China develops new high-protein corn to replace foreign soybeans
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China has been forced to import soybeans in huge quantities in recent years to fuel its expanding livestock industry, as Chinese consumers
adopt an increasingly meat and dairy-heavy diet
Beijing sees the growing dependence on foreign agricultural products as a threat to the nation's food security, as well as a potential issue of contention amid an intensifying trade war with the United States.
Developing higher-protein corn to replace soybeans in animal feed is seen as a potential solution, and researchers at China's Huazhong Agricultural University have already developed several promising varieties, according to the university's president.
Given China's vast corn production, an improvement of just one percentage point in the protein content of the grain could reduce China's demand for foreign soybeans by up to 8 million tonnes, Yan Jianbing, Huazhong's president, told reporters during last week's '
two sessions ' – the annual meeting of China's top legislative and consultative bodies.
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China has been placing increasing emphasis on food security amid a rise in geopolitical tensions and uncertainties in the international market.
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AllAfrica
24 minutes ago
- AllAfrica
Vietnam should heed the risks of high-speed rail losses
As Vietnam embarks on building its first high-speed rail (HSR) system, the financial struggles and failures of similar projects worldwide offer important lessons and insights. While Vietnam has only recently moved toward implementation, many countries have operated advanced HSR systems for decades. The experiences of these early adopters provide a valuable roadmap of potential pitfalls to avoid. The financial unsustainability of high-speed rail is a global phenomenon. According to the OECD, most HSR projects worldwide operate at a loss. This is supported by a World Bank study of 258 transport infrastructure projects across 20 countries, which found that nine out of ten exceeded their initial budgets and 84% had inaccurate revenue forecasts. The study's author, Professor Bent Flyvbjerg, noted that a mere 0.5% of all projects were completed on time, within budget and delivered their anticipated benefits, often because governments rushed approval before conducting thorough feasibility studies. Even the most celebrated HSR systems are not immune. Japan's Shinkansen, the pioneer of high-speed rail, required the government to cover nearly 100% of its 380 billion yen construction cost (roughly US$17 billion today) and had lost around $100 million by 1972. Similarly, China operates the world's most extensive HSR network but faces mounting debt nearing $900 billion, with only 6% of its 45,000-kilometer network reportedly profitable. More recent projects highlight specific modern challenges. Indonesia's Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail, a joint project with China, saw its budget balloon from $5.5 billion to $7.3 billion. Reliant on Chinese loans, the line was already reporting $200 million in annual losses upon opening in 2024. In Taiwan, a $15 billion HSR project launched in 2007 suffered continuous losses for years, with deficits reaching $1.73 billion by 2014. This was largely due to fierce competition from low-cost airlines and passenger volumes falling to nearly half of projections. These cases underscore the importance of cautious planning, realistic financial projections and a thorough assessment of long-term viability. Failure to account for these factors can lead to HSR projects becoming unsustainable financial burdens. Profitability and capital recovery time of global high-speed railway projects. Graphic: The Vietnamese / Luat Khoa Magazine Vietnam need not look abroad for cautionary tales; its own domestic urban rail projects have already suffered from the same issues plaguing HSR globally. Both the Cat Linh–Ha Dong line in Hanoi and Metro Line 1 in Ho Chi Minh City have been marred by severe cost overruns, prolonged delays and continue to operate at a loss. What is particularly concerning is that these are relatively modest urban projects, far less complex than the proposed North–South HSR system. The Cat Linh–Ha Dong line serves as a stark case study. Contracted to a Chinese builder, its budget ballooned from an initial $552.8 million to $886 million. The construction timeline stretched to nearly 10 years (2011–2021) for a railway that runs only 13 kilometers at a top speed of 80 km/h. Financially, the project is unsustainable. In 2024, it reported a post-tax profit of just $600,000—a mere 0.07% return on the original investment—and remains dependent on heavy government subsidies. Current estimates suggest a staggering 6:1 subsidy ratio, meaning for every $1 in ticket revenue, the government provides $6 in support. The financial unsustainability of the Cat Linh–Ha Dong project is apparent. Based on ticket revenue alone, the line would need 247 years to recover its $886 million investment. Factoring in its 2024 net profit of just $600,000, the payback period stretches to an astonishing 1,438 years. This calculation does not even account for its annual operating cost of over $24 million. Despite this sobering precedent, Vietnam is now undertaking its largest-ever public investment: the North–South High-Speed Railway. Approved by the 15th National Assembly in November 2024, with a budget of $67.34 billion for a 1,541-kilomater route, the project's projected cost has already increased by over $35 billion from its initial concept. To mitigate the immense financial risk, the government is shifting its strategy. A revised Law on Railways, along with new resolutions, now allows domestic enterprises to participate as primary investors. 