare earths using inexpensive plastic and hydrochloric acid instead. The cost advantage, together with weak enforcement of environmental standards, allowed China's rare earth refineries to undercut competitors in the West. Facing increasingly stiff environmental regulations, almost all of the West's refineries closed. Separately, China's geologists discovered that their country held nearly half the world's deposits of rare earths, including rich deposits of heavy rare earths in south-central China, valuable for magnets in cars as well as for medical imaging and other applications. In the 1990s and 2000s, Chinese refinery engineers mastered the task of prying apart heavy rare earths. That gave China an almost total monopoly on heavy rare earth production. 'The Middle East has oil,' Deng said in 1992. 'China has rare earths.' By then, he and Fang had already trained the next leader to guide the country's rare earth industry: a geologist named Wen Jiabao. He had earned a master's degree in rare earth sciences in the late 1960s at the Beijing Institute of Geology, when most of the rest of China was paralyzed during the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Wen went on to become a vice premier in 1998 and then China's premier from 2003 to 2013. During a visit to Europe in 2010, he declared that little happened on rare earth policy in China without his personal involvement.
The Print
30 minutes ago
- The Print
Nirav Modi's brother Nehal held in US on CBI, ED extradition requests; Justice Dept to oppose bail
Nehal, a Belgian national, has been named as an accused in charge sheets filed by both CBI and ED in the bank loan fraud, amounting to an excess of Rs 13,000 crore, which was borrowed fraudulently from the Punjab National Bank. His elder brother Nirav Modi and uncle Mehul Choksi have been named as the prime accused in the case. The Indian agencies have been informed by their American counterparts about the arrest, as well as given assurances from the US Justice Department that his bail plea will be opposed during the next date of hearing in the extradition proceedings. The next hearing is scheduled for 7 July, sources privy to the developments told ThePrint. New Delhi: Authorities in the United States Friday arrested Nehal Modi, brother and alleged co-conspirator of fugitive diamond businessman Nirav Modi, on the request for extradition submitted by India's agencies, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which have been probing the 2018 PNB loan fraud case. Notably, Nirav Modi has been in custody in the United Kingdom since March 2019, on account of pending extradition proceedings, while Mehul Choksi was detained by authorities in Belgium, where his extradition is also pending. Indian agencies managed to obtain a Red Corner Notice against Nehal in July 2019, based on which Interpol requested all its 192 member states to arrest or detain him upon spotting him in their countries, after which extradition or deportation proceedings could begin. In its charge sheet, the CBI has alleged that Nehal Modi attended a meeting with senior managers of the Punjab National Bank on 26 January, 2018, days before the CBI booked Nirav Modi, his family, Choksi, and retired deputy manager of the bank Gokulnath Shetty. Additionally, the agency found in the probe, through statements from individuals associated with Modis' firms, that after the registration of the CBI's case, Nehal Modi took overall control of the various companies' affairs. In the probe, agencies also allegedly found that Nehal Modi directed and facilitated the movement of funds and dummy directors of the firms of Nirav Modi from Dubai to Cairo, in an attempt to avoid arrest or criminal proceedings. He also allegedly instructed those directors to make false statements in the event of arrest by agencies, including claiming that they did not work for Nirav Modi. The ED also highlighted that Nehal allegedly took around 50 kg of gold and AED 3.5 million from a Dubai-based firm, Firestar Diamond FZE, as well as 150 boxes of pearls worth USD 6 million from Hong Kong, following investigations in India. Additionally, the agency alleged he was personally overseeing attempts to erase accounts and records that established the money trail of firms established by his brother, Nirav Modi, and his associates. 'He intimidated witnesses and sent them to Cairo, where their passports were taken over, and they were forced to sign some false papers. He offered a witness Rs 20 lakh for tendering false testimony before the judicial authorities of Europe,' the agency has alleged. (Edited by Viny Mishra) Also read: Rs 22,280 cr black & laundered money recovered, including from Mallya & Nirav Modi, says Sitharaman
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
30 minutes ago
- First Post
Trade, terror and the trust trap: Can India afford a reset with China?
