Other factors at play besides atomic bombs

Budapest Times

05-04-2025

History's simple telling is that the United States unleashed the two most lethal weapons of World War Two or any other war against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to quickly force a surrender by a stubborn enemy and save thousands of American lives. Historian Richard Overy takes a wider view that questions this mostly accepted narrative.
Under his scrutiny, the easy equation that 'bombing equals surrender' is no longer viable. The author rethinks the way this final stage of the war and the role of the bombs should be regarded. This standard conclusion about the bombing must be set in the broader context of what was happening in Japan in the months before surrender.
Overy's case is that there was already a long struggle within the country during 1945 to find a way to end the war, and this suggests an alternative account beyond the impact of America's 'rain of ruin'. B-29 aircraft had firebombed Tokyo and other cities considerably before the atomic attacks against Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 then Nagasaki three days later.
For the leadership of Japan the idea of unconditional surrender was a cultural leap too difficult to make, and Overy cites persistent divisions among the decision makers whether to terminate the war or fight to an annihilating finish. These were disagreements exceedingly difficult to reconcile even when faced with the reality of aerial destruction.
Japan had made a surprise attack on the United States naval base Pearl Harbor on Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, bringing the neutral US into the Second World War. At that time the US had no air bases near enough to Japan or an aircraft with sufficient range to target the country. When a handful of bombers launched from an aircraft carrier against Tokyo on April 18, 1942, it was a token gesture.
By May 1943 the US began to work on a conventional bombing campaign from bases in China, with the hope that this would switch to attacks from island bases captured in the Pacific. The targets included 'industrial and urban areas', with war production craft shops in and among private homes, and this opened the way to the huge urban destruction of 1945.
The large-scale damage to civilian areas through conventional incendiary bombing was contrary to previous US air force doctrine, and a prevailing view among crews was that it was neither morallíy nor strategically sensible. The M-69 incendiary had a napalm filling. But the strategy made it easier to cross the threshold of atomic bombing later on.
The Army Air Force, as it was then, made a decisive contribution to victory over Japan, and post-war the role of this air offensive would be debated. One supposition was, that the bombing by the Army Air Force would help it claim independence by matching the efforts made by the US Army in South-East Asia and the US Navy across the Pacific.
Meanwhile, in December 1941 President Roosevelt agreed to an American research project into the possibility of an atomic bomb, then in June 1942 approved its creation. The Potsdam Declaration was an ultimatum by the US, Great Britain and China on July 26, 1945 calling for the unconditional surrender of Japan, but capitulation had no precedent in the country.
For thousands of years Japan had not been invaded: in the wars against China in the 1890s, with Tsarist Russia in 1904-05, and against Germany in the Great War of 1914-1918, Japan had been victorious. The country's expectation with the long war against China that began in 1937, then against the British Empire, the US and the Netherlands from 1941, was 'certain victory' ( hissö ). Thus surrender in this culture was a foreign concept and talk of it was forbidden. Capitulation had no precedent and to achieve it required a political process centred on Emperor Hirohito, who was considered a divinity, and his willingness to give his 'sacred decision' ( seidan ), with all its constitutional complexities.
The firebombing continued unabated until August 14-15 and had been a central reference point from the early summer for those who sought peace, including the Emperor, 'precisely because it intensified the looming social crisis through evacuation, dispersal, and physical destruction and exposed the feebleness of the Japanese armed forces in response', Overy writes. The author is Honorary Research Professor at the University of Exeter in England.
He says the impact on the Japanese leadership of the two atomic attacks was less direct and less significant than US President Harry Truman (and most later historians) assumed. The bombs together destroyed only 5 per cent of the urban area, and conventional bombing the remaining 95 per cent. Eight of 25 raids caused more destruction than Hiroshima.
Bombing raids still hit Toyama, Fukuyama and Yawara with devastating effect and degrees of urban decimation outweighing Hiroshima. At first, then, the bomb on the city was regarded as just an extension of this campaign, and early news in from there was slow.
Also, the Soviet Red Army had invaded Manchuria, sparking fear in Japan of communism and anxiety about social stability. Failure in the ground war also contributed to the country's final decision, following the loss of Okinawa, the fifth-largest island, and the threatened invasion of the southern homeland, with a poor level of defensive preparation. Another factor was to try to preserve Japan's national polity ( kokutai ) from Allied elimination. Such factors may be overlooked when explaining Hirohito's 'sacred decision' to surrender on August 15.
Overy looks at the way in which the willingness to kill civilians and destroy cities became normalised as moral concerns were blunted. Scientists, airmen and politiicians followed a strategy of mass destruction they would never have endorsed before the war began.
He expands what is often an American narrative, thanks to scholarship that has made the Japanese side of the story a lot better known now than a generation ago. This aspect is integrated as fully as possible in discussing both kinds of bombing and their effects on the leadership and population: 'Understanding the Japanese view of surrender shows why it was so difficult to achieve – indeed it was never called a surrender but 'termination of the war'.'
The author notes the cultural differences at play between the Allies and Japanese. At that time, Japanese culture was based on worship of the emperor, who was regarded as the father of his people and a living god. All military personnel, for example, had an obligation to die to defend the emperor. Yet death was not the end; rather, the dead became enshrined 'warrior-gods' ( gunshin ). And when Japan didn't give up right away after the bombing, it was thought by the Allies that the people were fanatics who would rather die than surrender.
The truth was that there were already many divisions in the country: the military argued over strategy, and army factions over the economy. Conflict brewed between the elite who sought peace and the military leadership that wanted to fight on. While the emperor was the supreme sovereign, most decisions were made by the cabinet and the military high-ups.
From the American perspective, the widely held view has remained that the huge number of deaths of Japanese citizens was worthwhile. The bombing was both necessary and legitimate, precluding a bloody invasion. President Harry S. Truman said that saving a quarter of a million young American lives 'was worth a couple of Japanese cities'.
Overy covers diplomatic and cultural factors as well as military decisions, with the latest scholarship to better understand the historical, political and philosophical aspects of events.