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Despite all these unanswered questions, planning deficits and alarming cost projections, irreversible actions like land clearance and resident relocation are already underway in many provinces. Graphic: The Vietnamese / Luat Khoa Magazine The HSR era began in October 1964 with Japan's Tokaido Shinkansen, a project that laid the groundwork for a global wave of HSR development. Yet, in the decades since, only one project is widely regarded as a true financial success: the Train a Grande Vitesse (TGV) line connecting Paris and Lyon in France. Inaugurated in 1981, the Paris-Lyon TGV was built for a then-record low of just $4 million per kilometer for a total length of 417 kilometers, and was financed without direct government subsidies. This technical and commercial success was proven almost immediately. The line transported 10 million passengers in its first year, a number that quickly doubled, leading to an internal rate of return (IRR) of 12%—allowing the project to recover its initial investment in just 12 years. This success has endured to this day. By 2023, the TGV network carried 122 million passengers and generated 9.7 billion euros in revenue (approximately $11.3 billion), solidifying its status as one of the few HSR models in the world to achieve long-term commercial viability. This article was published in English by The Vietnamese and originally published in Vietnamese by Luat Khoa Magazine. It is republished here with kind permission.
HKFP
3 hours ago
- HKFP
Far-right German lawmaker's ex-aide on trial for spying for China
A German court will on Tuesday launch the trial of two suspected spies for China, one of whom worked as an assistant to the far-right lawmaker Maximilian Krah. The German national, partially identified as Jian G., allegedly worked for Chinese intelligence from 2002, including while he was an aide to the Alternative for Germany (AfD) MEP Krah between 2019 and 2024. Jian G. is accused by prosecutors in Dresden of using that position to pass on information about debates and decisions at the European Parliament, as well as some documents deemed highly sensitive. He is also suspected of being the handler for a second alleged operative, Chinese national Yaqi X., who is accused of spying on elements of the German arms industry. Jian G. is also suspected of gathering intelligence on leading AfD politicians and spying on Chinese dissidents in Germany. This included posing as an opponent of the Chinese government on social media in order to gain contacts in the opposition scene. The second defendant, Yaqi X., worked at a company which provided Leipzig airport with logistics services and is accused of helping Jian G. access information on flights and passengers. The information she passed on focused on flights transporting defence equipment and 'people with links to a German arms company'. According to German media reports, she particularly targeted arms giant Rheinmetall, which is involved in making Leopard tanks and which uses Leipzig airport for cargo flights. AfD 'power struggle' Both defendants have been in detention since they were arrested last year. The trial could be particularly embarrassing for the AfD if it leads to the information Jian G. collected on the party becoming public. According to news weekly Der Spiegel, investigators have seized records that Jian G. kept of conversations with Krah and other AfD politicians in which they discussed the private life of party co-leader Alice Weidel and alleged power struggles with her colleague Tino Chrupalla. Krah denied to the magazine ever having discussed such matters with Jian G. Krah was the AfD's top candidate in last year's European elections, but was excluded from its delegation after comments in which he minimised the crimes of the Nazis' notorious SS. However, he was welcomed back into the AfD fold for this year's German general election and now sits as one of the party's MPs in the Bundestag. The trial is expected to last until the end of September and Krah himself has been called to appear as a witness. Krah is also being investigated by prosecutors in Dresden on suspicion of money laundering and corruption during his time as a member of the European Parliament. According to Der Spiegel, between 2019 and 2023 he received more than 50,000 euros (US$57,900) in payments from firms linked to Jian G. Krah denies all wrongdoing and says the accusations against him are 'politically motivated'.