As the Brics+ summit approaches, India's fragile reset with China faces fresh strain amid Chinese support for Pakistan and financial flows that could shape regional stability read more The timing of the Pahalgam attack—during an India-China rapprochement—reignited India's security calculus and raised doubts over whether such diplomatic efforts could be meaningfully sustained. Image: Reuters File On 6–7 July 2025, the expanded Brics+ leaders will convene in Rio de Janeiro; however, the summit's choreography has already been disrupted. Beijing has confirmed that Premier Li Qiang—not President Xi Jinping—will lead the Chinese delegation, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend in person. Xi's absence throws a spotlight on the still-delicate reset that New Delhi and Beijing began in late 2024. Whether the Rio summit can consolidate that tentative détente—or expose its limits—will shape both the tone of the meeting and the broader credibility of Brics as a platform for emerging-power coordination. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Between late 2024, India and China began cautiously resetting their strained relationship, marked by a partial border agreement and a renewed focus on diplomatic and economic engagement. It aimed to de-escalate military tensions stemming from the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash, with both sides agreeing to reduce troop presence at select friction points. This was followed by foreign minister-level talks, working-level dialogues, and backchannel efforts to revive economic ties, under pressure from regional actors to avoid further escalation. Trade and investment re-emerged as key areas of re-engagement, highlighting deep but asymmetric interdependence. Bilateral trade remained high, with Indian imports of Chinese intermediate goods dominating the market, while India's trade deficit with China widened significantly. India's vulnerability to supply chain dependencies has become increasingly evident, particularly in sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and solar equipment. India also voiced its long-standing concerns over limited market access in China. It responded by selectively reopening its economy to targeted Chinese investments, especially in the electronics and infrastructure sectors. However, strategic mistrust persisted. On April 22, 2025, India was struck by a major terrorist attack in Kashmir's Pahalgam, killing 26 civilians. India accused Pakistan-based militants of responsibility and, within two weeks, launched 'Operation Sindoor' on May 7, 2025 – strikes on nine terrorist camps across the Line of Control in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The ceasefire on May 10 ended the immediate violence, but tensions have remained high since then. The timing of the attack—during an India-China rapprochement—reignited India's security calculus and raised doubts over whether such diplomatic efforts could be meaningfully sustained. Blood and Bailouts: Chinese Dollars, Deadly Dividends? Amid the India-Pakistan flare-up, Beijing has been overt in its backing of Islamabad. In a high-profile visit to Beijing in May 2025, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who publicly reaffirmed China's 'ironclad' support for Pakistan's security. China simultaneously urged both sides to dialogue, but its message was clear: Pakistan is a close ally. For New Delhi, this duality—preaching restraint while funding and shielding Pakistan—undermines China's credibility as a stabilising actor. This diplomatic posture reinforces China's 'all-weather' friendship, even as India views Pakistan as a security threat. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD At the United Nations and other forums, China has also shielded Pakistan. For example, a March 2025 report noted that Beijing blocked India's UNSC proposal to sanction five Pakistan-based terrorists, including a key Lashkar-e-Taiba figure, and similarly blocked India's call to designate the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)'s proxy 'The Resistance Front' (behind the Pahalgam attack) as global terrorists. The consistent veto of counter-terror measures at multilateral platforms adds another layer to India's frustration with the international rules-based order. China's economic investment in Pakistan underscores its strategic bond. Beijing is now Pakistan's largest bilateral creditor, with roughly US$29 billion in loans (~22 per cent of Pakistan's external debt). The flagship China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, channels tens of billions more into Pakistani infrastructure; the latest figures top $60 billion in investment commitments. Chinese spending on power plants, railways, and the Gwadar port has become a mainstay of Pakistan's fragile economy. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In key sectors such as energy, logistics, and telecom, Chinese capital has translated into strategic leverage, blurring the lines between commercial partnership and geopolitical patronage. In fact, in February 2025, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's visit to China culminated in new agreements to expand trade and investment, accelerate China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, and deepen security cooperation, including in the areas of technology and education. These developments further anchor the China–Pakistan alliance at a time of rising India–Pakistan tensions. Subsidising Instability: IMF, Investments, and Islamabad's Asymmetry Pakistan's stability now depends heavily on Chinese financing and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts more than ever. This pattern of external financing is not limited to China. Just a day before the Pahalgam ceasefire, the IMF approved a $2.4 billion bailout for Pakistan—$1 billion under the Extended Fund Facility and $1.4 billion via its climate-focused Resilience and Sustainability Trust. While framed as support for macroeconomic stability and climate resilience, the timing raised serious questions in India. It reinforced a perception that Pakistan, despite its sponsorship of terrorism, continues to receive lifelines from global institutions without accountability or behavioural change. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The sequence—from terror attack to retaliatory strikes and then IMF disbursement—seemed to reward belligerence rather than deter it. Critics argue that even if the IMF or Chinese funds are not directly used for military purposes, they ease budgetary pressure and free up resources that could be redirected toward defence and potentially militant infrastructure - in 2025, Pakistan's defence budget was set to rise by 18 per cent, even as it secured international financial support ostensibly for economic recovery. The IMF's long-standing technical neutrality in its engagements with Pakistan has become increasingly controversial. Despite 24 bailouts since 1958, meaningful reform remains elusive, mainly due to entrenched elite resistance, military dominance, and weak civilian oversight. Repeated IMF programmes have focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, while structural dysfunction has been left unaddressed. For India, the implications are grave: international financial institutions may be inadvertently subsidising a security threat. Pakistan's chronic crisis-response cycle—backed by both Chinese investment and Western liquidity—has not reduced its reliance on strategic proxies, but instead, risks sustaining them under the guise of economic stabilisation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Finally, Brics+ risks mirroring South Asia's own 'weaponised-bailout' paradox, where development rhetoric co-exists with permissive financing that enables destabilising proxies. The convergence of capital, conflict, and geopolitics in South Asia presents a dangerous paradox. As Pakistan leverages its strategic location to court both Chinese money and Western aid, India faces an increasingly asymmetric security landscape—one where conventional deterrence is undermined by financial impunity. The author is a research fellow at Observer Research Foundation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
