Complacency led to Navy landing craft collision that injured 36, investigation finds
Yahoo3 days ago
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Just after 10:15 p.m. on May 1, 2024, LCAC 84 was full of bored and irritated Marines and sailors. Nine minutes later, it would be deflated and destroyed.
The hulking inflatable landing craft — the acronym stands for Landing Craft, Air Cushion — had been dispatched from the deck of the amphibious assault ship USS New York that evening full of passengers bound for the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, also sailing off the coast of Florida. One passenger had somebody else's long fishing pole wedged between his knees; a deck engineer complained of an unpleasant smell in the cabin and hunted for a bottle of Febreze. The banter continued until 10:24, when an engineer reported seeing the green running light of LCAC 70, a hovercraft from the Wasp headed the opposite direction in what was planned to be a port-to-port passage.
'They are coming right at us, dude,' the engineer said, according to a black box recording. Five seconds later, the transports collided head-on at more than 50 knots, or 57 miles per hour. Three dozen Marines and sailors in both LCACs sustained lacerations, broken bones, and traumatic brain injuries; chained-down vehicles were flung onto their sides and the crafts themselves sustained some $48 million in damage.
A command investigation obtained by Task and Purpose via a Freedom of Information Act request attributed the head-on collision to human error, finding it was the result of 'a breakdown of basic mariner skills and failure to follow the rules of the road.' Roles were improperly assigned and unclear, while training was inadequate, officials found. Perhaps most damningly, reports showed that vehicle crewmembers told passengers they didn't have to wear their seatbelts and protective gear, an instruction that investigators found exacerbated the resulting injuries. What remains unclear is how the Navy has specifically addressed the underlying problems that led to a mystifyingly avoidable disaster.
In response to queries from Task and Purpose, Lt. Cmdr. David Carter, a spokesman for U.S. Fleet Forces Command, said that Adm. Daryl Caudle, the commander of Fleet Forces, had 'endorsed all 42 recommendations [from the report], which are in the process of being implemented by the respective commands.'
A photo of LCAC 84, following the collision from the investigation into the mishap. Image via the Navy.
Though no one died in the nighttime collision, the lack of effective communication and the confusion and shock that preceded the impact all echo the 2017 collisions of the Navy destroyers USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain with merchant vessels. The two incidents claimed the lives of 17 crew members and prompted a comprehensive review of the entire surface Navy that found undermanning, fatigue and insufficient training were widespread.
'Significant failures' across echelons of leadership in the Wasp Amphibious Ready Group 'are indicative of larger cultural shortfalls within the amphibious community,' a 1,470-page investigation completed by Rear Adm. Paul Lanzilotta, commander of the Navy's Carrier Strike Group 12, found. The 'patterns of failure' include manning shortfalls, gaps in operating doctrine, ineffective command and control and improper assumption of risk.
'These patterns indicate that the Navy has not implemented effective solutions to address root causes,' investigators concluded.
The investigation further excoriated a 'culture of noncompliance and lack of discipline' among both LCAC crews, citing low knowledge levels, missing radio discipline, and failures to identify and mitigate risk.' These factors directly contributed to the mishap, the investigation found.
Investigators also warned that as the Navy's LCAC program was transitioning from the legacy hovercraft to the replacement LCAC 100, with some crews already piloting the new craft as training curriculum lagged behind, risk was 'significantly elevated' and the possibility of another collision was more likely.
According to the investigation report, the two 87-foot landing craft had been set to carry out a passenger, mail and cargo transfer between the two warships the evening of May 1. The mission was briefed that afternoon, and about three hours before the LCAC operation was set to begin, the Wasp and the New York set Condition 1A, indicating the highest state of ship operational readiness. LCAC 84 left the well deck of the Wasp with 15 crew and passengers aboard just after 8 p.m. LCAC 70 departed the New York about 20 minutes later with 27 personnel aboard. Due to aircraft operations on the flight deck of the Wasp, LCAC 70 wasn't able to enter its well deck right away to unload passengers. Instead, it waited in the water near the ship for around 50 minutes as flight ops continued.
A Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in the Bay of Bengal on April 8, 2025. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Caroline H. Lui.
An additional hovercraft from the New York, LCAC 89, was supposed to conduct its own passenger transfer, but had mechanical issues. LCAC 84 was ordered to proceed to the New York to pick up the passengers the down landing craft couldn't carry. While crew members told investigators mission re-taskings like this were not uncommon, communication over the change was unclear and caused some confusion. The first passenger transfer was uneventful, with both LCACs entering the ships' well decks just before 10 p.m. and offloading passengers. But tasking changes for a second transfer were starting to cause stress. LCAC 70's crew found it was getting a new group of passengers to bring back to the New York, even though this change had not been fully briefed or acknowledged, and key commanders had not approved the change.
Both LCACs departed their ships' well decks on a return journey at 10:13 p.m., each with 19 personnel aboard. The night was dark, and LCAC 70's windshield wipers weren't working. The two hovercraft were in communication, but both started playing music and using internal comms for 'playful banter' back and forth. They also made 'pejorative comments' about LCAC 89's crew for being inoperable due to a broken bow thruster.
At 10:15 p.m., nine minutes before the collision, LCAC 70's loadmaster identified an object off the craft's bow. The LCAC's navigator acknowledged the report sarcastically, according to a transcript of recorder data.
'Yeah, it's the ship. Good job,' the navigator responded.
The engineer told the navigator not to dismiss the loadmaster, calling his tone 'very condescending.'
The loadmaster got the distance wrong, saying the Wasp was eight miles away when it was actually 12, but the navigator didn't mention it, investigators found. The loadmaster told investigators he was often told he 'provided too many contact reports' in his job as a lookout.
Six minutes before the collision, LCAC 70's navigator reported that the two craft were going to pass each other at their starboard, or right-hand, sides. Key information, like bearing, range, and passing distance, was never transmitted. LCAC 84's navigator also clocked the other craft around the same time, but didn't communicate to its crew. At 10:22, with two minutes to collision, the navigator told his craftmaster that it looked like the two LCACs were going to pass within 1,000 yards of each other, but did not report bearing and range.
With a minute to go until collision, the navigator communicated to LCAC 70 a casual message that investigators think may have been an inside joke: 'We will meet you on the twos for a little port to port.'
'See ya on the twos!' an unknown crew member from one of the LCACs responded.
At 10:24, the crews of both LCACs spotted the other craft and realized a collision was imminent. LCAC 84's loadmaster saw a white masthead light and froze in shock, failing to make a report. LCAC 70's navigator told the craftmaster to 'break right,' but didn't explain what he was seeing, causing confusion. Neither vessel reduced its speed.
Onboard recorders captured the terror of the final seconds before impact.
'Go, go, go, go, go, go, left,' LCAC 70's navigator or engineer says. 'Go left!'
A final message, from the craft master or navigator, is cut off.
'Guys, brace, brace for s…'
The high-speed collision threw passengers around the cabins of both crafts. Loose gear, including fire extinguishers, caused head injuries. The worst-injured had skull and facial fractures; four had to be medically evacuated from their ships. Search-and-rescue crews retrieved the injured personnel from the water, and the two LCACs were at least temporarily abandoned. It was the worst LCAC mishap since the vessels entered service in 1986.
While training for LCAC crew members is rigorous — the senior navigator for all LCACs told investigators that the attrition rate for navigator training is the second-highest in the Navy, after SEAL training at BUD/S — a source close to the investigation told Task and Purpose the LCAC community itself was not subject to the same standards as the rest of the surface fleet. The source, who declined to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly, pointed out that the landing crafts are crewed entirely by enlisted personnel, and craftmaster qualification training does not resemble the rigor of Officer on Duty training for ships.
'Each craft seems to have developed a 'microclimate' based on the individual in charge,' the source said.
Beyond evidence of what Navy Surface Force Atlantic Commander Rear Adm. Joseph Cahill called a 'complacent and unprofessional attitude' in his sign-off of the report, the LCAC community was found to be dogged by familiar issues: budget shortfalls, undermanning, and exhaustion.
Crew members reported that inoperable windshield wipers were common on the aging craft. Seatbelts were tangled, some were tied behind benches and inaccessible. Only 37% of seats were fully operational across Assault Craft Unit 4, the parent command for the two LCACs involved in the collision, the investigation found. More broadly, witnesses told the investigators that funding for spare parts was lacking.
Post-collision images of LCAC 70, left, and LCAC 84, right, taken from the Navy's investigation into the mishap. Images via the Navy.
Manning was also recognized as a major problem throughout the LCAC community. While the LCACs had full crews, several watchstanders aboard the New York were performing multiple duties due to manning shortfalls and the Wasp was short on personnel to man the boat control team and watch stations, which direct, track, and provide lookout for LCACs from the ship.
'Boat control team manning aboard ships is not sufficient to support shipboard rest policies,' the investigation found.
Fatigue seemed to be a problem within the landing craft as well. While LCAC crews told investigators they'd gotten sufficient rest before their mission, cabin recorders picked up one navigator complaining of exhaustion and empty energy drink cans were found scattered in one of the craft's forward compartments.
Training also came up short of expectations, particularly on use of systems like the Amphibious Assault Direction System, a kind of Blue Force Tracker that can help craft operators spot 'contacts' in the surrounding waters.
Finally, the unexpected re-tasking of the two LCACs after their first personnel transport missions the night of May 1 was found to be a causal issue in the crash, with shortfalls in communication, expertise, and proper risk assessment all contributing to the disastrous outcome.
'Leadership failing to recognize the accumulated risk is a natural product of the system structure,' investigators wrote.
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When the command investigation into the mishap was receiving final endorsements in November 2024, certain corrective actions were already taking place, including a 90-day review of the culture within Assault Craft Unit 4, and unspecified 'interim corrective actions to shape the culture.'
Carter, the Fleet Forces Command spokesman, said the 90-day review was completed in June, and follow-on questions and commentary for Naval Beach Group Two, the parent unit of Assault Craft Unit 4, 'are currently being reviewed.'
The implementation status of the 42 recommendations to come from the report, covering improvements to training, instruction on the rules of the road at sea, watchbills, and LCAC manning, are unclear.
Leadership of Assault Craft Unit 4 'have addressed cultural and operational issues through afloat cultural workshops, training critiques, and safety procedure reviews and initiatives,' Carter said.
The investigation called for a host of administrative and disciplinary actions, including administrative action for the commanding officers of the Wasp for failure to execute LCAC briefings by the book and the New York for failure to institute the correct watch bill. The leaders for the LCAC units were also faulted for failures of oversight and for re-tasking the landing craft in violation of policy. No senior officers appear to have lost their jobs over the disaster, though. The commanding officers of both amphibious assault ships transitioned out in standard passage of command ceremonies in January. The commander of Assault Craft Unit 4 retired in May.
The navigators for LC70 and LC84 and a craftmaster with LC70 were recommended for discipline or administrative action due to dereliction of duty, and the crewmembers of both crafts were cited for not wearing seatbelts or helmets as required.
Carter said all personnel actions had been completed and the Navy would not comment further on personnel matters.
The source close to the investigation suggested that the collision of the LCACs could be grounds for another 'CR moment,' referring to the Navy's comprehensive review.
But, they said, with individual mishaps and investigations that take months to complete, it's hard to keep attention on the problems.
'End result is that people forget and move on,' the source said. 'Nobody connects the dots.'
Yahoo is using AI to generate takeaways from this article. This means the info may not always match what's in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience.