AllAfrica
6 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Why Trump shouldn't attend Xi's 'Victory Day' parade
As rumors swirl about President Donald Trump possibly attending China's 'Victory Day' parade this September, it's worth sounding an alarm. Such a visit to Beijing would be a strategic blunder that undermines Washington's Indo-Pacific posture, undercuts American allies and sends a troubling message to the wider world. On its face, this kind of diplomatic invitation may be tempting at this delicate juncture in bilateral relations. Trump has long shown an affinity for grand displays of military prowess, high-stakes diplomacy and face-to-face theatrics. A handshake with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in front of goose-stepping soldiers might make for dramatic television. If Beijing officials dangle the promise of a new trade agreement, it might even be a transactional win. But the costs would far outweigh the optics. First, there is the history and symbolism of Victory Day itself. China's September 3 commemoration is not merely a celebration of the end of World War II. It's a well-worn anti-Japanese ritual. While framed as a tribute to China's role in defeating fascism, the parade often serves as a thinly veiled nationalist spectacle aimed at disparaging modern Japan and legitimizing the Communist Party's historical narrative. This is not to suggest that Japan's actions during World War II were innocent or justified — far from it. But China's Victory Day parade is more about nationalist messaging and historical revisionism than sober remembrance, and ultimately aims to serve Beijing's current strategic goals. The irony is that most of the conventional resistance to Japan came not from Mao Zedong's Communist forces, but from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army — the same Nationalists who later fled to Taiwan. By standing alongside Xi and possibly even Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump would risk endorsing this misleading version of history. That, in turn, would alienate two of America's strategic partners in East Asia, namely Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan, in particular, would have reason to feel betrayed. Its very identity is rooted in the struggle against the same Chinese Communist Party that now seeks to erase its role, and seemingly its existence, from the annals of history. South Korea, too, would draw the wrong conclusions. Lee Jae-myung, the left-leaning president, has reportedly decided not to attend the same ceremony as a quiet signal of the importance of maintaining his country's alignment with Washington. Trump's presence could undercut this calculation, emboldening voices within Seoul that favor a tilt toward Beijing. It would surely sow confusion among American allies in East Asia at a time when Washington is demanding their deeper support for its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China. There is also precedent to consider. In 2015, then-President Park Geun-hye of South Korea attended the same parade as the only US ally to do so. While she sought to strike a delicate diplomatic balance, the visit spectacularly backfired. Her decision raised significant eyebrows in Washington and Tokyo, and the political backlash at home was even greater. To this day, her appearance standing between Putin and Xi atop Tiananmen Tower is remembered not as a diplomatic gambit but as a major miscalculation. The stakes in 2025 are even higher. The world is witnessing the most dangerous moment for the global order since the end of the Cold War. China is waging an economic war against the West and flirting with military adventurism in the Taiwan Strait. Russia, meanwhile, remains entrenched in a war of aggression in Ukraine. For Trump to attend a parade that implicitly legitimizes both of these regimes would hand Beijing and Moscow a propaganda victory. Even more troubling is the message it would send about America's military posture in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese military parades prominently feature missiles and weapons systems explicitly designed to threaten US bases, forces and partners, including in Guam, Japan and Taiwan. Trump's attendance at the celebration could be interpreted as tacit approval of Beijing's growing ambitions and invite serious doubt about Washington's security resolve. There is also the potential domestic political cost. Trump built his election campaign on confronting China, restoring American strength, and putting 'America First.' Attending a parade that glorifies communist China's military might would hand his critics a damning visual contradiction. To national security conservatives and China hawks, it could look like a compromise of the very principles Trump claims to represent and defend. It would likewise undercut the recent efforts of Republican foreign policy voices such as Elbridge Colby and Brian Mast, who have been urging America's East Asian allies to take on a more assertive role in Washington's broader efforts to counterbalance China. Trump would thus be well advised to stay home on September 3. Kenji Yoshida is a Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward
