UBS beats expectations with $2.4bln second-quarter profit
Net profit attributable to shareholders for Switzerland's largest bank came in at $2.4 billion, comfortably ahead of a company-provided consensus estimate of $2.045 billion.
In its investment banking division, revenues for global markets surged 25% during a quarter when trading cues were focused on ructions caused by U.S. President Donald Trump's tariff war. At the same time, transaction-based income for its global wealth management division rose 12%.
Integration of its one-time rival Credit Suisse remained on track, UBS said in a statement, with one-third of client accounts booked in Switzerland migrated. Cumulative cost reductions reached $9.1 billion, or 70% of expected gross cost savings, it added.
UBS was delivering on its capital return plans for 2025 and continued accruing for double-digit growth in its dividend, the bank said.
It is reporting earnings for the first time since the Swiss government proposed in June stricter rules for the country's remaining big bank.
UBS has said it strongly disagrees with what it calls an "extreme increase" in proposed capital requirements to cover risks in its foreign operations and which could mean it would need to hold around $24 billion in additional CET1 capital.
(Reporting by Ariane Luthi; Editing by Edwina Gibbs)
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