Yahoo is using AI to generate takeaways from this article. This means the info may not always match what's in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience. Generate Key Takeaways
Just after 10:15 p.m. on May 1, 2024, LCAC 84 was full of bored and irritated Marines and sailors. Nine minutes later, it would be deflated and destroyed.
The hulking inflatable landing craft — the acronym stands for Landing Craft, Air Cushion — had been dispatched from the deck of the amphibious assault ship USS New York that evening full of passengers bound for the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, also sailing off the coast of Florida. One passenger had somebody else's long fishing pole wedged between his knees; a deck engineer complained of an unpleasant smell in the cabin and hunted for a bottle of Febreze. The banter continued until 10:24, when an engineer reported seeing the green running light of LCAC 70, a hovercraft from the Wasp headed the opposite direction in what was planned to be a port-to-port passage.
'They are coming right at us, dude,' the engineer said, according to a black box recording. Five seconds later, the transports collided head-on at more than 50 knots, or 57 miles per hour. Three dozen Marines and sailors in both LCACs sustained lacerations, broken bones, and traumatic brain injuries; chained-down vehicles were flung onto their sides and the crafts themselves sustained some $48 million in damage.
A command investigation obtained by Task and Purpose via a Freedom of Information Act request attributed the head-on collision to human error, finding it was the result of 'a breakdown of basic mariner skills and failure to follow the rules of the road.' Roles were improperly assigned and unclear, while training was inadequate, officials found. Perhaps most damningly, reports showed that vehicle crewmembers told passengers they didn't have to wear their seatbelts and protective gear, an instruction that investigators found exacerbated the resulting injuries. What remains unclear is how the Navy has specifically addressed the underlying problems that led to a mystifyingly avoidable disaster.
In response to queries from Task and Purpose, Lt. Cmdr. David Carter, a spokesman for U.S. Fleet Forces Command, said that Adm. Daryl Caudle, the commander of Fleet Forces, had 'endorsed all 42 recommendations [from the report], which are in the process of being implemented by the respective commands.'
A photo of LCAC 84, following the collision from the investigation into the mishap. Image via the Navy.
Though no one died in the nighttime collision, the lack of effective communication and the confusion and shock that preceded the impact all echo the 2017 collisions of the Navy destroyers USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain with merchant vessels. The two incidents claimed the lives of 17 crew members and prompted a comprehensive review of the entire surface Navy that found undermanning, fatigue and insufficient training were widespread.
'Significant failures' across echelons of leadership in the Wasp Amphibious Ready Group 'are indicative of larger cultural shortfalls within the amphibious community,' a 1,470-page investigation completed by Rear Adm. Paul Lanzilotta, commander of the Navy's Carrier Strike Group 12, found. The 'patterns of failure' include manning shortfalls, gaps in operating doctrine, ineffective command and control and improper assumption of risk.
'These patterns indicate that the Navy has not implemented effective solutions to address root causes,' investigators concluded.
The investigation further excoriated a 'culture of noncompliance and lack of discipline' among both LCAC crews, citing low knowledge levels, missing radio discipline, and failures to identify and mitigate risk.' These factors directly contributed to the mishap, the investigation found.
Investigators also warned that as the Navy's LCAC program was transitioning from the legacy hovercraft to the replacement LCAC 100, with some crews already piloting the new craft as training curriculum lagged behind, risk was 'significantly elevated' and the possibility of another collision was more likely.
According to the investigation report, the two 87-foot landing craft had been set to carry out a passenger, mail and cargo transfer between the two warships the evening of May 1. The mission was briefed that afternoon, and about three hours before the LCAC operation was set to begin, the Wasp and the New York set Condition 1A, indicating the highest state of ship operational readiness. LCAC 84 left the well deck of the Wasp with 15 crew and passengers aboard just after 8 p.m. LCAC 70 departed the New York about 20 minutes later with 27 personnel aboard. Due to aircraft operations on the flight deck of the Wasp, LCAC 70 wasn't able to enter its well deck right away to unload passengers. Instead, it waited in the water near the ship for around 50 minutes as flight ops continued.
A Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in the Bay of Bengal on April 8, 2025. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Caroline H. Lui.
An additional hovercraft from the New York, LCAC 89, was supposed to conduct its own passenger transfer, but had mechanical issues. LCAC 84 was ordered to proceed to the New York to pick up the passengers the down landing craft couldn't carry. While crew members told investigators mission re-taskings like this were not uncommon, communication over the change was unclear and caused some confusion. The first passenger transfer was uneventful, with both LCACs entering the ships' well decks just before 10 p.m. and offloading passengers. But tasking changes for a second transfer were starting to cause stress. LCAC 70's crew found it was getting a new group of passengers to bring back to the New York, even though this change had not been fully briefed or acknowledged, and key commanders had not approved the change.
Both LCACs departed their ships' well decks on a return journey at 10:13 p.m., each with 19 personnel aboard. The night was dark, and LCAC 70's windshield wipers weren't working. The two hovercraft were in communication, but both started playing music and using internal comms for 'playful banter' back and forth. They also made 'pejorative comments' about LCAC 89's crew for being inoperable due to a broken bow thruster.
At 10:15 p.m., nine minutes before the collision, LCAC 70's loadmaster identified an object off the craft's bow. The LCAC's navigator acknowledged the report sarcastically, according to a transcript of recorder data.
'Yeah, it's the ship. Good job,' the navigator responded.
The engineer told the navigator not to dismiss the loadmaster, calling his tone 'very condescending.'
The loadmaster got the distance wrong, saying the Wasp was eight miles away when it was actually 12, but the navigator didn't mention it, investigators found. The loadmaster told investigators he was often told he 'provided too many contact reports' in his job as a lookout.
Six minutes before the collision, LCAC 70's navigator reported that the two craft were going to pass each other at their starboard, or right-hand, sides. Key information, like bearing, range, and passing distance, was never transmitted. LCAC 84's navigator also clocked the other craft around the same time, but didn't communicate to its crew. At 10:22, with two minutes to collision, the navigator told his craftmaster that it looked like the two LCACs were going to pass within 1,000 yards of each other, but did not report bearing and range.
With a minute to go until collision, the navigator communicated to LCAC 70 a casual message that investigators think may have been an inside joke: 'We will meet you on the twos for a little port to port.'
'See ya on the twos!' an unknown crew member from one of the LCACs responded.
At 10:24, the crews of both LCACs spotted the other craft and realized a collision was imminent. LCAC 84's loadmaster saw a white masthead light and froze in shock, failing to make a report. LCAC 70's navigator told the craftmaster to 'break right,' but didn't explain what he was seeing, causing confusion. Neither vessel reduced its speed.
Onboard recorders captured the terror of the final seconds before impact.
'Go, go, go, go, go, go, left,' LCAC 70's navigator or engineer says. 'Go left!'
A final message, from the craft master or navigator, is cut off.
'Guys, brace, brace for s…'
The high-speed collision threw passengers around the cabins of both crafts. Loose gear, including fire extinguishers, caused head injuries. The worst-injured had skull and facial fractures; four had to be medically evacuated from their ships. Search-and-rescue crews retrieved the injured personnel from the water, and the two LCACs were at least temporarily abandoned. It was the worst LCAC mishap since the vessels entered service in 1986.
While training for LCAC crew members is rigorous — the senior navigator for all LCACs told investigators that the attrition rate for navigator training is the second-highest in the Navy, after SEAL training at BUD/S — a source close to the investigation told Task and Purpose the LCAC community itself was not subject to the same standards as the rest of the surface fleet. The source, who declined to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly, pointed out that the landing crafts are crewed entirely by enlisted personnel, and craftmaster qualification training does not resemble the rigor of Officer on Duty training for ships.
'Each craft seems to have developed a 'microclimate' based on the individual in charge,' the source said.
Beyond evidence of what Navy Surface Force Atlantic Commander Rear Adm. Joseph Cahill called a 'complacent and unprofessional attitude' in his sign-off of the report, the LCAC community was found to be dogged by familiar issues: budget shortfalls, undermanning, and exhaustion.
Crew members reported that inoperable windshield wipers were common on the aging craft. Seatbelts were tangled, some were tied behind benches and inaccessible. Only 37% of seats were fully operational across Assault Craft Unit 4, the parent command for the two LCACs involved in the collision, the investigation found. More broadly, witnesses told the investigators that funding for spare parts was lacking.
Post-collision images of LCAC 70, left, and LCAC 84, right, taken from the Navy's investigation into the mishap. Images via the Navy.
Manning was also recognized as a major problem throughout the LCAC community. While the LCACs had full crews, several watchstanders aboard the New York were performing multiple duties due to manning shortfalls and the Wasp was short on personnel to man the boat control team and watch stations, which direct, track, and provide lookout for LCACs from the ship.
'Boat control team manning aboard ships is not sufficient to support shipboard rest policies,' the investigation found.
Fatigue seemed to be a problem within the landing craft as well. While LCAC crews told investigators they'd gotten sufficient rest before their mission, cabin recorders picked up one navigator complaining of exhaustion and empty energy drink cans were found scattered in one of the craft's forward compartments.
Training also came up short of expectations, particularly on use of systems like the Amphibious Assault Direction System, a kind of Blue Force Tracker that can help craft operators spot 'contacts' in the surrounding waters.
Finally, the unexpected re-tasking of the two LCACs after their first personnel transport missions the night of May 1 was found to be a causal issue in the crash, with shortfalls in communication, expertise, and proper risk assessment all contributing to the disastrous outcome.
'Leadership failing to recognize the accumulated risk is a natural product of the system structure,' investigators wrote.
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When the command investigation into the mishap was receiving final endorsements in November 2024, certain corrective actions were already taking place, including a 90-day review of the culture within Assault Craft Unit 4, and unspecified 'interim corrective actions to shape the culture.'
Carter, the Fleet Forces Command spokesman, said the 90-day review was completed in June, and follow-on questions and commentary for Naval Beach Group Two, the parent unit of Assault Craft Unit 4, 'are currently being reviewed.'
The implementation status of the 42 recommendations to come from the report, covering improvements to training, instruction on the rules of the road at sea, watchbills, and LCAC manning, are unclear.
Leadership of Assault Craft Unit 4 'have addressed cultural and operational issues through afloat cultural workshops, training critiques, and safety procedure reviews and initiatives,' Carter said.
The investigation called for a host of administrative and disciplinary actions, including administrative action for the commanding officers of the Wasp for failure to execute LCAC briefings by the book and the New York for failure to institute the correct watch bill. The leaders for the LCAC units were also faulted for failures of oversight and for re-tasking the landing craft in violation of policy. No senior officers appear to have lost their jobs over the disaster, though. The commanding officers of both amphibious assault ships transitioned out in standard passage of command ceremonies in January. The commander of Assault Craft Unit 4 retired in May.
The navigators for LC70 and LC84 and a craftmaster with LC70 were recommended for discipline or administrative action due to dereliction of duty, and the crewmembers of both crafts were cited for not wearing seatbelts or helmets as required.
Carter said all personnel actions had been completed and the Navy would not comment further on personnel matters.
The source close to the investigation suggested that the collision of the LCACs could be grounds for another 'CR moment,' referring to the Navy's comprehensive review.
But, they said, with individual mishaps and investigations that take months to complete, it's hard to keep attention on the problems.
'End result is that people forget and move on,' the source said. 'Nobody connects the dots.'
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